North Korea’s leadership has spent decades making blood-curdling threats. Now armed with nuclear warheads, they routinely warn of turning cities into ash. But is it all bluster, or would Pyongyang really “press the button” first? In this Deep Dive, we explore North Korea’s philosophy, its leader’s mindset, and its strategic calculus to ask: would Kim Jong Un actually launch a nuclear first strike?

North Korea’s Sabre-Rattling vs. Reality

North Korea is notorious for its fiery rhetoric. State media often vows to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames,” a threat first issued in 1994 and repeated during subsequent crises[1][2]. In 2017, amid heightened tensions with Washington, Pyongyang even warned it would make the US “suffer in endless fear” with its missiles[3]. Such threats of nuclear war are designed to terrify adversaries. Yet for all the bluster, North Korea has never actually used a nuclear weapon (nor any weapon of mass destruction) in conflict. This contrast raises an intriguing question: how serious is Pyongyang about initiating nuclear hostilities?

Analysts generally assess that North Korea’s nuclear sabre-rattling is primarily a deterrent – a way to prevent attacks on itself – rather than a genuine intent to start an unwinnable war. As one expert noted, “the danger that North Korea would launch a nuclear first strike against the United States or its allies… is relatively small.” Pyongyang claims its nuclear arsenal’s purpose is to deter a more powerful U.S. from invading or toppling the regime[4]. In other words, North Korea’s leadership may be ruthless, but they are not suicidal. Kim Jong Un knows that a nuclear first strike on South Korea, Japan, or the U.S. would invite a devastating retaliation that could annihilate his government. Indeed, North Korea’s goal in going nuclear has been regime survival, not martyrdom.

At the same time, we cannot dismiss Pyongyang’s threats as pure empty theatre. The regime has carefully cultivated an image of volatility to keep opponents guessing. By brandishing nukes so frequently, North Korea hopes to “deter the more powerful United States from launching a nuclear or conventional war against it”[5]. The strategy has a logic: if Kim can make Washington doubt whether defending South Korea is worth risking, say, Los Angeles, then he might restrain U.S. action. This dynamic is known as “decoupling” – sowing fear that North Korea could strike the American homeland and thus deter U.S. retaliation on behalf of its allies[6][7]. It’s a high-stakes gamble, but one Pyongyang has signalled repeatedly. In fact, North Korean propaganda openly touts the country’s willingness to strike first. One recent propaganda poster showed missiles raining down on the U.S. with the caption: “Start a war against us… We strike the American bastards first!”[8]. Such rhetoric is intended to instil fear that Pyongyang might actually pull the trigger.

So, would it? History provides some clues. In past showdowns, North Korea has often marched to the brink – then stopped short of the point of no return. For example, in 2017 Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Trump exchanged threats of nuclear “fire and fury,” raising global alarm[9]. North Korea even drew up plans to launch missiles near Guam (a U.S. territory) before ultimately refraining[10]. Time and again, Pyongyang’s pattern has been to create a crisis, wring out concessions or display its might, and then de-escalate before full war erupts. This suggests a cold logic behind the heated words. Deterrence – frightening enemies to prevent war – seems to be Pyongyang’s main aim, rather than commencing an apocalyptic fight it knows it would likely lose[11]. As we will see, North Korea’s ideology, its leadership, and its military strategy all revolve around survival. The bombast serves that survival by keeping foes at bay. But if that survival were threatened, the bluster could turn deadly real.

Juche, Songun, and the Cult of War

To understand North Korea’s potential for a first strike, one must grasp its guiding ideology and indoctrination. The regime’s philosophy is a heady mix of Juche (self-reliance) and Songun (military-first policy), infused with a siege mentality. North Koreans are taught from birth that they are under constant threat from hostile foreign forces, and that their very existence hinges on defying these enemies. In this worldview, nuclear weapons loom large as the ultimate shield of national sovereignty – almost a sacred object.

