In the vast expanse of the Pacific, a quiet but consequential nuclear competition is underway. China and the United States are modernizing their arsenals and adjusting strategies in ways that are reshaping deterrence in East Asia – all without the dramatic alert level changes that would grab public attention. This “silent race” is marked by rapid technological advances, shifting doctrines, and strategic posturing by both powers, even as official policies remain cautious and opaque. Analysts warn that China’s rapid nuclear buildup and deliberate opacity have left the world guessing about Beijing’s true capabilities and intentions, raising concern that misreading these signals could spur a dangerous miscalculation[1]. Meanwhile, the United States is responding with its own deterrence adjustments and alliances to maintain stability. Below, we explore six key dimensions of this evolving nuclear balance of power in the Pacific, drawing on expert commentary and recent developments in a neutral, policy-focused tone.

1. Modernization of China’s Nuclear Arsenal

China’s nuclear arsenal is undergoing a remarkable modernization and expansion. In recent years Beijing has embarked on a rapid build-out of its land-based nuclear forces, including the construction of hundreds of new missile silos in remote regions. Satellite imagery and analysis indicate that roughly 300–350 new ICBM silos are under construction across three desert areas in northern China – a dramatic increase in potential launch sites[2]. Many of these silos are believed intended for the solid-fueled DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which can carry multiple warheads. China’s missile forces now operate approximately 350 nuclear-capable land-based missile launchers, about 135 of which could reach the continental United States[3]. This expansion represents a significant shift from the past “minimum deterrent” stance, giving China a much larger and more survivable ICBM force than it has ever fielded.

Beijing is also deploying cutting-edge delivery systems, notably in the realm of hypersonic weapons. It is reportedly developing a new intermediate-range ballistic missile known as the DF-27, with an estimated range of 5,000–8,000 km[4]. What makes the DF-27 noteworthy is its ability to carry a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) – an ultra-fast maneuverable warhead that can fly at low trajectories. U.S. intelligence assessments indicate China tested a “multirole” HGV for the DF-27 in 2023, which flew for about 12 minutes and 2,100 km[5]. The missile was even rumoured to be in limited service, with Chinese state media in 2021 showing footage of an exercise featuring a DF-27-like system (a DF-26 booster with a hypersonic glider attached)[6]. If deployed at scale, such weapons could be very difficult to track and intercept, complicating missile defenses across the region.

Underpinning this buildup is a strategic ambiguity in China’s nuclear doctrine. Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China has proclaimed a No First Use (NFU) policy – pledging never to use nuclear weapons first – and has long framed its arsenal as a purely defensive deterrent. Officially, that stance remains in place and was reiterated in China’s 2023 national defense strategy, with Beijing insisting it will not attack unless attacked and will never threaten non-nuclear states with nukes[7]. However, China’s rapid modernization has spurred debate about whether its doctrine is subtly shifting toward a more flexible or war-fighting posture. Chinese officials have privately hinted that NFU might not apply if the survivability of China’s nuclear forces is at stake[8]. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense reported in 2023 that China’s strategy “probably” includes options to use nuclear strikes in response to a non-nuclear attack that threatens the viability of its nuclear arsenal or command-and-control systems[9]. This suggests Beijing is contemplating scenarios under which it might resort to nuclear use first in extreme circumstances – a significant departure from a strict NFU policy. Additionally, as China’s capabilities grow, its leaders have used phrases like achieving a “strategic counterbalance,” implying their nuclear forces should offset U.S. military power more broadly[10]. All of this creates intentional opacity: China keeps adversaries guessing about how large its arsenal will get and when it might be used, which it views as enhancing deterrence through uncertainty. But to outside observers, this ambiguity – combined with the sheer scale of the buildup – raises concerns that China’s nuclear posture may be inching toward one that could enable limited nuclear use or coercion, rather than just assured retaliation.

2. U.S. Deterrence Strategy Adjustments

Faced with these developments, the United States has been recalibrating its deterrence strategy in the Indo-Pacific. American officials emphasize that extended nuclear deterrence – the promise to defend allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella – remains “ironclad.” But the U.S. is also making tangible moves to ensure its nuclear forces and plans keep pace with China’s advances. One visible debate has been over the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the region. The U.S. withdrew all its tactical nukes from Asia by the early 1990s, but the growing threats from China, North Korea, and even Russia have prompted some in Washington to argue that a forward-deployed nuclear presence may be needed again. In 2024, for example, influential lawmakers like Senator Roger Wicker proposed exploring the return of U.S. nuclear arms to East Asia (specifically the Korean Peninsula) as part of a broader defense spending plan[11]. Another senior senator echoed that the U.S. should “explore options for returning nuclear weapons to the Pacific theater” to strengthen deterrence[12]. These calls reflect a concern that current U.S. capabilities might not sufficiently deter China (and North Korea) in a regional conflict, especially if China’s arsenal continues to grow.

