Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Arsenal in 2025

Russia possesses the world’s largest inventory of tactical nuclear weapons – also known as non-strategic nuclear warheads – with current estimates ranging from roughly 1,500 to 2,000 warheads[i]. (For comparison, the United States has only a few hundred such weapons, primarily B61 gravity bombs, about half of which are forward-deployed at NATO bases in Europe[ii].) These Russian warheads are kept in central storage but can be assigned to a wide array of delivery systems. According to expert analyses, Russia’s stockpile includes warheads for short-range ballistic missiles (like the 9K720 Iskander-M), ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, gravity bombs deliverable by tactical fighter-bombers, and even nuclear-capable anti-ship, anti-air, anti-submarine, and air-defence missiles[iii]. During the Cold War the Soviet Union even developed nuclear artillery shells and land mines, and while many older systems have been retired, Russia today still fields modern equivalents – dual-use missiles and munitions designed for battlefield use rather than intercontinental strikes.

In terms of destructive power, Russia’s tactical nukes generally have lower yields than strategic warheads. Many are “dial-a-yield” designs that can be adjusted from sub-kiloton levels up to tens of kilotons of explosive force. For instance, warheads for the Iskander-M ballistic missile are reported to have yields in the 5–50 kiloton range[iv]. Free-fall nuclear bombs deployable by Russian tactical aircraft (such as Su-25 or Su-34 strike fighters) are believed to be smaller, often 10–20 kilotons or less[v]. (By comparison, the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945 was ~15 kilotons.) Some reports suggest certain “tactical” warheads could even achieve up to 100–300 kilotons of yield – many times the Hiroshima bomb’s power[vi] – although typical Russian battlefield nukes are thought to be on the lower end of the scale for more controlled, localized effects. In practical terms, even a 10–50 kt weapon could devastate several city blocks to a few square miles, so these weapons, while “tactical” in designation, are still extraordinarily destructive.

Reliability and maintenance. An important question is how reliable this arsenal remains, given the well-documented issues in Russia’s military-industrial complex (corruption, budget constraints, and maintenance lapses). Publicly available information provides a mixed picture. On one hand, Russia has emphasized modernization of its nuclear forces – including tactical systems – over the past decade. The Federation of American Scientists reports that Russia has been “introducing new types” of shorter-range nuclear-capable weapons even as the total number of non-strategic warheads slowly declined from Cold War levels[vii]. Many Soviet-era warheads have been retired and dismantled, and the current stockpile is composed of warheads either built or refurbished in recent decades. This suggests active upkeep. Indeed, Russia’s 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence (the branch responsible for nuclear weapon storage and maintenance) presumably gives high priority to ensuring these warheads remain functional. Western defence analysts note that nuclear weapons are a core national security asset and thus are likely insulated from the worst of Russia’s corruption and decay; the safety, security, and performance of the nuclear arsenal is maintained by dedicated personnel and protected funding, unlike some conventional military programs[viii][ix].

On the other hand, transparency is limited – Russia is not required to disclose the status of its tactical nukes, and uncertainties remain. Some observers have speculated that a portion of the stockpile may be aging or in less-than-perfect condition due to Russia’s economic troubles in the 1990s and sporadic funding in the 2000s. Warheads typically need periodic maintenance (for example, tritium, a gas used to boost nuclear detonations, must be replenished as it decays). If Russia’s capacity to produce warhead components or conduct rigorous testing has been constrained, some warheads might not perform at full yield. However, there is no hard evidence that Russia’s nuclear warheads have become “duds.” Russia continues to conduct subcritical nuclear tests and engineering trials to validate its warhead designs, and its leaders have expressed confidence in the arsenal. In short, while corruption and poor standards have undoubtedly hurt Russia’s conventional forces, its nuclear forces are considered a top-priority pillar of power. The credible consensus is that Russia’s tactical nukes would likely work if called upon, even if exact readiness levels are unknown. U.S. defence and intelligence estimates continue to treat Russia’s stockpile of roughly 1,000–2,000 non-strategic warheads as a very real factor in military planning[x].

Destructive Power and Intended Battlefield Roles

Russian military doctrine envisages tactical nuclear weapons as tools to gain advantage in regional or theatre conflicts where conventional forces alone might not suffice. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons (which are built to obliterate distant cities or enemy nuclear forces across the globe), tactical nukes are meant for use on the battlefield or against specific military targets. Their destructive power, while lower than strategic warheads, is still immense. A single tactical nuke could annihilate a large military formation or flatten a critical node of infrastructure in an instant, with a blast and thermal wave far beyond any conventional bomb. For example, a 50-kiloton warhead (the high end of many Russian tactical weapons) might have a blast radius only about 500 meters wider than the Hiroshima bomb’s – but that translates to a few kilometres of severe destruction, easily enough to wipe out an airbase or port facility[xi]. Even the lower-yield devices (1–5 kilotons) could destroy a hardened command post or a massed tank column, while also leaving lasting radiation fallout over the area.