The country’s propaganda and education relentlessly glorify military might and loyalty. North Korean soldiers and citizens alike are exhorted to show fanatical devotion to the Supreme Leader and the motherland. Slogans in Pyongyang literally call for turning people into human weapons. “Let us become human bombs to devotedly defend Respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un!” declares one official slogan[12]. Another urges citizens to be “iron shields… to the death” protecting the Party and nation[13]. The code of honour in the Korean People’s Army preaches absolute obedience and courage unto death in defence of the leader. Self-sacrifice is celebrated as the highest virtue. In Korean War museums and school textbooks, students learn that martyrs who died fighting American “imperialists” are national heroes whose example must be followed. All of this builds a psychological groundwork where, at least in theory, fighting a cataclysmic war is preferable to defeat or dishonour.

North Korea’s military doctrine also reflects this militant ethos. In recent years, Pyongyang has explicitly embraced the notion of using nuclear arms not just as a last resort, but as practical weapons on the battlefield. In 2022, the regime even passed a law codifying scenarios for preemptive nuclear strikes “to protect itself” and “gain the upper hand during a war,” spelling out conditions under which it might launch first[14]. These include retaliating against an imminent WMD attack, targeting enemy leadership if the regime is imperilled, or using nukes to prevent the expansion of a conventional conflict[15]. Such doctrine is striking – it treats nuclear weapons as usable tools, not just a doomsday deterrent[16]. It implies North Korea believes a limited nuclear war could be fought and survived, for example by nuking U.S. bases in Asia or South Korean forces to blunt an invasion[17]. This stands in contrast to most other nuclear-armed states, which publicly downplay any intent to actually fire nuclear weapons except in retaliation. For Pyongyang, nukes are woven into warfighting plans as the “ultimate trump card” against superior conventional foes[18].

Of course, external analysts strongly doubt North Korea could escape doom if it fires the first nuclear shot. Any nuclear use by Pyongyang would almost certainly trigger massive U.S. retaliation, ending the regime[19]. But internally, the North’s propaganda does not emphasize that part. Instead, it tells a story of a righteous nation that, though outgunned in normal arms, can terrorise its enemies into backing off by wielding a nuclear dagger. This narrative is reinforced by historical analogies: the idea that nuclear-armed states don’t get invaded. The fates of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi – both overthrown after abandoning their WMD programs – are constantly cited by North Korean media as cautionary tales. Kim Jong Un is said to have learned “the lesson of Libya”: never give up your nukes, or you’ll suffer Gaddafi’s fate[20]. He has even enshrined North Korea’s nuclear status in the constitution and declared it “irreversible,” with “never… any declaration of giving up our nukes”[21]. This all-or-nothing mindset suggests that if Kim ever felt disarmed or cornered, he might indeed choose to “go down swinging” with nuclear fire – because living without nuclear power is, to him, no life at all.

Kim Jong Un: The Man Behind the Bomb

Any decision to start a nuclear war ultimately comes down to the man at the top. Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s 39-year-old Supreme Leader, commands a personality cult as absolute as those of his father and grandfather. Understanding Kim’s upbringing and lifestyle is key to gauging his risk appetite. Unlike his predecessors, Kim has had a taste of the wider world. As a child, he spent years studying in Switzerland under a pseudonym[22][23], where he was exposed to Western culture – everything from NBA basketball to fast food and modern amenities. Classmates recall him as a shy boy who loved American action movies and the Chicago Bulls. This overseas stint gave Kim a window (albeit a limited one) into life beyond the North Korean bubble.

Yet, far from transforming him into a reformer, Kim Jong Un has emerged as an even more iron-fisted ruler than his father in some respects. Since taking power in 2011, he has ruthlessly eliminated potential rivals (even executing his own uncle and ordering the assassination of his half-brother abroad). He has also accelerated the nuclear and missile programs that his father began. In many ways, Kim’s character seems a mix of brutal pragmatism and inherited paranoia. On one hand, those who have met him describe him as calculating and not irrational – “brutally rational,” as one analysis put it[24]. His overriding goal is regime survival and personal power, and he has demonstrated a keen instinct for self-preservation. He enjoys a life of luxury – from palaces and private resorts to imported liquor and gourmet cheese – and maintaining that lifestyle depends on keeping his regime intact. This suggests Kim is unlikely to recklessly commit national suicide by initiating a nuclear holocaust that would end his reign and creature comforts.

