Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling has intensified since the onset of the Ukraine conflict, raising urgent questions about Moscow’s true intentions. President Vladimir Putin and other officials have repeatedly reminded the world of Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest – amid clashes with the West over Ukraine. At the same time, Russia has been rolling out new nuclear weapons and hypersonic delivery systems, deploying nuclear-capable missiles to tense hotspots, and revising its nuclear doctrine. Is this assertive nuclear posture in 2025 a credible threat of potential use, or a strategic bluff aimed at deterring Western intervention? This investigative article examines Russia’s current nuclear doctrine, its new “super-weapons,” regional deployments, and expert commentary to assess whether Moscow’s nuclear posturing is more bark or bite.

Evolution of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine

Russia’s official nuclear doctrine has undergone notable changes in recent years, especially in the wake of the Ukraine war. In late 2024, President Putin approved amendments to Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy that lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Under this revamped doctrine, Russia can consider a nuclear strike in response to a conventional attack on Russia or its ally Belarus if that attack “created a critical threat” to their sovereignty or territorial integrity. This marks a significant shift: previously, Russian doctrine reserved nuclear use mainly for retaliation against weapons of mass destruction or if the state’s very existence was at risk. Now, even a non-nuclear attack – if backed by a nuclear-armed NATO country – could theoretically trigger Russia’s atomic arsenal. Defense Minister (and Security Council head) Sergei Shoigu explicitly warned in 2025 that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons” if faced with Western aggression, citing these new doctrinal terms.

Such ambiguity is deliberate. Western analysts note that by introducing vaguer red lines, the Kremlin hopes to make NATO think twice about aiding Ukraine with advanced arms. For example, Moscow now frames Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with Western-supplied missiles as attacks “with the participation of a nuclear state,” implying they cross a joint threshold. The updated doctrine also extends Russia’s nuclear umbrella over Belarus, treating an attack on Belarus as an attack on Russia. Critics, however, question the credibility of these broadened threats. Steven Pifer, a former US ambassador and arms control expert, argues that using nuclear weapons in response to a limited conventional strike would be “fraught with political and military peril for Russia” – likely turning even friendly powers like China and India against Moscow. In Pifer’s view, Putin’s saber-rattling aims to scare the West, but the actual willingness to cross the nuclear threshold remains doubtful given the catastrophic consequences.

Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons and Hypersonic Systems

To bolster its nuclear deterrent (and its threats), Russia has been developing an array of next-generation weapons often described as “super weapons” by the media. These include hypersonic delivery vehicles and novel nuclear-powered systems announced by Putin in recent years. Here we break down some of the most prominent new weapons in Russia’s 2025 arsenal and how far along they are:

• Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle: The Avangard is a nuclear-capable boost-glide warhead that can ride the atmosphere at over 20 times the speed of sound, maneuvering to evade missile defenses. It entered limited service in late 2019 atop modified SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles. By the end of 2023, Russia had outfitted two missile regiments with Avangard-equipped ICBMs. Each Avangard can carry a warhead reportedly ~2 megatons in yield and can zigzag toward targets unpredictably. Plans are underway to deploy Avangard on the new RS-28 Sarmat heavy ICBM in the future. However, the Sarmat program has faced repeated delays – with only one successful test flight (in 2022) and several failures through 2024. Despite official claims that Sarmat was on “experimental combat duty,” analysts assess that no Sarmat missiles were operational as of early 2025 due to technical setbacks. This suggests that while Avangard is a real system, it remains deployed in very small numbers for now.
• Kinzhal and Zircon Hypersonic Missiles: Russia has also developed air- and sea-launched hypersonic missiles. The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (“Dagger”) is an air-launched ballistic missile, essentially an adapted Iskander missile, carried by MiG-31K fighter jets. It can fly at Mach 5–10 and is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Russia has used Kinzhal missiles in Ukraine for high-speed strikes, though mostly with conventional warheads. Notably, Ukraine claimed to intercept some Kinzhals in 2023 with Western air defenses, calling into question earlier claims of invincibility. The 3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon) is a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile. In January 2023, Putin deployed the frigate Admiral Gorshkov armed with Zircon missiles on a patrol to the Atlantic – a highly publicized signal of Russia’s new capability. Zircon missiles travel at over five times the speed of sound, with ranges around 1,000 km, and can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads. Putin lauded these weapons as having “no analogues in the world,” saying such hypersonics could reliably penetrate any existing missile defenses. Together with Avangard, systems like Kinzhal and Zircon form the centerpiece of Russia’s hypersonic arsenal aimed at offsetting U.S. and NATO technological advantages.
• Poseidon Nuclear Torpedo: Perhaps the most fearsome-sounding new weapon is the Poseidon – a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed autonomous torpedo (also known as Status-6 or “Kanyon”). This giant underwater drone is designed to carry a very high-yield warhead (potentially up to several tens of megatons) and detonate offshore, creating a radioactive tsunami to inundate coastal cities. Poseidon’s development has been shrouded in secrecy, but underwater tests began in 2018. In early 2023, Russian state media TASS claimed the first batch of Poseidon torpedoes had been produced and delivered for installation on the special-purpose submarine Belgorodr. The Belgorod, launched in 2019, is the first submarine built to carry Poseidons (up to 6 per sub) and has been undergoing trials in the Northern Fleet. Western analysts note there was an aborted Poseidon test in late 2022, followed by a reported test launch (using a mock-up) in early 2023. Full operational deployment is not expected until later in the decade – the Russian Navy projects initial Poseidon deployment by 2027. Nonetheless, the prospect of an “doomsday” torpedo has alarmed experts. A nuclear Poseidon strike could theoretically render large swathes of a coastline uninhabitable, though some question whether such a weapon would ever be used in practice or is mainly a psychological weapon.

• 9M730 Burevestnik Nuclear Cruise Missile: Another exotic project is the Burevestnik (“Storm Petrel”), a nuclear-powered cruise missile with essentially unlimited range. Nicknamed SSC-X-9 Skyfall by NATO, Burevestnik aims to circumvent missile defenses by flying under radar around the globe. However, it has encountered serious setbacks. Nearly a dozen test launches have ended in failure. One test missile was lost at sea, and a recovery operation in 2019 led to a deadly radioactive explosion at Nenoksa, killing five scientists and two soldiers. After a hiatus, there were signs of new tests: in 2023, satellite imagery hinted at an imminent Burevestnik test, and Putin later claimed a successful test had been conducted. He provided no details, and Western observers remain skeptical without concrete evidence. Notably, analysts identified a possible Burevestnik deployment site under construction in northern Russia: a remote area near the Vologda-20 nuclear weapons storage bunker, with clusters of launch pads thought to be for this missile. Construction started in 2021 and by late 2024 the site’s infrastructure (launch pads, support buildings) was largely in place. It is “highly unusual,” experts say, to build launch pads right next to a warhead storage depot, underscoring the experimental nature of this project. As of 2025, Burevestnik is not yet operational, but Russia’s persistence suggests it wants to eventually field this borderline-doomsday weapon despite the technical challenges.

In summary, Russia’s modernization drive is yielding qualitatively new nuclear systems, but many remain in prototype or limited deployment stages. Moscow has successfully deployed a few Avangard hypersonic gliders and is fielding hypersonic missiles like Kinzhal and Zircon, yet its more radical inventions (like Poseidon and Burevestnik) are likely still years from full service. Even conventional upgrades, such as the Sarmat ICBM, have been slower than planned. This mismatch between grand announcements and actual deployment has led some analysts to argue that Russia’s nuclear modernization is as much about messaging and deterrence value as it is about concrete military capability.