Battlefield roles: Historically, the Soviet Union developed tactical nukes to offset NATO’s advantages in conventional precision weapons and to punch through NATO defences in a European war. Today, Russia’s tactical nuclear doctrine is often summarized by the phrase “escalate to de-escalate.” In essence, if faced with a losing conventional war, Russia might escalate by using a limited nuclear strike in order to shock the adversary into backing down, thus “de-escalating” the conflict on terms favourable to Moscow[xii]. This concept is reflected in Russian military writings that discuss using a demonstration blast or a single strike to stave off defeat. The intended targets in such a scenario would be military – for instance, a NATO carrier strike group at sea, a large troop concentration, or a key logistics hub – rather than an enemy’s major city (which would be more clearly strategic and world-altering). By striking a target that is militarily significant but not necessarily causing hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, Russian planners theorize they could signal resolve and raise the costs to the enemy, hoping the enemy would choose to cease hostilities rather than risk further nuclear exchange.

In practical terms, Russian tactical nukes in Europe would likely be used against NATO military assets or infrastructure critical to NATO’s fighting ability. Possible targets frequently discussed include: frontline bases or airfields (to destroy squadrons of aircraft on the ground and disable runways), major staging areas for NATO troops, supply depots or transportation nodes (railway junctions, bridges over which reinforcements and matériel flow), and naval assets like carrier or amphibious groups in the North Atlantic. For example, Russia could detonate a nuclear warhead over a NATO airbase in Eastern Europe, instantly destroying planes, fuel, and command centres at the facility. Or it might use an anti-ship missile with a nuclear warhead to obliterate a naval task force. Another conceivable use is an airburst over a sparsely populated area as a warning shot – demonstrating the willingness to use nuclear weapons without initially mass casualties, to push NATO to halt its advance.

Russia has also made moves to increase the readiness and regional presence of its non-strategic nukes. In 2023, President Putin announced deployment of tactical nuclear warheads to Belarus, a Russian ally bordering NATO territory. Warheads for Iskander-M missiles and aircraft-delivered bombs were reportedly moved to newly upgraded storage sites in Belarus[xiii]. The rationale was to forward-position these weapons as an added deterrent against Western intervention – effectively shortening the time it would take Russia to employ a tactical nuke in the European theatre. Russian forces have since conducted high-profile drills simulating the procedures for deploying and using tactical nukes, including exercises in 2024 that involved units in northwest Russia (near the NATO Baltic region) practicing loading “special” (nuclear-capable) warheads onto Iskander launchers and naval cruise missiles[xiv]. Such drills underscore the battlefield role these weapons play in Russian strategy: a last-resort but very real option to prevent defeat or to secure a decisive advantage in a conflict with NATO.

It’s worth noting that NATO, too, once planned for extensive battlefield nuclear use during the Cold War (when the West had thousands of tactical warheads in Europe). Today, however, NATO’s posture has changed: the U.S. maintains an estimated 100 B61 nuclear bombs in Europe for NATO’s use (at bases in five allied countries), and these gravity bombs – deliverable by allied fighter aircraft – are the only forward-deployed NATO nuclear arms[xv]. Other NATO nuclear powers, Britain and France, field mostly strategic weapons. In a scenario where Russia used tactical nukes in Europe, NATO could in theory respond with these B61 bombs; but they are fewer in number and would require sending allied aircraft into hostile airspace. In practice, NATO’s doctrine places heavy emphasis on conventional force response and the overwhelming strategic nuclear retaliatory capability of the U.S., UK, and France to deter Russian nuclear use. This contrast – Russia’s large and varied tactical arsenal vs. NATO’s much smaller tactical stockpile – is one reason the subject is so closely studied: it shapes the imbalance and calculations in any European conflict involving nuclear weapons.

Escalation Risks and Deterrence Considerations

Any Russian use of a tactical nuclear weapon would carry grave risks of escalation. Crossing the nuclear threshold for the first time since 1945 would shatter the post–World War II taboo and fundamentally “change the nature of the war,” as NATO officials warn[xvi]. Even if Russia’s initial strike were limited – say, a single low-yield blast against a military target – the immediate question becomes: what next? NATO’s likely response would be forceful, and while leaders might try to avoid an automatic nuclear reply, the situation could spiral rapidly.