On the other hand, Kim’s background has also immersed him in the Kim dynasty’s revolutionary mythology. He grew up hearing how his grandfather Kim Il Sung fought the Japanese and Americans, and how only the Kim family’s “military-first” leadership can protect Korea. Inside North Korea, Kim Jong Un lives in an echo chamber of flattery and doctored reality, where his absolute authority is never questioned. His worldview is shaped by regime propaganda as much as it is by any memories of Swiss school. He may understand the outside world better than his father did – he has met foreign leaders, from China’s Xi Jinping to U.S. President Trump – but Kim still channels a profound distrust of outsiders. He often cites the examples of countries that gave up nuclear arms and then fell (Ukraine, for instance) as justification never to disarm[25]. In a 2022 speech, he proclaimed North Korea’s nuclear status “irreversible” and vowed “there will never be any bargaining over our nukes.”[26]

Importantly, Kim Jong Un holds sole authority over North Korea’s nuclear trigger[27]. The recent nuclear doctrine law explicitly states that only the Supreme Leader can order a nuclear strike. However, if Kim were in danger of being killed by an enemy “decapitation” strike, the law provides for nuclear launch “automatically and immediately” via pre-set plans[28]. This reveals Kim’s acute fear of being taken out before he can act – and his desire to convince enemies that even if he is eliminated, North Korea’s nukes will still fire. It’s a macabre failsafe intended to deter any attempt on his life or a coup. For Kim personally, this means he lives with the knowledge that if war comes to his doorstep, he might as well use every weapon he has, because defeat likely means death.

So, would Kim trade his throne and life for a burst of nuclear glory? Probably not in any scenario short of regime collapse. Observers generally believe Kim Jong Un enjoys his lifestyle too much and is rational enough to know that a spontaneous nuclear war would cost him everything. As U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said in 2017, Kim “has no death wish” and Americans “should sleep well at night” because Kim won’t strike first without cause[29]. But – and it’s a big but – if Kim becomes convinced that war with the U.S. is inevitable or that his days are numbered, his calculation could change dramatically. In that desperate moment, his rationality might drive him to use nuclear weapons first not out of madness, but cold logic that it’s his best chance to survive.

Facing the United States, South Korea, and Japan

North Korea’s strategic calculus cannot be separated from the adversaries it faces. The United States is painted as Pyongyang’s ultimate foe – the giant that seeks to strangle North Korea through sanctions, military pressure, and alliance with South Korea and Japan. North Korean media constantly remind the populace that the Korean War (1950-53) ended not in victory but in an armistice, and that U.S. troops remain in South Korea to this day, poised to invade again at any time. This sense of an unfinished war deeply influences Pyongyang’s stance. Every year, when the U.S. and South Korea conduct joint military exercises, North Korea fulminates that these are rehearsals for invasion. The Kim regime’s narrative is that its nuclear weapons alone prevent a second Korean War, by making any U.S.-led attack too costly.

From Washington’s perspective, of course, the U.S. has no desire to initiate a war on the Korean Peninsula – doing so would be catastrophically costly in lives (especially South Korean) and economically. But Pyongyang either does not believe this, or finds it useful to pretend not to. Kim Jong Un likely genuinely fears the fate of Saddam and Gaddafi. He watched the U.S. overthrow those dictators once they were defenceless. And he watched the U.S. diplomatically isolate and sanction North Korea for years. So however inaccurate it may be, North Korea’s leadership perceives an ever-present threat from the U.S. As one Council on Foreign Relations brief put it, Kim has seen that “governments in Ukraine, Iraq, and Libya [were] overthrown after giving up their nuclear weapons… and he is determined not to make the same mistake.”[30] It’s a classic security dilemma: the more threatened Kim feels by America, the more he clings to nukes – which in turn heightens U.S. concern.

South Korea and Japan, North Korea’s immediate neighbours, also factor into this equation. Both are long-time foes in Pyongyang’s official ideology. South Korea (the Republic of Korea) is ruled by “puppets” of Washington, in the North’s view, and lacks legitimacy. Japan, which brutally colonized Korea in the early 20th century, is vilified as a mortal enemy second only to the U.S. North Korea’s missiles frequently fly in Japan’s direction (sometimes literally over Japanese territory, triggering alerts)[31]. And Pyongyang has threatened to “sink Japan into the sea” during past tirades. The North Korean leadership likely calculates that a nuclear strike on U.S. bases in Japan or on Tokyo itself would cripple the U.S.-Japan alliance and shock Washington into hesitation. Similarly, nuking South Korea (for instance, U.S. forces stationed in Korea, or even Seoul) is seen as a way to shatter the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In a warped way, Kim Jong Un could imagine a scenario where a sudden nuclear blow against the South might cow the Americans into backing off, fearing further strikes on their own cities. This thinking underpins what experts call an “asymmetric escalation” strategy – hit the enemy’s allies or forces with nukes early, then threaten the enemy’s homeland to deter all-out retaliation[32].

