Introduction: In December 2021, Vladimir Putin presented the West with an extraordinary ultimatum. Moscow demanded NATO withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe and forswear ever admitting Ukraine, warning that if Russia’s security interests were ignored it would respond with a “military” reaction akin to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis[1]. This stark demand – issued as Russian troops massed on Ukraine’s border – shocked Western capitals. Yet for the Kremlin, it was the culmination of years of growing resentment and fear, rooted in a worldview that sees the West not as a partner but as a persistent threat. Understanding today’s tensions requires looking at global events through Moscow’s eyes, tracing how historical grievances, NATO’s expansion, and clashing values have shaped Russia’s strategic mindset vis-à-vis the West.

Historical Context: Ghosts of Invasions and the Cold War

Russia’s wary view of the West did not emerge overnight. It is grounded in a long historical memory of conflict with European powers. From Napoleon’s invasion of 1812 to Hitler’s onslaught in 1941, Russians have twice seen devastating invasions arrive from the West, instilling a deep instinct to seek strategic buffer zones for survival. The subsequent Cold War only reinforced this mindset. In the Soviet era, the Kremlin cast Western powers – especially the United States and its NATO allies – as ideological and military adversaries encircling the Motherland. Even after the USSR’s collapse, those Cold War suspicions never fully vanished. In 2005 Putin famously lamented that the Soviet Union’s breakup was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century, viewing it as a humiliation that robbed Russia of power and left “25 million [ethnic] Russian people” stranded outside Russia’s borders[2]. This sense of grievance laid the groundwork for Moscow’s drive to restore its influence and security in what it considers its historical sphere.

NATO’s Eastward Expansion: Promise or Provocation?

Nothing has loomed larger in Moscow’s strategic calculus than NATO’s post-Cold War expansion. In the 1990s and 2000s, the Western alliance admitted former Soviet allies and even ex-Soviet republics – a process Russia watched with growing alarm. From the Kremlin’s perspective, NATO enlargement was a betrayal: Russian officials often claim Western leaders promised “not one inch eastward” after 1990, only to see the alliance push right up to Russia’s borders[4]. Western leaders dispute that any formal pledge was made, but the perception of broken promises persists in Moscow’s narrative. By 2004, NATO had added the Baltic states (once part of the USSR) and was openly discussing future membership for Georgia and Ukraine – crossing what Russia considers red lines.

Russian objections to NATO’s advance were loud and consistent. Back in 1997, George Kennan (architect of U.S. Cold War containment strategy) warned that expanding NATO would prove “the most fateful error” of the post-Cold War era, needlessly provoking Russia[5]. Even some Western statesmen feared it would “create the very danger it was supposed to prevent” – Russian aggression in response to a perceived Western encirclement[6]. From Moscow’s standpoint, that is exactly what transpired. An analysis of the current Ukraine crisis argues that “the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine has been primarily driven by the threat of NATO’s expansion along Russia’s border”, with Putin determined to weaken Ukraine so it can never join NATO[7].

Putin’s own words underscore this mindset. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference – a watershed moment in East-West relations – Putin blasted NATO’s eastward push as “a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust”, pointedly asking: “Against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”[8]. His message was clear: Moscow felt deceived and endangered by NATO’s growth. Russia’s 2014 official Military Doctrine echoed these fears, singling out “the build-up of the power potential of [NATO]… near the borders of the Russian Federation, including by further expansion of the alliance” as a top military risk[9]. The same doctrine brands foreign-backed regime change as a dire threat, warning against “establishment of regimes… by overthrowing legitimate state authorities” in neighboring states[10] – a thinly veiled reference to pro-Western revolutions in places like Ukraine or Georgia. In Moscow’s eyes, NATO’s expansion and Western support for uprisings abroad form a menacing pattern aimed at eroding Russia’s security.