Forward Deployments in Kaliningrad, the Arctic, and Belarus

Beyond new hardware, Russia has also been repositioning nuclear-capable forces geographically. Key deployments in certain regions have strategic significance, either to NATO or to the Ukraine conflict. These moves are closely watched as indicators of intent. Below we examine three areas – the Kaliningrad exclave, the Arctic, and Belarus – where Russia’s nuclear-capable systems have raised tensions.

Kaliningrad: “Iskander” Missiles on NATO’s Doorstep

Kaliningrad is a small Russian territory on the Baltic Sea sandwiched between NATO countries (Poland and Lithuania). Despite its size, it packs a punch in military terms. Russia has turned Kaliningrad into a forward outpost bristling with advanced missiles – notably the 9K720 Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile system. The Iskander can launch missiles up to ~500 km, capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads. In recent years, Moscow has repeatedly deployed Iskander units to Kaliningrad, especially as relations with NATO soured. In early 2018, for example, Russia moved Iskander-M launchers into Kaliningrad on a presumably permanent basis, prompting protests from neighboring states. Russian officials claimed these deployments were a response to U.S. missile defense installations in Eastern Europe. NATO, however, viewed it as “aggressive military posturing,” since nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad put nearly all of Poland and the Baltic states within strike range in minutes.

Kaliningrad also hosts dual-capable bomber and naval units. Russia has upgraded an airbase there to accommodate MiG-31K interceptors armed with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles. (Notably, in 2022, three MiG-31K with Kinzhals were sent to Kaliningrad’s Chkalovsk airfield as a show of force.) In addition, Kaliningrad’s coastal defense and naval assets, including ships that can fire Kalibr cruise missiles, mean the exclave can serve as a local nuclear launchpad from land, air, or sea. This multilayered militarization led one report to dub Kaliningrad “Russia’s Missile Bastion in Europe.” For Russia, it is a strategic counterweight to NATO forces in the region. For NATO, it represents a thorny “A2/AD” (anti-access/area denial) bubble that could threaten alliance reinforcements in a crisis. The nuclear dimension – even if warheads are kept in central storage in Russia most of the time – adds a menacing backdrop to any military scenario involving Kaliningrad. It effectively reminds NATO that any conventional clash around the Baltics could carry the risk of escalation to the nuclear level, thus serving as a deterrent by fear.

The Arctic and Northern Fleet’s Nuclear Bastion

The Arctic region is another focal point of Russia’s strategic posture, albeit in a different way. Rather than new deployments per se, the Arctic is home to Russia’s longstanding Northern Fleet bases on the Kola Peninsula, which anchor Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. Russia operates 11 nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) across its fleets, and the most advanced of these – the Borei-class submarines – are increasingly active in Arctic waters. The Northern Fleet uses the Arctic Ocean as a protective bastion for these submarines, where they can hide under polar ice and remain out of reach of anti-submarine forces. In recent years, Russia has invested heavily in modernizing Arctic bases and infrastructure: building new icebreaker-equipped bases, airfields, and radar sites stretching along its northern coast. Some of this buildup is defensive (securing the warming Northern Sea Route), but it also supports nuclear forces. For instance, in 2021 the Borei-A class Knyaz Vladimir sub undertook an “unprecedented expedition under the ice,” a sign of Russia’s confidence in Arctic operations.

Russia regularly conducts nuclear war games in the Arctic as well. Each year, exercises like Grom (Thunder) feature the launch of ballistic missiles from submarines in the Barents Sea and cruise missiles from strategic bombers flying over polar regions. In one notable case in October 2022, Moscow publicized the test-launch of a Sineva SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) from the Arctic and a Yars ICBM from Plesetsk, as part of drills simulating a large-scale nuclear retaliation. Such drills are intended to demonstrate that Russia’s nuclear triad (land, sea, air) remains ready and that even if conflict is localized to Ukraine, Russia’s strategic forces worldwide are on alert. The Arctic, in essence, serves as Russia’s nuclear backyard – a remote stronghold from which it can threaten the United States and Canada (via the polar trajectory of ICBMs and SLBMs) and ensure a second-strike capability if Russia were attacked. NATO countries have taken note: Norway, the U.S., and others have stepped up Arctic patrols and intel gathering, wary of the quiet but potent nuclear deployments in the far north. While less in the media spotlight than Kaliningrad or Belarus, the Arctic deployments underscore Russia’s message that its nuclear reach extends globally, and its strategic forces are protected by geography.