Indeed, this strategy has parallels in other states. France during the Cold War, and Pakistan vis-à-vis India, have espoused the idea of using nuclear weapons first if overwhelmed conventionally[33]. North Korea appears to have embraced a similar doctrine. Kim’s bet would be that the U.S. is not willing to trade Los Angeles for Seoul. By holding American cities at risk with a few ICBMs, he hopes to “make America think twice” about fully retaliating[34]. As The DEFCON Warning System analysis noted, North Korea has in effect created a “mini-MAD” with the United States: Washington knows attacking North Korea could invite nuclear strikes on U.S. allies or even the U.S. mainland, while Pyongyang knows using nukes offensively would mean its own destruction[35]. The balance is horribly lopsided in capability – North Korea has only a few dozen warheads versus America’s thousands – but even a small chance of Los Angeles or New York being nuked is usually enough to give any U.S. president pause.

So far, this ugly equilibrium has held; despite extreme threats, North Korea hasn’t followed through on nuclear attack, likely because even Kim & his generals fear the consequences[36]. But the danger lies in misjudgement or miscalculation. In a fast-moving conflict, Kim could believe he has a fleeting chance to “decouple” the U.S. from its allies by using nukes first. Conversely, U.S. or South Korean leaders, fearing Kim might do just that, could feel pressure to strike first themselves in a crisis – a recipe for disaster. The adversarial dynamic on the peninsula is like a high-stakes poker game, with bluff and belief tightly interwoven. North Korea wants its foes to believe it will indeed fire nuclear weapons if pushed; its foes want North Korea to believe they’ll retaliate if it does. As long as both sides believe and fear the other, deterrence holds. The worry is if either side stops believing – or if Pyongyang talks itself into a corner where not using the Bomb would make it lose face.

“Friends” You Can’t Fully Trust: China and Russia

If North Korea ever contemplates a first strike, one more factor could weigh in: its so-called allies. China and Russia are often seen as North Korea’s patrons on the world stage. Kim Jong Un undoubtedly counts on their diplomatic cover to some extent. China provides a vital economic lifeline, accounting for the vast majority of North Korea’s trade and aid. Russia, too, has grown friendlier of late, with reports of arms deals (North Korean ammunition reportedly feeding Russia’s war in Ukraine) and political camaraderie against the West. However, when it comes to all-out war, especially nuclear war, Pyongyang likely harbours no illusions that Beijing or Moscow would sacrifice themselves on its behalf.

Historically, China fought alongside North Korea in the Korean War, but that was 70 years ago under very different circumstances. In the generations since, Chinese support for Pyongyang has been pragmatic and limited. Beijing’s primary interest is stability – it does not want a war or a collapse in North Korea that could send refugees flooding across the border and eliminate a buffer state. But China also does not want to be dragged into a nuclear Armageddon. Tellingly, in 2017 a Chinese state-run newspaper (often used to signal official thinking) warned that China would stay neutral if North Korea struck first and the U.S. retaliated[37]. “China should make clear that if North Korea launches missiles that threaten U.S. soil first and the U.S. retaliates, China will stay neutral,” the paper wrote[38]. However, it also added that if the U.S. and South Korea tried to overthrow Kim’s regime, China would intervene to prevent that[39]. In essence, Beijing was saying: Pyongyang, don’t start a fight expecting us to bail you out; but Washington, don’t try to eliminate North Korea either. For Kim Jong Un, this message would have been sobering – his most important ally publicly hinting it won’t have his back if he fires the first shot.