So far, the Biden administration has been cautious on this front. Officials have ruled out any immediate plan to reintroduce nuclear warheads to allied soil, emphasizing that doing so could be highly provocative and spur regional arms races[13]. Instead, the U.S. has focused on enhancing the visibility and readiness of its strategic forces in the Pacific in other ways. For instance, Washington agreed in 2023 to increase the rotational presence of nuclear-capable assets around the Korean Peninsula as a signal of resolve. In a summit with South Korea, U.S. leaders pledged to show the “regular visibility of strategic assets” – a phrase that translated into tangible action when a U.S. Navy Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine made a port call in South Korea in 2023, the first visit of a nuclear-armed sub since the 1980s[14]. This rare deployment of an SSBN to Busan was a powerful symbol reinforcing the U.S. commitment to defend its ally with nuclear forces if necessary. The U.S. has also been flying strategic bombers (like B-52s and B-1s) to the region more frequently for exercises and messaging, and it has equipped some ballistic missile submarines with new low-yield nuclear warheads in recent years – all steps aimed at bolstering deterrence across the spectrum of conflict.

Another pillar of U.S. strategy is deepening alliances and partnerships to counterbalance China’s growing capabilities. A prime example is AUKUS, the trilateral security pact between Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. Announced in 2021, AUKUS will provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarine technology, dramatically expanding allied undersea power in the Pacific. At a meeting in March 2023, the AUKUS leaders unveiled a multi-phase plan to base advanced SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) in Australia in coming years and eventually build a new class of submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. This initiative is explicitly aimed at shoring up deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific as China’s naval reach grows[15]. By the mid-2030s, the AUKUS partners are expected to more than double the number of allied nuclear-propelled submarines operating in East Asian waters, complicating China’s calculus. In the interim, the U.S. and U.K. will rotate submarines through Australian ports and expand joint naval exercises with Australia, integrating it more tightly into U.S. war plans. Australia’s role in U.S. strategy is thus becoming pivotal – not as a nuclear-armed player (Australia remains non-nuclear), but as a host for allied forces and a participant in high-end deterrence operations. U.S. bomber aircraft and missiles may also be forward-positioned in Australia in a crisis, leveraging the vast distance of the continent for staging. All these moves send a unified message intended to deter China from military adventurism: that the U.S. and its allies are prepared to respond decisively, even in the nuclear realm.

Finally, the United States is modernizing its own nuclear forces to ensure it can credibly counter new Chinese (and Russian) capabilities. This includes developing the Sentinel ICBM to replace aging Minuteman III missiles, building more Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, and fielding the B-21 Raider stealth bomber. As China’s arsenal grows, U.S. defense officials have hinted at adjusting nuclear force posture. Notably, with the last arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nukes set to expire in 2026, the U.S. Air Force has signaled it will be ready to upload additional nuclear warheads onto missiles and bombers if directed[16]. Today, each Minuteman III ICBM carries just one warhead (per treaty limits), but it could carry up to three; similarly, bombers could be loaded with more weapons. In June 2025, the head of U.S. Global Strike Command confirmed that once treaty constraints are gone, the U.S. has the capacity to deploy more nuclear warheads on its land-based missiles and strategic bombers in response to the “rise of new nuclear powers” like China[17]. Any such changes would require presidential orders, and officials caution they are not inevitable. But Congress has been pressing the Pentagon to ensure modernization programs stay on track (for instance, avoiding delays in the Sentinel ICBM project) so that the U.S. deterrent remains robust[18]. In short, Washington’s strategy is to strengthen its nuclear backstop – through readiness, technology, and regional posture – to match China’s growing capabilities, all while trying to avoid reckless steps that might escalate tensions prematurely.