Belarus: Stationing Tactical Nukes Abroad

Perhaps the most controversial recent development is Russia’s decision to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus. In March 2023, President Putin announced plans to station some Russian nuclear warheads on Belarusian soil – the first time since the 1990s that nuclear arms would be placed outside Russia’s own territory. This followed Belarus’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and a constitutional amendment in Minsk that year renouncing Belarus’s non-nuclear status. By summer 2023, construction of a nuclear weapons storage facility in Belarus was completed, and Belarusian crews had been trained to handle nuclear-capable systems. True to Putin’s word, by early 2024 Western officials confirmed that Russia had transferred a quantity of tactical nuclear warheads into Belarus. The warheads are to be kept under strict Russian control – Belarus does not have its own launch codes – but could be mated with delivery systems operated by Belarusian units. These include Belarus’s fleet of Su-25 ground attack jets (apparently modified to carry nuclear bombs) and the Iskander-M missile system that Russia provided to Belarus in 2022.

Moscow portrayed this deployment as a countermeasure against NATO. Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu said in 2023 that stationing nukes in Belarus was a response to “hostile actions” by the West and would “strengthen the Union State’s defense”. NATO, for its part, condemned the move but also downplayed its practical impact. Because Russia can already strike all of Europe from its territory, simply moving some warheads a few hundred kilometers west “does not drastically change” the military balance, according to NATO officials. The U.S. and allies labeled it “nuclear saber-rattling” – essentially a political signal aimed at sowing fear and discord within NATO. Indeed, the timing corresponded with heightened nuclear rhetoric by the Kremlin meant to dissuade Western support for Ukraine. Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko welcomed the nuclear sharing (even hinting he would use the weapons if Belarus were attacked), but most experts see Minsk as subservient in this arrangement. Control remains with Russia, and the credibility of using these Belarus-based weapons would still depend on decisions in Moscow. Still, the deployment breaks a decades-long nuclear taboo and brings Russian warheads closer to NATO’s eastern flank – a symbolic reminder of Moscow’s leverage. It also serves domestic propaganda, projecting Russia’s power and unity with Belarus against the West.

Threat or Bluff? Expert Perspectives on Moscow’s Posture

Is Russia truly prepared to employ nuclear weapons in the current conflict, or is it mainly bluffing to deter? Analysts and officials are divided, but most agree that the Kremlin’s nuclear threats must be taken seriously even if the likelihood of use remains low. Throughout 2022-2023, Putin and his top lieutenants made a series of thinly veiled nuclear warnings. For instance, Putin vowed to use “all means at our disposal” to defend Russia’s territory (a reference to nuclear arms) and announced the forward-deployment of nuclear arms as Western aid to Ukraine expanded. Such rhetoric led to intensive behind-the-scenes signaling: U.S. officials privately warned Moscow of severe consequences if it crossed the nuclear line, and public statements from Washington noted “no indications” of Russia preparing a strike even as the bluster peaked. By mid-2023, when Ukraine’s counteroffensives were underway and Putin’s earlier red lines (like attacks on Crimea) had been crossed without nuclear escalation, a narrative took hold in Western media that Putin had been “bluffing” all along. Indeed, Russia toned down its most extreme threats after September 2022, suggesting its nuclear saber-rattling succeeded in sowing caution – Western governments delayed certain heavy weapons deliveries to Ukraine, at least initially, out of fear of Russian reaction.