Russia’s support is even less certain. While Moscow and Pyongyang have a defence treaty with North Korea today, the treaty is fashioned in such a way to give Russia a lot of wiggle room when it comes to actually committing forces. Russia under Putin has shown some solidarity – for example, vetoing or weakening some UN sanctions – but it has also approved many UN sanctions against North Korea in the past, especially after nuclear tests. Like China, Russia’s priority is avoiding chaos on the Korean Peninsula, not abetting a North Korean offensive war. If Kim launched a nuclear strike, it is highly doubtful that Russian forces would join the fray. At most, Moscow might condemn U.S. retaliation or try to broker ceasefires, but it would not trade Moscow or Vladivostok for Pyongyang. North Korean officials are well aware of this reality. They prize their independence fiercely (Juche is all about self-reliance) and have historically distrusted even their communist allies. Kim Il Sung skilfully played China and the Soviet Union against each other to extract aid, but he never fully trusted either. Kim Jong Un is likely similarly wary. He certainly values Chinese and Russian support to withstand Western pressure, but when the “proverbial chips are down,” North Korea stands essentially alone.

This realization might actually increase Pyongyang’s inclination to threaten nuclear strikes. Knowing that no big brother will fight for them, the North Korean leadership leans even harder on its own nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor – the equalizer that means North Korea doesn’t need someone else’s army to rescue it. However, the flip side is also true: without any ironclad allies, if Kim starts a nuclear war, no one is likely to come save him. This isolation could make him more cautious about plunging into a conflict he can’t win solo.

Would They Really “Press the Button” First?

Taking into account all the above – the ideology, the leadership psyche, the enemies and lack of reliable friends – we arrive back at the core question. Would North Korea (or more precisely, Kim Jong Un) actually launch a nuclear first strike? The answer is nuanced. Under most circumstances, no – Pyongyang’s nuclear threats are intended to deter and coerce, not to be acted upon preemptively. But under some extreme circumstances, yes – North Korea might strike first if the regime believed it had no other option to survive.

The extreme scenarios essentially boil down to regime survival. North Korea might consider a nuclear first use if:

• Imminent Invasion or Attack: If Kim becomes convinced beyond doubt that the U.S. (with South Korea) is about to attack or invade, he might try to preempt it with nuclear strikes. The 2022 nuclear doctrine explicitly allows a preemptive strike if a “fatal military attack” on North Korea’s strategic targets is judged to be imminent[40]. Kim could decide to hit U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan (and perhaps Guam) with nuclear missiles at the outset of war, aiming to throw U.S. plans into disarray. The logic, as described by one expert, would be to “use one set of nuclear devices to stave off the conventional invasion, and hold in reserve longer-range devices to threaten the enemy’s cities”[41]. By doing so, Kim would hope to force a stalemate, essentially saying: I can devastate your regional forces now, and I have ICBMs for your homeland next – so back off. It is a desperate gambit, but if the alternative Kim sees is a 100% chance of being overthrown, he may judge this gambit has a slim chance to save him.
• Decapitation Threat: If there were intelligence of an impending strike to kill Kim or sever his command (a so-called decapitation strike), North Korea might launch nukes immediately. In fact, Pyongyang has warned that “a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately” if the leadership comes under attack[42]. They would likely target the sources of that threat – for example, U.S. aircraft carriers, command centres in South Korea, etc. The grim automaticity of that clause is meant to deter any attempt to take out Kim preemptively. Essentially, “if you come for me, we’ll go down firing nuclear weapons.”
• Internal Collapse or Coup: This scenario is less talked about, but if the regime were imploding internally (say a coup by other elites or widespread revolt) and Kim somehow retained loyalty of nuclear units, he might consider lashing out externally to force reunification of the people against a common enemy. Launching a nuclear strike in such chaos would be an extreme act – essentially an “Samson option” of bringing the temple down with him. Some analysts doubt the military would follow launch orders in a coup scenario, but it cannot be entirely ruled out if hardliners prevailed.

Outside of these nightmare scenarios, North Korea has little incentive to fire first. The leadership knows it cannot “win” a full nuclear war against the U.S. and its allies – doing so would be national suicide. Kim Jong Un’s own hope for survival hinges on avoiding any situation where the U.S. would feel compelled to unleash its far superior nuclear arsenal on Pyongyang. As a result, North Korea’s aggression is typically calibrated: bold enough to scare and provoke, but cautious enough to stop short of forcing the other side’s hand. Kim wants to enjoy many years of comfortable rule, not a last stand in a bunker. His nuclear weapons are meant to ensure he gets those years by keeping enemies at bay.