3. Regional Fallout: Allied Debates and Alignments

The evolving Sino-U.S. nuclear balance is sending ripples across the Indo-Pacific region, forcing U.S. allies and neighbors to reassess their security strategies. Key U.S. partners like Japan, South Korea, and Australia find themselves grappling with how to respond to China’s military rise and the shifting U.S. posture, especially in the shadow of North Korea’s nuclear threats. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s precarious position as a potential flashpoint adds further complexity to regional deterrence dynamics. Below we examine the regional fallout in key capitals:

• South Korea: Perhaps nowhere has the debate over nuclear deterrence intensified more than in Seoul. South Koreans face a dual threat – a nuclear-armed North Korea today and a more powerful China in the long term – which has led to surging public support for stronger nuclear options. Recent opinion polls show record-high support in South Korea for acquiring nuclear weapons. A 2025 survey by the Asan Institute found 76.2% of South Koreans favor an indigenous nuclear arsenal, and about 66% would even support the U.S. re-deploying tactical nuclear weapons to their territory[19]. Such numbers were almost unthinkable a decade ago, reflecting deepening anxiety about the credibility of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” and North Korea’s expanding arsenal. This public pressure is impacting policymakers. For the first time since the Cold War, officials in Seoul have begun to openly discuss the nuclear option. In Feb. 2025, South Korea’s foreign minister Cho Tae-yong stated that developing the South’s own nuclear weapons is “not off the table” if threats worsen – a remarkable shift in tone[20]. He also noted that bringing U.S. tactical nukes back to the peninsula is a possible option, even as an interim measure[21]. Such ideas had long been taboo (South Korea gave up a nuclear program in the 1970s under U.S. pressure), but now they are part of mainstream discourse. That said, South Korea has not made any decision to pursue nuclear armament yet. The government of President Yoon Suk-yeol has instead struck a Washington Declaration with the U.S., creating a new Nuclear Consultative Group to give Seoul more say in U.S. nuclear planning and regularly deploying U.S. strategic assets (like bombers and submarines) around Korea to reassure the South. Seoul’s hope is that these steps will reinforce extended deterrence enough to obviate the need for its own nukes. But if confidence in U.S. protection were to falter – for example, if a future U.S. administration appeared less committed – the push for a South Korean bomb could gain further momentum, altering the regional balance.
• Japan: In Japan, the nuclear debate is more muted but still significant. Japan is the only nation to have suffered nuclear attack, and it has a strong anti-nuclear identity. Nevertheless, as China’s military grows and North Korea perfects long-range missiles, some Japanese strategists are quietly questioning traditional taboos. Former officials and politicians have broached ideas that would have been politically explosive in the past. Notably, in late 2024 former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba – briefly a candidate for prime minister – called for an “Asian NATO” and raised the idea of nuclear sharing with the United States[22]. Ishiba argued that threats from China, Russia, and North Korea could render the current U.S. extended deterrence framework insufficient, thus Japan should consider arrangements similar to NATO’s nuclear sharing (whereby U.S. nuclear weapons are forward-deployed with allied dual-use aircraft). This was a startling proposal in Japan’s domestic context, as it directly challenges Japan’s long-held Three Non-Nuclear Principles (no possessing, producing, or hosting of nuclear weapons). The fact that a senior LDP figure would voice such an idea underscores how regional security fears are chipping away at previous certainties. However, it’s important to stress that Japan’s official policy has not changed – Tokyo quickly reaffirmed that it “adheres to the three non-nuclear principles” and has no intention of revising them[23]. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida (himself from Hiroshima) responded to nuclear sharing suggestions by flatly rejecting them, and public opinion in Japan remains generally opposed to nuclear armament. Instead, Japan is bolstering its conventional defenses (e.g. acquiring longer-range missiles) and deepening integration with U.S. forces. The U.S. and Japan have enhanced their Extended Deterrence Dialogue consultations, and Japan is reportedly opening to hosting more U.S. military assets (like U.S. Marine rapid-reaction units and potentially joint training with U.S. nuclear-capable bombers). In summary, Japan for now remains content under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but it is intensely watching how U.S.-China nuclear dynamics unfold, and a serious erosion of U.S. credibility could spark much more serious nuclear consideration in Tokyo down the road.
• Australia: Australia has long been a close U.S. ally, but today it is taking on a larger role in the regional deterrence architecture. The signing of the AUKUS pact in 2021 signaled Canberra’s commitment to stand with the U.S. and U.K. in countering strategic threats in the Indo-Pacific. Through AUKUS, Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines capable of extended deployments – giving it a far greater ability to patrol the Pacific and even the South China Sea. Although these subs will carry conventional weapons (not nuclear warheads), their stealth and range substantially enhance allied military power vis-à-vis China. Australian crews have already begun training with the U.S. Navy on submarine operations, and as early as 2027, American and British attack submarines will start rotating through Australian naval bases. This effectively creates a more persistent Western undersea presence in waters near China. Strategically, Australia is thus becoming a critical southern anchor of the U.S. deterrence network, complementing Japan and South Korea in the north. The integration goes beyond submarines: the U.S. is planning to deploy up to six B-52 strategic bombers to bases in northern Australia, and U.S. Army units are experimenting with missiles and radar installations in Australia as well. Australia itself is investing in long-range strike capabilities (like cruise missiles) and greatly increasing defense spending. All these moves align with Australia’s interest in deterring aggression in the region – a goal explicitly stated when AUKUS was unveiled, with leaders saying the partnership will “increase the ability of [our] nations to deter aggression and contribute to stability in the Indo-Pacific”[24]. Domestically, Australia remains committed to non-proliferation (it doesn’t seek nuclear weapons), but its defense calculus is unquestionably now tied to the U.S. and allied collective deterrence efforts against China.
• Taiwan: Although not an official U.S. ally and lacking any nuclear capabilities, Taiwan is a central factor in Pacific deterrence. The island democracy is the most likely flashpoint for a U.S.-China war – a conflict that could, by extension, bring nuclear risks into play. China’s nuclear modernization must be viewed partly through the prism of Taiwan: Beijing’s arsenal can serve as an ultimate backstop in a showdown over Taiwan, deterring the U.S. from intervening or from escalating conventionally. Chinese leaders have made clear that Taiwan’s status is a “core interest,” and they have not ruled out force to achieve unification. In a crisis or war over Taiwan, many analysts fear that nuclear signaling and coercion would quickly enter the picture. China might, for example, issue veiled nuclear threats or explicitly hint at renouncing its No First Use pledge to scare off U.S. intervention[25]. During Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s nuclear saber-rattling arguably deterred Western escalation; Chinese observers noted this, and Xi Jinping could attempt a similar strategy. We might see steps like the dispersal of Chinese mobile ICBMs to field, surge deployments of China’s SSBNs to sea, or even test launches of nuclear-capable missiles – all calculated to raise the stakes for the U.S.[26]. The U.S., for its part, has been deliberately vague about how it would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan, but it would certainly bring forces to bear. Ensuring that U.S. extended deterrence covers Taiwan (at least to prevent outright Chinese nuclear use) is crucial, yet tricky, since the U.S. has no formal defense treaty with Taipei. American policymakers walk a fine line of providing enough security assistance to Taiwan to deter a Chinese attack, without encouraging any declaration of independence that could trigger war. In any case, Taiwan’s fate is an obvious nuclear flashpoint: if a conventional conflict started, both Washington and Beijing would immediately calculate the nuclear dimension. The risk is that miscommunication or perceived red lines could lead one side to overreact. Taiwan thus plays an outsized role in Pacific deterrence theory, often being the test case in war games for how nuclear escalation might occur (or be averted) in a U.S.-China clash.