Perceptions of Threat and Encirclement

Given this backdrop, it is little surprise that Russian public opinion also views the West with mistrust. By mid-2022 – after the Ukraine war began – independent polling found 82% of Russians had a negative attitude toward NATO, with a strong majority believing that new countries joining NATO pose a direct threat to Russia[11]. Some 60% said Russia has reason to fear NATO, the highest level of threat perception since the Crimea crisis in 2014[12]. Many in Russia genuinely feel militarily encircled and targeted by the Western bloc. In fact, nearly half of Russians polled believed the fighting in Ukraine could escalate into a direct war between Russia and NATO, and one-third even considered it likely that Putin would order a first-use of nuclear weapons if such a war broke out[13]. This siege mentality – the notion that Russia is under looming existential threat – has been carefully nurtured by state media and officials. Since the 2022 invasion, Kremlin-controlled TV has openly mused about nuclear strikes and painted the Ukraine conflict as Russia vs. the entire “collective West”, further conditioning the public to see the West as the true adversary[15]. By early 2024 the Kremlin’s own rhetoric shifted, with officials like Dmitry Peskov candidly admitting “we are in a state of war… as soon as the collective West became a participant on the side of Ukraine, it became a war for us”[16]. This marked departure from the “special operation” euphemism signaled to Russians that Moscow views itself as fighting NATO itself on Ukrainian soil.

For Moscow’s strategists, nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor against this perceived Western encirclement. Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and has integrated nuclear threats into its overall strategy to keep NATO at bay. From the outset of the Ukraine war, Putin reminded the world of Russia’s nuclear might – placing forces on alert and warning of “unthinkable” consequences if the West intervened too directly[17]. This brazen “nuclear sabre-rattling” proved alarmingly effective: NATO ruled out any troops on Ukrainian soil or no-fly zones, explicitly to avoid a direct clash with a nuclear-armed Russia[19]. One expert noted that Russia’s nuclear-backed bluster was “a spectacular success” in deterring the West from intervening on Ukraine’s behalf[21]. In Moscow’s eyes, its nuclear “shield” validated itself by scaring the West into restraint[22]. This outcome reinforces a key element of Russia’s mindset: that its strategic arsenal neutralises the West’s conventional superiority, giving Russia leeway to assert itself in its neighborhood without inviting Western military retaliation.

Ideology and Values: The East–West Divide

Beyond tangible security matters, Russia’s clash with the West is also ideological and civilizational. The Kremlin portrays Russia as a distinct Eurasian civilization with its own “traditional values” and political model – one often juxtaposed against the liberal, globalist values of the Western world. Putin and his inner circle frequently decry what they call a decadent, domineering West that seeks to impose its values and political systems on others. In July 2021, Russia approved a new National Security Strategy that frankly identifies the West as an adversary on multiple fronts. It asserts that Westernisation threatens Russia’s cultural sovereignty and heritage, accusing foreign actors of trying to “rob [Russia] of [its] cultural sovereignty” by attacking Russian traditional values and even “rewriting history” to vilify Russia[24]. The strategy describes a world in turmoil where Western “hegemony” is fading, but warns that as the West loses dominance it will react with even greater ferocity, fomenting conflicts to hold on to power[25]. This worldview casts today’s Russia as both protector and victim: the defender of conservative values and multipolar order, and the target of Western plots to undermine it.

Concrete examples of this narrative abound. Moscow accuses Washington of sponsoring “colour revolutions” – pro-democracy uprisings – in post-Soviet states to install anti-Russian governments. Russian state media and officials routinely claim the U.S. seeks regime change in Moscow as well, by funding NGOs, opposition groups, or through information warfare. In the Kremlin’s telling, terms like “democracy” or “human rights” are often cynical covers for Western geopolitical encroachment. As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put it in 2017, Russia “categorically rejects the allegations” that it is undermining the liberal order, turning the accusation back on the West by charging that Western powers use talk of democracy to justify expanding their own influence[26][27]. The rhetoric of a besieged fortress – defending Russian civilization from foreign subversion – is now standard fare on Russian airwaves. Moscow’s current ideology leans heavily on reinforcing patriotism, Orthodox Christian orthodoxy, and historical pride, while depicting Western liberal values (from LGBT rights to press freedom) as chaotic or morally corrosive imports. The 2021 security strategy explicitly frames this as a security issue, vowing to protect Russia’s “spiritual-moral values” against Westernisation[28]. In short, Russia’s strategic mindset includes an ethnocultural dimension: it not only fears Western tanks and missiles, but also Western ideas and social norms, seeing them as instruments to weaken Russian society from within.