That being said, the risk of a first strike is not zero. One big risk factor is miscalculation. War on the Korean Peninsula could break out not by grand design but by accident or escalation of a small clash. For instance, a conventional skirmish at sea or a border incident could spiral. If North Korea were losing a conventional battle or if communications broke down, Kim might resort to nukes in panic, even if neither side intended all-out war at the start. The fog of war could lead Pyongyang to wrongly perceive an incoming attack and “use or lose” its nuclear forces. North Korea’s doctrine even allows nuclear use to “take the initiative in war” if needed[43], which is worryingly open-ended. The constant threat posturing could also corner Kim rhetorically – if he threatens to nuke over something and the adversary doesn’t back down, he faces a lose-lose choice of either using a nuke (and inviting doom) or eating his words (and losing face). As one analysis noted, the more frequently nuclear threats are issued, the greater the risk that someday a leader “talks himself into a corner” where firing one seems necessary to save credibility[44].

Finally, it’s worth noting that North Korea’s capabilities, while growing, are still limited. As of 2025, estimates suggest North Korea has on the order of 50 nuclear warheads assembled[45], with potentially material for a few dozen more[46]. It has various delivery systems – short-range missiles that can hit South Korea and Japan, and a few long-range ICBMs that might reach the U.S. mainland[47]. It is also reportedly developing tactical nuclear warheads for battlefield use[48]. However, this arsenal is small compared to the U.S. (or even China/Russia). Kim likely cannot destroy the United States, but he can inflict unacceptable damage to cities like Seoul, Tokyo, and maybe one or two American cities. North Korea’s hope is that this threat is enough to deter any rational opponent[49]. Conversely, if Kim actually executed a first strike, he would have used up his trump card – and would have to pray that threat of a second strike (if he kept some warheads in reserve) would halt the war. It’s a highly uncertain bet, which is why so far, even Kim’s aggressive posture has come with restraint: he brandishes nukes to get concessions and security, not to invite annihilation.

Lessons from History’s Close Calls

Looking back at North Korea’s track record in confrontations, a pattern emerges that informs our assessment of a first strike. Over the decades, North Korea has provoked and attacked in limited ways, but always stopped short of actions that would bring about its own destruction. During the Cold War, Kim Il Sung orchestrated incidents like the 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo (an American spy ship) and the 1976 ax-murder of U.S. officers in the DMZ, testing Washington’s resolve. Each time, the situation was defused – often after the U.S. showed force but also exercised restraint. North Korea learned that it could get away with certain aggressions as long as it didn’t cross the threshold that would trigger full-scale U.S. military retaliation.

In more recent times, North Korea has maintained this brinkmanship strategy. In 2010, it sank a South Korean navy ship (the Cheonan) and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing soldiers and civilians. South Korea was enraged, but a wider war was avoided; Pyongyang achieved a moment of terror and then quieted down. In 2013, after its third nuclear test, North Korea declared a “state of war” with the South and cut hotlines – yet no actual war erupted, and eventually tensions eased. The 2017 nuclear crisis is perhaps the most instructive. That year, North Korea tested its most powerful nuclear bomb to date and launched long-range missiles, claiming the ability to strike the U.S. mainland. President Trump responded with unprecedentedly bellicose language, at one point tweeting that his nuclear button was “much bigger” than Kim’s. The region held its breath through months of missile flights and bombastic threats. Many wondered if miscalculation or pride would lead to catastrophe. But ultimately, by early 2018, Kim switched gears to diplomacy – suddenly extending an olive branch that led to summits with South Korea’s president and with Trump. The crisis subsided as quickly as it had escalated. Kim extracted the prestige of being treated as an equal on the world stage, without having fired an actual shot in anger.

The 2017 episode suggests that Kim is willing to walk up to the brink of war but also to step back when it suits his interests. He achieved a major goal (demonstrating nuclear ICBM capability and forcing the U.S. to the negotiating table) without actually starting a war he couldn’t win. This reinforces the idea that North Korea’s leadership, however militant, is fundamentally calculating. They will push their luck, but not to the point of self-destruction – unless they miscalculate or feel cornered. It’s a dangerous game, but one they have played for decades.