4. Arms Control Vacuum and Its Dangers

Complicating this emerging rivalry is the almost complete absence of arms control treaties or dialogue involving China. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union (later Russia) negotiated extensive agreements to limit nuclear weapons and establish verification and communication channels. Today, virtually none of that exists between the U.S. and China. China is not party to any bilateral or multilateral treaty that caps its nuclear arsenal. The traditional arms control framework – like the New START treaty which limits U.S. and Russian strategic warheads – does not include China at all. Moreover, even that framework is unraveling: Russia suspended its participation in New START in 2023, and the treaty is set to expire in 2026 with no extension in sight[27]. If New START dies, there will be no legally binding limits on the world’s three largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in decades. This looming arms control vacuum is especially concerning in the Pacific context, where China’s numbers are climbing from a much smaller base.

For now, China insists it will not join arms control talks with the U.S. or Russia until it has comparably large forces. Chinese officials argue that U.S. and Russian stockpiles (still an order of magnitude larger than China’s) must come down further before expecting others to participate. The U.S., however, has been urging China to enter into strategic stability dialogues – even informal – to inject some transparency into each other’s plans. These calls have mostly been rebuffed by Beijing. The result is that neither side fully understands the other’s nuclear red lines or escalation thresholds, and there are no agreed rules of the road for certain dangerous situations. Unlike the U.S. and Russia, which maintain direct communication hotlines and have decades of experience in arms control verification, the U.S. and China lack similar risk-reduction measures. Military-to-military communications between them are limited and were even frozen at times during recent Taiwan Strait crises. There is also no mechanism for mutual inspections or data exchanges regarding nuclear forces in China, leaving U.S. intelligence to estimate silo counts and warhead totals from satellites and other means – an uncertain science at best.