Notably, Moscow has aligned itself with other powers that share its aversion to Western dominance. China and India are highlighted in Russia’s strategic documents as key partners, alongside forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation[29]. The Kremlin openly prioritises relations with non-Western countries, while branding the United States and certain NATO states “unfriendly countries” in official parlance[30]. This shift reflects Putin’s oft-stated desire for a “multipolar world” – one where no single bloc (especially not the West) can dictate global rules, and where Russia is recognised as one of several great powers. In practice, this has meant tighter political, economic, and military cooperation with Beijing, attempts to woo countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and information campaigns positioning Russia as a leader of a global anti-Western front. From Moscow’s view, these steps counter what it sees as a US-led attempt to maintain a unipolar hegemony. As Putin complained in 2007, the unipolar model led to the U.S. acting as “one center of authority, one center of force, one center of decision-making” using overwhelming military force around the world – a situation he called “extremely dangerous” because “no one feels safe” under such hegemony[31]. Thus, undermining Western unity and power – whether via closer ties with China, or using tools like cyber warfare and disinformation – is not just opportunism for Russia but a strategic imperative born of its core beliefs.

The Ukraine Flashpoint and the New Cold War Climate

All these threads converged in the Ukraine crisis – the most acute Russia–West clash since the Cold War. By the late 2010s, Ukraine had become emblematic of Moscow’s grievances: a former Soviet republic pivoting toward NATO and the EU, experiencing street revolts (in 2014) that ousted a pro-Russian president, and loudly courted by Western powers. For Putin, Ukraine’s westward drift was the final straw, a “brotherly” nation slipping into the Western camp and potentially hosting NATO bases at Russia’s doorstep. In late 2021 he began publicly asserting that Ukraine is not a real sovereign country without Russia, writing a long historical essay claiming Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” – rhetoric that primed the Russian public to accept aggressive moves[33]. Then came the sweeping demands for Western security guarantees, essentially calling for NATO to roll back its post-1997 expansion and forswear Ukrainian membership[34]. When those demands were predictably rejected by Washington and Brussels, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, framing it as a forced response to “NATO’s military development” of Ukraine and even the “genocide” of Russian speakers there – an extreme claim echoing the propaganda of defending against Western-backed enemies.

Moscow’s calculus in Ukraine reveals its strategic mindset in action. Russian leaders assumed the West, in its decadence and internal disunity, would not directly fight for Ukraine – a gamble that proved correct in the short term, as NATO limited its involvement to arms and sanctions. Putin also wagered that his nuclear threats would paralyse Western intervention (indeed, NATO’s caution validated that theory to a large extent)[36]. However, the Ukraine war also demonstrated Russia’s deep misreadings: Moscow underestimated Western resolve to support Kyiv indirectly, and overestimated its own military prowess, leading to a longer, costlier war than anticipated. Still, the Kremlin doubles down on portraying the conflict as existential. In Putin’s speeches, Russia is cast as heroically resisting a U.S.-led plot to destroy it, while Ukrainians are painted as mere pawns of the “Anglo-Saxons.” This narrative aims to both justify the sacrifices of war to the Russian public and to deter Western unity by stoking fears of a wider war. By 2023–24, Putin took to calling the war a battle for “the future of Russia” against those who would “dismember and destroy” his country – explicitly accusing the United States and its allies of seeking to break Russia apart like the USSR[38]. Such rhetoric underscores how genuinely Moscow views the West as bent on Russia’s strategic defeat, if not outright destruction.

What Does Moscow Want? – Security and Status

From the above, a picture emerges of Russia’s strategic endgame. At its core, Moscow’s ambitions are to reclaim security and status on its own terms. Analysts note that the Kremlin’s goals include “broad acknowledgement by Washington of Moscow’s revitalised role as a key player on the world stage” and explicit recognition that Russia has “legitimate… security interests” in its neighboring regions – its traditional sphere of influence[39]. In practice, that means Russia insists on a veto on NATO expansion and a free hand to dominate the affairs of former Soviet states, from the Baltics to Central Asia. The Kremlin also seeks an end to Western sanctions and pressure over conflicts like Georgia and Ukraine[40]. Essentially, Putin wants the post-Cold War settlement revised: no further NATO enlargement eastward, no foreign troops near Russia’s borders, and acceptance that places like Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan fall within Russia’s orbit. These aims reflect longstanding grievances and a “revisionist” outlook in Moscow – a desire to overturn what it views as decades of Western encroachment and disrespect since the Soviet collapse[41]. The Kremlin often couches these demands in the language of “equal and indivisible security” for all, but to Western ears they sound like calls for spheres of influence and a Yalta-like great power accord.