Crucially, nuclear weapons have made this game both safer and more dangerous. Safer, because the existence of nukes deters both sides from actually igniting a huge war (indeed, since obtaining nuclear capability, North Korea has not fought any large-scale conventional battles with the South – deterrence has frozen the conflict at a stalemate). But also more dangerous, because if war does break out, the risk of it going nuclear is extremely high. In a conventional clash now, Pyongyang would quickly face defeat due to South Korea’s and America’s superior forces – thus Pyongyang would be highly incentivized to use nukes early. As one strategic assessment bluntly put it: “North Korea knows using nukes offensively would provoke U.S. retaliation that ends the regime… The danger is misjudgement: in a conventional war on the Korean Peninsula, Kim might use nukes rather than lose power”[50]. Each time North Korea and the U.S.-South Korea alliance approach the brink, the world holds its breath that cooler heads prevail once more.

Conclusion: On the Knife’s Edge of Deterrence

North Korea’s penchant for threatening nuclear Armageddon raises the spectre of a nightmare scenario – but the evidence suggests Pyongyang prefers survival over suicide. Kim Jong Un and his regime have a clear priority: preserve their rule and the nation’s sovereignty. Nuclear weapons are, in Pyongyang’s eyes, the ultimate guarantor of that goal. Thus far, North Korea has wielded its nuclear sword as a shield – a menacing deterrent to keep enemies from attacking, rather than a trigger to conquer new lands. All its fiery threats and “first strike” posturing serve to reinforce deterrence by convincing the world that Kim might just be crazy enough to do it. Paradoxically, by cultivating an image of irrational aggression, North Korea’s leaders behave quite rationally – they discourage any thought of regime change in Washington, Seoul, or Tokyo.

That said, the risk can never be dismissed. Pyongyang’s indoctrination of its military and citizens glorifies unwavering resistance and even preemptive attack under certain conditions. Its official doctrine now permits striking first if necessary to “gain the upper hand” in war[51]. Kim Jong Un’s personal exposure to foreign comforts might make him cautious, but his commitment to his family’s dynasty and fear of ending up like Gaddafi could drive him to extreme action if he believes his regime is about to fall. North Korea would likely only start a nuclear war if the leadership felt truly desperate – facing invasion, annihilation, or an existential threat. Under those dire circumstances, Kim might conclude that going nuclear is the only way to possibly survive or at least exact revenge. It would be a decision drenched in tragic logic: if we’re doomed anyway, take them with us; if there’s a slim chance to force a ceasefire by shocking the enemy, try it.

For now, though, such a scenario remains hypothetical. History’s close calls have so far bent away from disaster, guided by a mix of caution and chance. Deterrence, however uncomfortable, is still holding on the Korean Peninsula – neither North nor South (nor the U.S.) wants to commit national suicide. The Kim regime, for all its bombast, has reaped benefits from merely threatening nuclear war without actually unleashing it. There is an old saying: a barking dog doesn’t bite. North Korea’s bark is among the loudest on Earth. Its bite, we earnestly hope, will never come – because if it does, it would unleash unspeakable suffering on Koreans and their adversaries alike. In the end, Kim Jong Un is not eager to give up his luxurious life and total control in a blaze of radioactive glory. His nuclear arsenal is a means to ensure his regime’s longevity, not a tool for national suicide or unprovoked apocalypse.

Would North Korea actually consider a nuclear first strike? They consider it often – they plan, they posture, they prepare. But would they actually execute it? Only at the last extremity. Pyongyang knows that the first to shoot in a nuclear standoff also writes their own death warrant. As of now, Kim Jong Un appears content to keep polishing his gun, waving it around theatrically, but keeping the safety on. The world must continue to tread carefully, discourage miscalculations, and maintain strong deterrence – for as long as nuclear weapons remain entwined with the fate of the Korean Peninsula, we truly live on the knife’s edge of peace and catastrophe. The answer, then, is that North Korea could strike first under certain dire conditions, but it prefers not to as long as there is any other way to survive. In the high-stakes game of nuclear poker, Kim Jong Un is holding his cards, raising the bets, but hoping, like the rest of us, never to reach the final terrible showdown.

The article has been revised to correct some errors. Previously, the article said Donald Trump was a “former” president, and the article also stated there was no formal defense treaty between Russia and North Korea. The article has been updated to correct these errors.