NATO’s response and posture: NATO has consistently signalled that any nuclear weapon use by Russia would be met with “severe consequences”[xvii]. While exact response plans are classified (and deliberately kept ambiguous to complicate Russian decision-making), Western officials have hinted at overwhelming conventional retaliation. For example, this could include NATO directly entering the conflict with airstrikes to destroy the unit that launched the nuclear attack or other Russian military assets. In the context of Russia using a tactical nuke in Ukraine (which is not under NATO’s Article 5 umbrella), the U.S. and allies might still respond conventionally against Russian forces, aiming to punish the action without immediately escalating to nuclear exchange[xviii]. Indeed, analysis of potential Ukraine scenarios suggests NATO would bolster military aid to Ukraine and could conduct limited strikes on Russian forces in Ukraine or nearby, stopping short of a nuclear response unless Russia continued to use nuclear weapons[xix].

However, if Russia were to detonate a nuclear weapon against a NATO member’s territory or forces, the situation becomes far more perilous. An attack on NATO soil would trigger Article 5 consultations and very likely a direct NATO military engagement. At that point, NATO could consider a nuclear retaliation in kind. The alliance does possess U.S. nuclear forces that could be employed – for instance, a B61 bomb strike or the use of a low-yield warhead on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Current deterrence frameworks, including the U.S. Nuclear Posture, have been adjusted in recent years to strengthen this credibility (the U.S. even deployed a new low-yield Trident submarine warhead in 2020 to ensure Russia knows any limited nuclear use still can meet a proportional nuclear response). Western strategists stress that there is no guarantee a nuclear conflict would remain limited. Once one nuclear weapon is used, the fog of war and human fear factor come into play. Each side would be under pressure to deter the other from further strikes, possibly by demonstrating resolve – which could mean preparing their own nuclear forces for action or even using another nuclear weapon. The danger of tit-for-tat escalation leading to a strategic nuclear exchange (city-busting strikes) is the primary reason all nuclear-armed states, including Russia, have so far avoided any use of these weapons.

Deterrence theory and historical practice suggest that Russia is well aware of these risks. Moscow’s nuclear doctrine officially states that nuclear weapons could be used if the existence of the state is threatened or in response to massive aggression with WMDs or conventional forces. In other words, Russia paints nuclear use as a last resort. Russian leaders also know that employing a nuclear weapon would likely draw NATO directly into war and unite the world (even China and India have signalled opposition to any nuclear use in the Ukraine conflict). NATO’s own doctrine is to deter such Russian actions by making the costs unmistakably high. For instance, NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirmed that “the fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression.” In practice this means NATO wants to convince Russia that any nuclear attack will fail to cow the West and instead invite a stronger Allied response, possibly even the end of the Russian regime. As U.S. President Joe Biden put it in late 2022, referring to Putin’s nuclear threats: using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine would be an “incredibly serious mistake” and would entail catastrophic consequences for Russia – a message meant to keep Putin deterred.

Ultimately, the real risk in 2025 is not that Russia’s tactical nukes are used lightly – indeed, the threshold remains very high – but that their existence casts a constant shadow over any potential Russia-NATO clash. These weapons give Moscow a form of leverage, a frightening backstop in conflicts where Russia is outmatched conventionally. The danger is that in a moment of desperation, miscalculation, or perceived existential threat, Russian decision-makers could consider pulling that nuclear trigger, believing it might salvage a dire situation. Should that occur, the world would enter uncharted territory. Even a “small” nuclear detonation would break a 80-year precedent and force NATO and other nuclear powers to make fateful choices about retaliation. The scenario could escalate unpredictably – hence the steadfast efforts by NATO to reinforce deterrence and by the international community to warn Russia off any such course. All sides understand that a tactical nuclear strike would not be the end of a conflict, but rather the beginning of a far more dangerous phase. In the words of a NATO statement, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” and ensuring that Russia’s tactical nukes remain a theoretical menace and not a battlefield reality is a cornerstone of European security in 2025.

[i] Federation of American Scientists: Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons 2025

[ii] Newsweek: A comparison between the Russian and American stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons

[iii] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Russian nuclear weapons, 2025

[iv] ICAN: Nuclear weapons in Belarus: What we Know

[v] Ibid

[vi] Newsweek: A comparison between the Russian and American stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons

[vii] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Russian nuclear weapons, 2025

[viii] Federation of American Scientists: Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons 2025

[ix] Newsweek: A comparison between the Russian and American stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons

[x] Federation of American Scientists: Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Weapons 2025

[xi] Council on Foreign Relations: If Russia Goes Nuclear: Three Scenarios for the Ukraine War

[xii] Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey: Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike “De-escalation”

[xiii] ICAN: Nuclear weapons in Belarus: What we Know

[xiv] Reuters: Russia broadens tactical nuclear weapons drills

[xv] Newsweek: A comparison between the Russian and American stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons

[xvi] NATO: NATO’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

[xvii] Ibid

[xviii] Council on Foreign Relations: If Russia Goes Nuclear: Three Scenarios for the Ukraine War

[xix] Ibid