It is important to note that Russia’s self-perception as a besieged fortress and a resurgent great power are two sides of the same coin. Feeling threatened drives Moscow to assert itself more aggressively; and each act of aggression, in turn, deepens Western distrust and reinforces Russia’s pariah status – a spiral that then “validates” the Kremlin’s siege narrative domestically. The result is a kind of security catch-22. From Moscow’s eyes, NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe or Western support for democracy abroad must be countered, lest Russia be weakened or encircled. But from Western eyes, each Russian intervention or nuclear threat confirms that Moscow is hostile and must be contained. The tragedy of this dynamic is that it becomes self-reinforcing. As one former U.S. defense secretary observed with regret, the West’s post–1990 approach “badly underestimated the magnitude of Russian humiliation” and “recklessly ignored” what Russia considers its “vital national interests”[42]. That miscalculation, combined with Putin’s zero-sum worldview, has ushered in a new era of confrontation.

Conclusion: Through the Kremlin’s Looking Glass

Today, relations between Russia and the West are arguably at their lowest point since the Cold War – a situation born of mutual mistrust and clashing strategic narratives. Through the Kremlin’s looking glass, the West appears as a treacherous hegemon, one that expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep, foments dissent within its neighbors (or even inside Russia itself), and imposes punitive measures to thwart Russia’s rise. Through Washington and European eyes, meanwhile, Russia looks like an aggressive revisionist power flouting international norms to rebuild an empire. Bridging this perception gap is extraordinarily difficult, but it begins with recognizing how Moscow sees its own actions. In Russian thinking, wars in places like Georgia or Ukraine are not wanton expansion, but pre-emptive defences against NATO’s creep. Cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns are not meddling, but counter-measures to Western information dominance. Even cooperation can be double-edged: Moscow might offer to help on, say, counter-terrorism, while simultaneously pursuing its geopolitical objectives under that guise[43].

In crafting policy, Western leaders often declare that “Russia has nothing to fear” from NATO or that democracies pose no threat to Moscow – statements entirely unconvincing to Russian ears. Decades of policy and propaganda have solidified the view in Moscow that the West’s true aim is to keep Russia weak and down. This does not mean the Kremlin’s narrative is objectively true, but it is a reality one must contend with. As the war in Ukraine grinds on with no clear resolution, the risk is that Russia’s leadership doubles down further on the hostile worldview that brought us here. The world is effectively sliding into a new Cold War-style standoff, with Russia turning away from the West and aligning more with China and other powers that share its grievances.

Crucially, analysts stress that understanding Russia’s strategic mindset is not the same as agreeing with it. Rather, it is about facing the facts of how Russia interprets Western actions. That interpretation – however distorted it may seem from London, Washington or Berlin – drives Russian behavior. “We need to remember the views of the enemies that we fight, as part of every strategic battle,” one observer noted, highlighting that for 60+ years the USSR/Russia has genuinely feared a U.S.-led global hegemony[45]. In the end, neither side may fully convince the other of its benign intent. But any future dialogue or détente will have to contend with the narratives Moscow lives by. Through Moscow’s eyes, the West will likely remain a rival and danger – unless and until a new security framework is built that acknowledges Russia’s core concerns while upholding the sovereignty of its neighbors. Striking that balance is the central challenge if the cycle of mistrust is ever to be broken. For now, however, Russia’s strategic worldview and the West’s remain a mirror image of mutual suspicion, locked in a tense standoff that shows every sign of hardening for years to come.

Sources:

• Reuters – Putin on the Soviet collapse
• Australian Outlook (AIIA) – NATO expansion and Russia
• Cato Institute / National Interest – Putin’s 2007 speech and Gates’ comments
• Guardian – Russia’s 2021 security demands
• Levada Center – Russian public opinion on NATO (June 2022)
• DEFCON Warning System – Analysis of nuclear deterrence in Ukraine
• Reuters – Kremlin rhetoric on “war” with the West
• Carnegie Endowment – 2021 Russian National Security Strategy analysis
• Wikipedia – Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine (threat perceptions)
• Cipher Brief – Maskirovka and Russian strategic aims