The absence of verification and communication protocols with China raises the risk of misperceptions. For instance, if China suddenly surges its missile deployments or alerts its forces, the U.S. might assume worst-case intentions without any hotline discussion to clarify. During the Cold War, arms control treaties like START, INF, and confidence-building measures helped set predictable limits and allowed each side to monitor the other to avoid surprises. With China, such predictability is missing. Chinese strategic forces are growing in secret, and the U.S. is essentially in the dark about key metrics like how many warheads China plans to ultimately deploy or what conditions might prompt a change in alert status. This opacity is, to some extent, a strategic choice by Beijing (as discussed, ambiguity can be a tool of deterrence). But it also means even well-intentioned actions can be misread. As a 2025 analysis by The DEFCON Warning System notes, the world “cannot afford to misinterpret China’s nuclear posture” in this atmosphere of uncertainty[28]. A lack of mutual understanding could turn a minor incident into a major crisis.

Efforts are being considered to mitigate this arms control vacuum. Security experts propose initiating track-2 dialogues (unofficial academic meetings) to feel out possible transparency or restraint measures involving China. Others suggest focusing on risk reduction agreements short of formal treaties – for example, an accord where the U.S. and China pledge to notify each other of certain missile test launches or to keep bombers at certain bases during peacetime. Confidence-building steps like these could at least reduce the chance of an accidental scare. There have been some tiny positive signs: China and the U.S. have discussed establishing a nuclear hotline, and China has at times attended multi-party discussions on nuclear doctrine. But as of now, Beijing prefers to handle deterrence unilaterally. The onus is increasingly on China – as its capabilities approach peer status – to show more transparency and willingness to engage[29]. Without some form of understanding or communication, the Pacific will remain an arms control void. That raises the stakes for every military move, because there’s no back-up framework to prevent worst-case assumptions. Both Washington and Beijing recognize that a nuclear war must be avoided, but achieving stability by handshake (instead of treaty) is inherently fragile.

5. Nuclear Escalation Pathways in a Conflict

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the U.S.-China “silent race” is the potential for a conventional conflict to escalate into nuclear confrontation – even if neither side initially intends it. Military planners and analysts have sketched out several scenarios in which miscalculation, time pressure, or ambiguous warfare could lead to the unthinkable. A conflict over Taiwan is frequently cited as the most likely catalyst. In a Taiwan Strait crisis or war, the nuclear risk would lurk in the background from day one[30]. As mentioned, China might engage in nuclear signaling to dissuade U.S. intervention – such as dispersing its road-mobile ICBMs out of garrison, deploying its Jin-class SSBNs into the open ocean, or conducting missile test-firings to demonstrate capability[31]. If the situation deteriorated, Beijing could even announce it is suspending its No First Use policy (a drastic step it has never taken before) to make its threats more credible[32]. From the Chinese perspective, these actions could be seen as necessary to “raise the stakes” for Washington and convince U.S. leaders that defending Taiwan might trigger nuclear war[33].

However, such moves are inherently escalatory and risky. For one, the U.S. would be forced to interpret and respond under extreme uncertainty. If China, for example, began visibly fueling missiles or if its rocket forces went on high alert, U.S. intelligence might conclude a nuclear strike could be imminent. The U.S. (and Taiwan, and possibly Japan) would then face immense pressure to pre-empt or counter any perceived Chinese nuclear launch preparations[34]. This might involve conventional strikes on Chinese missile units or leadership targets, which in turn could be misinterpreted by China as the start of a disarming attempt. As both sides operate under the “fog of war,” false alarms or misidentified attacks could occur. Analysts give a harrowing example: if China detects what it believes to be an incoming nuclear missile – which might actually be a conventional U.S. hypersonic weapon – Beijing’s doctrine of assured retaliation could drive it to respond with nuclear missiles before confirming the nature of the threat[35]. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, even in a limited way, escalation would be very hard to control. A recent Atlantic Council issue brief warned that any U.S.-China war over Taiwan carries a “significant danger” of escalating to the nuclear level, potentially through limited nuclear use aimed at forcing a favorable outcome on the battlefield[36]. In such a nightmare scenario, both nations’ leadership would have to decide – possibly within minutes – whether to use nuclear weapons, amid chaos and imperfect information. It’s easy to see how miscalculation could lead to catastrophe even though neither side actually sought a nuclear exchange at the start.