However, many experts urge caution against outright dismissal of Russia’s threats as empty. “Even a low probability of nuclear use is gravely concerning,” notes one Bulletin of Atomic Scientists analysis, because miscalculation or desperation could change the calculus quickly. Some Russian hawks, like strategist Sergey Karaganov, have even argued Russia should launch a “demonstration” nuclear strike in Europe to shock the West – an idea repudiated by most Russian officials but indicative of the discourse. On the whole, Western security analysts assess that Putin would resort to a nuclear weapon only under extreme circumstances (for example, if Russian forces were facing total defeat or if NATO openly entered the war). The costs of nuclear use – diplomatic isolation, probable NATO retaliation (even if non-nuclear), and loss of support from key countries like China – act as a strong deterrent on Moscow’s decision-making. Indeed, China has consistently warned against any use of nuclear arms, and Putin himself in late 2023 publicly noted there was “no need” to use nukes in Ukraine. This suggests that for all the fiery rhetoric, Russia’s leadership understands the taboo around nuclear weapons remains very much in effect.

In terms of credibility, Russia’s nuclear posture in 2025 walks a fine line. The deployments and doctrine changes are real – they enhance readiness and put more weapons in potential theaters of operation. The threats, too, are designed to be believable, to the point of ambiguity: by keeping the West guessing, the Kremlin hopes to deter Western actions that could seriously harm Russian interests. Yet, ambiguity cuts both ways. If a threat is seen as overblown or beyond what Putin would actually carry out, its deterrent value diminishes. Western governments have gradually called what they perceive as Putin’s bluff by increasing military aid to Ukraine (such as tanks, long-range missiles, and talk of fighter jets) despite Moscow’s warnings. So far, Russia has not escalated to nuclear use in response – indicating a reluctance to cross the threshold. This reinforces the view that Russia’s posture is largely strategic signaling. Still, nuclear deterrence is ultimately a mind game: as long as Russian officials can instill doubt and fear about “what if,” their nuclear arsenal will have achieved its purpose without ever leaving the storage bunker.

Conclusion: Russia’s nuclear posture in 2025 can be seen as both a real and a bluffing strategy – real in that Russia is undeniably improving its nuclear capabilities and is willing to brandish them, but a bluff in that actual use would be a lose-lose choice. By updating its doctrine and fielding new weapons, Moscow seeks to coerce and deter its adversaries amid a volatile confrontation in Europe. The threat of nuclear war, however distant, casts a long shadow, and that is precisely what the Kremlin counts on. For the general public and world leaders alike, the key is to parse the difference between posture and intention: Russia wants the strategic benefits of nuclear intimidation without the horrific reality of nuclear conflict. How long this delicate balance holds may depend on the course of the war in Ukraine and the resilience of international resolve. In the end, Russia’s nuclear stance – whether bluster or bona fide – reminds us that even 80 years after Hiroshima, the specter of the bomb still shapes global geopolitics. Each nuclear signal from Moscow must therefore be handled with utmost caution, calibrated neither to give in to fear nor to inadvertently provoke a disaster that all sides wish to avoid.

Footnotes:

1. Reuters – “Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons…,” April 24, 2025
2. PBS NewsHour (AP) – “Putin formally lowers threshold for using nuclear weapons,” Nov 19, 2024
3. Brookings – Pifer, Steven. “How credible is Russia’s evolving nuclear doctrine?” (Arms Control Initiative), Oct 2024
4. Reuters – “Putin deploys new Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles to Atlantic,” Jan 4, 2023r
5. Reuters – “Russia produces first set of Poseidon super torpedoes – TASS,” Jan 16, 2023
6. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists – “Russian nuclear weapons, 2025” (Nuclear Notebook by Kristensen & Korda et al.), May 2025
7. Reuters – “Russia deploys Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad – RIA,” Feb 5, 2018
8. Foreign Policy – “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Are Now in Belarus,” March 14, 2024
9. OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies, Poland) – “Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus – consequences,” June 6, 2023
10. Reuters – “Top Russian official says Moscow has right to use nuclear weapons if attacked by West,” April 24, 2025