The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty eliminated an entire class of U.S. and Soviet/Russian ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, removing thousands of weapons from Europe and anchoring crisis stability for three decades. The U.S. withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, citing Russia’s long-running deployment of the 9M729/SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the accord. With the treaty gone—and no successor—regional missile balances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific have shifted measurably. [1][2][3][4]

In early August 2025, Russia declared that it no longer considers itself bound by its self-imposed moratorium on deploying nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles, explicitly linking the decision to U.S. and allied deployments of comparable systems. The move formalizes what the post-INF environment already implied: both sides are now free to field missiles once prohibited by the treaty. [5][6]

This briefing surveys the main military and strategic effects of the post-INF landscape and highlights practical watchpoints for assessing escalation risk. It is descriptive and analytic; it does not advocate policy.

What INF removed—and why its collapse matters

• Category removed: All ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500–5,500 km band, nuclear or conventional. Air- and sea-launched systems were untouched. [7][8]
• Verification & impact: Thousands of missiles were destroyed and inspections built confidence that Europe’s shortest-warning-time land systems were off the board. The loss of these constraints re-introduces fast-flying, hard-to-defend land missiles into already compressed theaters. [9]
• Cause of collapse: Repeated U.S. and NATO findings—public since 2014—that Russia’s 9M729/SSC-8 violated the treaty; Moscow denied non-compliance and counter-alleged U.S. violations. [10][11]

Europe: Ground-based missiles are returning—so far, conventionally armed

• U.S.–Germany 2026 announcement: The United States and Germany announced plans to begin stationing U.S. long-range fires in Germany starting in 2026, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-6, and a developmental hypersonic weapon. These systems can hold key military targets at risk across much of European Russia from land platforms—capabilities that INF once forbade. [12]
• NATO’s stated ceiling: NATO has reiterated “no intention to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Europe,” signaling that any new land-based systems in the alliance will be conventional. The alliance has instead emphasized integrated air and missile defense, strike from air/sea, and resilience. [13]
• Russian response: Moscow’s end to its INF-related moratorium (Aug. 2025) signals potential deployments of short- and intermediate-range missiles positioned to reach European targets, compressing warning times and complicating NATO defense planning. [14]

Strategic effect: Europe is transitioning from a three-decade status quo (no INF-range land missiles) to a mixed environment in which conventionally armed U.S. systems appear on NATO soil while Russia reserves the option to field nuclear-capable counterparts. Even absent nuclear warheads, flight times and pre-delegated launch procedures can introduce crisis instability in fast-moving confrontations.

Indo-Pacific: An arena INF never covered now centers on land-based missiles

• Unconstrained China: China was never party to INF and has spent years building a large force of medium- and intermediate-range missiles (e.g., DF-21, DF-26), optimized for theater operations. The Pentagon assessed in 2024 that China’s nuclear stockpile surpassed 600 warheads by mid-2024, while CSIS assesses DF-26 range at ~3,000–4,000 km, putting Guam and large swathes of maritime approaches at risk. [15][16]
• U.S. Army “Typhon” (MRC) returns land-based reach: The Army’s Mid-Range Capability (Typhon) fires Tomahawk and SM-6 from ground launchers, bridging the gap between ATACMS/PrSM and hypersonic systems. A Typhon battery deployed to Northern Luzon, Philippines in April 2024 for exercises and has remained on rotation, prompting sustained protests from Beijing; congressional and Army reporting discuss additional fielding—including a battery to Europe in FY2026. [17]
• Prospective expansions: Manila and Washington are discussing additional U.S. missile launchers in the Philippines to strengthen deterrence in the South China Sea; this follows the Typhon deployment and Marine anti-ship batteries under the U.S.–Philippine alliance framework. [18]
• Regional counter-strike moves: Separately, Japan has signed to acquire ~400 Tomahawk missiles for maritime platforms, reinforcing a broader, legally permitted “counter-strike” posture that complements U.S. land systems without violating Japan’s non-nuclear commitments. [19]

Strategic effect: The Indo-Pacific already featured dense INF-range arsenals on one side (China). The post-INF environment now permits the United States and allies to add land-based strike options ashore—potentially improving deterrence and complicating adversary targeting, but also creating new fixed points that could become early targets in a crisis.

Flight time and crisis stability

INF-range missiles reduce time-to-target across key theaters—from minutes to tens of minutes, depending on range and trajectory. In peacetime, the presence of mobile, concealable launchers can be a deterrent; in a crisis, the same attributes can incentivize preemption or produce “use-or-lose” pressures. Because these weapons can carry either conventional or nuclear payloads, warhead ambiguity risks misinterpretation under stress—especially if command-and-control and early-warning systems are under cyber or kinetic attack. (Background on classes and timelines from treaty summaries and official releases.) [20][21]

Arms-control prospects: Narrow windows

• Russia’s moratorium is over: With Moscow’s unilateral restraint now lifted, the practical on-ramp for regional limits in Europe is narrower; any future arrangement would need to address Russian deployments verifiably and reconcile U.S./NATO conventional deployments announced for Germany (2026). [22][23]
• Indo-Pacific complexity: An INF-style treaty that matters militarily would need to involve China—a country that has relied heavily on INF-range systems for regional strategy and has shown no interest in joining bilateral frameworks. (U.S. DoD/FAS reporting on Chinese force growth provides context.) [24]

Indicators to watch (near-term)

1. European basing details: Siting, numbers, and readiness milestones for U.S. Tomahawk/SM-6/hypersonic elements in Germany; supporting infrastructure and command arrangements. [25]
2. Russian deployments: Evidence of new land-based short- and intermediate-range systems in Russia’s Western Military District and Kaliningrad, following the end of the moratorium. [26]
3. Philippines posture: Whether additional U.S. launchers are approved beyond the Typhon rotation, including Marine NMESIS positioning along the Luzon and Palawan axes. [27]
4. Japan’s integration timeline: Delivery, training, and fleet integration of Japan’s Tomahawks and domestic Type-12 upgrades (for maritime and land use), which will shape regional strike geometry. [28]
5. Chinese missile force growth: Observable changes in DF-26 brigades, new silo fields, or support infrastructure that affect regional saturation and reach. [29]

Context: The first post-INF tests and today’s force design

Immediately after the U.S. withdrawal took legal effect in August 2019, the Pentagon conducted two proof-of-concept flights: a ground-launched cruise missile in August 2019 and a prototype ground-launched ballistic missile in December 2019 (both conventionally configured). These tests foreshadowed the later Typhon program and today’s long-range fires initiatives. [30]

Bottom line

• Europe: Conventional U.S. land-based missiles are due to arrive in Germany by 2026; Russia has removed its self-restraint and can mirror with nuclear-capable systems. Expect compressed decision timelines and greater premium on air/missile defense, dispersal, and survivability. [31][32]
• Indo-Pacific: The U.S. has re-entered the land-based strike domain with Typhon rotations in the Philippines and may expand launcher presence; Japan’s Tomahawk purchase and China’s existing IRBM force redefine the theater missile balance. [33][34][35][36]
• Arms control: With INF gone and Russia’s moratorium ended, any new limit would require multilateral participation to be strategically meaningful, particularly in Asia. [37][38]