Beyond Taiwan, other escalation pathways exist due to the modern military systems each side is fielding. One concern is the ambiguity of certain weapons that can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. China’s DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile is a prime example – it is dual-capable. Imagine a scenario where a conflict breaks out in the Western Pacific (perhaps related to the South China Sea or another flashpoint) and China fires a volley of DF-26 missiles at U.S. bases or carrier groups in the region. The U.S. would have mere minutes to judge whether those missiles are armed with conventional explosives or nuclear bombs. If U.S. commanders assume the worst (nuclear warheads) and they are wrong, they might still retaliate with nuclear weapons – massively escalating a conflict that was meant to be conventional[37]. Conversely, if they assume the missiles are conventional and it turns out even one was nuclear, the U.S. could suffer a devastating surprise attack. This creates a nearly impossible dilemma and could lead to inadvertent nuclear war by miscalculation[38]. The introduction of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) exacerbates this issue: HGVs travel at extreme speeds and on unpredictable trajectories. An incoming hypersonic boost-glide weapon could strike a target with little warning, and its payload (nuclear or not) might not be discernable until impact[39]. This compresses decision time for the side under attack and blurs the line between nuclear and conventional strike – an ambiguity that was less acute in the slower-paced Cold War context. The risk of a mistaken response increases in such an environment, especially without communication channels to quickly clarify intent.

Even outside the U.S.-China dyad, we should note that China’s nuclear rise can affect other regional rivalries, introducing multi-party escalation risks. For instance, a hypothetical border war between China and India (another nuclear-armed state) could spin up nuclear tensions. Both have NFU policies, but heavy fighting might prompt India to disperse its nuclear-capable missiles as a precaution. China, seeing that, could fear India is preparing to use nukes and respond by readying its own – a classic security dilemma[40]. Add in Pakistan (India’s rival) potentially misreading the situation, and suddenly three nuclear powers could be on higher alert without anyone wanting it. Such scenarios underscore the importance of clear communication and confidence-building – yet, as noted, those are lacking with China right now.

In summary, the pathways to nuclear escalation in the Pacific theater are varied but share a common theme: misinterpretation under duress. Whether it’s a Taiwan showdown or a skirmish at sea, each side might take steps it views as defensive that the other views as offensive, potentially lighting the fuse of nuclear use. Modern multi-domain warfare – involving space, cyber, and advanced conventional weapons – only increases the chances of confusion. Experts stress that avoiding nuclear conflict will depend on careful crisis management, redundant communication links, and restraint even amid intense provocation[41]. Without these, the risk remains that a future incident or misstep could escalate far beyond anyone’s intent – truly a worst-case outcome of this silent arms race.

6. DEFCON Levels and Public Signals

One curious aspect of this nuclear competition is that it largely unfolds out of public view, with little change in visible alert postures like U.S. DEFCON levels. The term DEFCON (“Defense Readiness Condition”) refers to the five-level scale of U.S. military alert status, from DEFCON 5 (peaceful normal readiness) up to DEFCON 1 (nuclear war imminent). During known crises in the past (like the Cuban Missile Crisis or 1991 Gulf War), the U.S. military has secretly raised DEFCON levels, but such changes are classified and not announced publicly[42]. Today, even as China rapidly expands its nuclear forces and the U.S. bolsters its deterrent, the official DEFCON remains at 5 – the lowest state – as far as the public can tell. In other words, the significant nuclear build-up in the Pacific has not triggered any public warning or alert. This is not because it’s ignored, but because DEFCON is meant to signal immediate military readiness rather than long-term trends. Barring an acute crisis or imminent threat, U.S. Strategic Command sees no need to stir public panic by changing alert levels. The steady improvements in China’s arsenal, important as they are, have occurred gradually and outside of wartime – so they haven’t merited a jump to DEFCON 3 or higher in peacetime. From a public perspective, then, life goes on at DEFCON 5 even as this “silent race” continues.

That said, there are indicators and warnings that experts and observers watch to gauge shifts from pure deterrence postures toward more provocative or war-ready stances. Because official channels are tight-lipped, independent monitors like The DEFCON Warning System (a private organization) interpret open-source intelligence to inform the public of changes in nuclear risk. They note that the U.S. government does not issue civilian alerts for rising nuclear tensions[43], so their system exists to fill that gap. For example, if unusually many U.S. strategic bombers suddenly disperse from their bases, or if there’s a spike in nuclear command-and-control aircraft flights, it may suggest a quiet increase in readiness. Likewise, if China were to visibly deploy nuclear missiles or evacuate leadership, it could indicate a heightened state of alert. During the Ukraine crisis, the U.S. and Russia engaged in nuclear signaling (like Russia moving tactical nukes to the forefront of rhetoric) without formal DEFCON changes – something similar could happen in an Asian crisis. Another public indicator might be political rhetoric: if either Washington or Beijing starts explicitly invoking nuclear consequences or red lines, that typically marks a shift from routine deterrence to more overt nuclear posturing, which is inherently more provocative.

It’s also worth noting that not every military development prompts a DEFCON reaction. Modernization efforts (e.g., China building silos or the U.S. deploying new warheads) are part of long-term deterrence improvements and are signaled as such. Both countries frame these steps as deterrent in nature – defensive and stabilizing from their perspective – rather than offensive provocations. Therefore, they do not trigger crisis responses unless paired with aggressive moves. For instance, the U.S. did not change its alert level simply because China tested a hypersonic glide vehicle; it treats that as a concerning development but not cause to prepare for imminent conflict. Similarly, China has thus far kept most of its nuclear forces off high alert (it reportedly keeps warheads separate from missiles in peacetime) and has not mirrored the continuous launch-on-warning postures of the U.S. and Russia[44]. This means day-to-day nuclear readiness remains low-profile. The DEFCON Warning System, for example, has consistently kept its public alert at DEFCON 5 through recent years, advising only heightened awareness as opposed to emergency actions. In the event things do escalate – say, a major Taiwan crisis – the first hints of moving out of DEFCON 5 might be detected indirectly: increased military flights, naval movements, or government advisories for citizens. But until such a crisis hits, the silent race continues in the background, with neither side wanting to appear trigger-happy.

In summary, the lack of visible DEFCON changes despite the nuclear buildup underscores the silence of this arms race. Both China and the U.S. are walking a fine line: expanding and refining their nuclear deterrents without triggering a panic or confrontation. The public might not see any difference – no sirens blaring or press releases about readiness – but under the surface, the Pacific’s nuclear landscape is being fundamentally reshaped. Staying informed through credible sources (government statements, independent watchdogs, think tank analyses) is crucial, as the official alert system may only change when a crisis is already at hand. The hope is that robust deterrence on both sides will prevent that crisis from ever occurring, keeping DEFCON at bay.

Conclusion

The Pacific is witnessing a subtle yet profound transformation in nuclear deterrence. China’s accelerated arsenal modernization – from sprawling missile silo fields to hypersonic gliders – is challenging the old status quo and introducing new uncertainties about its intentions. The United States, in turn, is adapting its deterrence posture, reinforcing alliances, and quietly boosting readiness to meet the potential threat. Around them, regional players are contemplating once-unthinkable options, from South Korea’s flirtation with nuclear armament to Japan’s cautious debate on hosting U.S. nukes, while Australia embeds itself deeper into America’s strategic plans. All of this is unfolding in an arms control vacuum, where no treaties constrain the competition and few communication channels exist to defuse tension. The rivalry remains a “silent” one in peacetime – no missile crises or DEFCON-raising standoffs yet – but experts worry that silence can be deceiving. As we have seen, a conventional clash in this environment carries an elevated risk of rapid nuclear escalation, thanks to ambiguous weapons and hair-trigger decision timelines. The challenge for leaders in Washington, Beijing, and allied capitals is to manage this strategic competition prudently, avoiding alarmism and provocation while still addressing genuine security concerns.

There are reasons for optimism: deterrence, after all, has kept the great powers from direct conflict for decades, and both China and the U.S. insist they do not want war. Clearer communication, mutual restraint, and perhaps fresh arms control or risk-reduction initiatives could help steer the Pacific toward a more stable equilibrium. Yet until such measures take root, the world must navigate a new era in which two nuclear giants eye each other warily across the ocean, each racing quietly to ensure the other is deterred – but not misjudging the other’s moves. It is a delicate balance of signal and silence. The coming years will test whether this evolving deterrence framework can keep the peace in East Asia, or whether missteps and mistrust will make that balance untenable. The hope is that, through vigilance and diplomacy, the “silent race” stays silent – never erupting into the kind of crisis that the entire world would hear.

References

[1] Kristensen, Hans M., et al. “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80:1 (Jan. 2024), pp. 49-72. (China expanding missile silo fields, ~350 new silos under construction and ~350 launchers, with modernized ICBMs and dual-capable missiles)

[2] Kristensen, Hans M., et al. “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Jan. 2024). (China developing DF-27 missile with 5,000–8,000 km range; reports of DF-27 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle, tested in 2023 for ~2100 km flight)

[3] Kristensen, Hans M., et al. “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Jan. 2024). (Debate over China’s No-First-Use policy: official NFU reiterated in 2023, but Pentagon report suggests China might consider nuclear use in response to conventional threats to its nukes)

[4] Kim, Young Gyo. “Threats in Indo-Pacific fuel debate over US nuclear redeployment.” VOA News (Sept. 11, 2024). (Calls by U.S. lawmakers to consider redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to Asia; Sen. Wicker’s plan for returning nukes to South Korea, contrasted with others warning it could provoke China)

[5] Yim, Hyunsu. “U.S. nuclear-powered submarine arrives at South Korea’s Busan port.” Reuters (June 16, 2023). (After U.S.-South Korea summit, U.S. agreed to increase visibility of strategic assets; an Ohio-class nuclear-armed submarine (SSBN) to visit South Korea for first time since 1980s as a show of resolve)

[6] Garamone, Jim. “AUKUS Plan Looks to Shore up Deterrence, Promote Stability.” U.S. Department of Defense News (March 14, 2023). (Leaders of U.S., UK, Australia announce AUKUS submarine pathway to increase ability to deter aggression in Indo-Pacific; providing nuclear-powered subs to Australia will bolster regional stability)

[7] Tirpak, John A. & Cohen, Rachel S. “Air Force Ready to Deploy More Nukes Once Arms Control Treaty Ends.” Air & Space Forces Magazine (June 6, 2025). (Air Force Global Strike Command prepared to add nuclear warheads to ICBMs and bombers if directed after New START expires in 2026, in response to rising threats from new nuclear powers like China)

[8] Lee, Peter & Kang Chung-ku. “Worth the Squeeze: South Korean Public Support for Nuclear Deterrence.” Asan Institute Issue Brief (May 28, 2025). (2025 Asan poll finds 76.2% of South Koreans support an indigenous nuclear weapons capability and 66.3% favor redeployment of U.S. tactical nukes, reflecting record-high threat perceptions and doubts about U.S. commitment)

[9] Kim, Jeongmin. “In shift, South Korea’s top diplomat says nuclear armament ‘not off the table’.” NK News (Feb. 27, 2025). (ROK Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yong suggested Seoul developing its own nukes is an option and that redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons is possible, marking a change in tone amid concerns about U.S. defense commitment)

[10] Kuramitsu, Shizuka. “Japan’s New Leader Stirs Debate on Nuclear Sharing.” Arms Control Today (November 2024). (Former Japanese PM candidate Shigeru Ishiba proposed an Asian NATO and raised the idea of U.S.-Japan nuclear sharing to deter China/North Korea, challenging Japan’s non-nuclear principles; Japanese government still reaffirms no nuclear weapons policy)

[11] The DEFCON Warning System. “China’s ‘Nuclear Ambiguity’: What the World Doesn’t Know Could Start a War.” defconwarningsystem.com (June 3, 2025). (Analysis of China’s strategic ambiguity: China’s rapid nuclear modernization and opaque doctrine cause global concern; ambiguity in force size and NFU policy could heighten miscalculation risks in a crisis)

[12] The DEFCON Warning System. “China’s ‘Nuclear Ambiguity’…” defconwarningsystem.com (June 2025). (Escalation scenarios: In a severe Taiwan conflict, China might use nuclear threats or alert deployments to coerce the U.S., risking rapid escalation if misinterpreted; Atlantic Council warns any war over Taiwan carries significant nuclear escalation danger through limited use)

[13] The DEFCON Warning System. “China’s ‘Nuclear Ambiguity’…” defconwarningsystem.com (June 2025). (Danger of dual-use missile miscalculation: a PLA conventional ballistic missile strike (e.g. DF-26) could be mistaken for nuclear, potentially triggering inadvertent U.S. nuclear retaliation; hypersonic weapons shorten decision times and blur nuclear thresholds)

[14] “Understanding DEFCON: What Our Alert Levels Mean and How You Should Respond.” The DEFCON Warning System (June 6, 2025). (Official U.S. DEFCON levels are classified and not announced in real time; the public remains unaware of military readiness changes unless disclosed later, hence independent monitors interpret open sources to inform about nuclear threat levels)