Introduction

China’s nuclear doctrine has long been shrouded in strategic ambiguity, a calculated opacity that leaves other powers guessing about Beijing’s true capabilities and intentions. This ambiguity – coupled with rapid nuclear modernisation – is increasingly a focus of global concern. While Chinese leaders insist their nuclear arsenal is for defensive deterrence only, outsiders struggle with what they don’t know. How large is China’s nuclear stockpile? Under what conditions would Beijing resort to nuclear weapons? Could misreading China’s opaque signals trigger a catastrophic miscalculation? In an era of rising geopolitical tensions, especially involving the United States and India, these questions take on urgent significance. This report explores the evolution of China’s nuclear strategy, from its historical doctrine of No First Use to its ongoing arsenal expansion, and assesses how limited transparency and doctrinal ambiguities could heighten the risk of nuclear escalation. The world cannot afford to misinterpret China’s nuclear posture – because what it doesn’t know could start a war.

Historical Evolution of China’s Nuclear Doctrine

China’s journey as a nuclear-armed state began in October 1964, when it conducted its first atomic test amid the Cold War. On the very day of that test, Beijing declared a policy of No First Use (NFU) – pledging it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. This stance, born of both ideology and strategic necessity, set China apart from the superpowers of the time. Mao Zedong famously referred to nuclear weapons as a “paper tiger” in the 1950s, downplaying their utility, yet he also recognized that China needed “this thing” (the bomb) to avoid being bullied by nuclear-armed rivals. Throughout the Cold War, China maintained only a minimal nuclear arsenal aimed at deterring nuclear coercion by others. Its focus was assured retaliation – the ability to survive an attack and strike back – rather than nuclear war-fighting or parity with the United States or Soviet Union.

 In the 1980s and 1990s, as China opened to the world, it slowly modernised its deterrent but kept a low profile. It joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 as a nuclear-weapon state and consistently reaffirmed its NFU pledge in international fora. Beijing portrayed its nuclear forces as purely defensive, intended only to prevent nuclear blackmail. Importantly, China did not enter into arms racing during this period, content with a “lean and effective” arsenal often described as a minimum deterrent. However, even then, a degree of ambiguity was inherent: Chinese leaders never publicly defined what size of force constituted a “minimum” deterrent, nor how exactly they would respond in a nuclear crisis. This strategic opacity was deliberate – by revealing little, Beijing hoped to present a credible uncertainty to potential aggressors, dissuading them from ever gambling on a disarming first strike.

No First Use Policy and Strategic Ambiguity

At the core of China’s nuclear doctrine is its No First Use policy. According to official statements, China vows never to use nuclear weapons first, and never to use or threaten them against non-nuclear states. Beijing touts NFU as a hallmark of its “self-defensive” nuclear strategy, emphasizing that its weapons exist only to deter nuclear aggression. In diplomatic arenas, China has even urged other nuclear powers to adopt a mutual NFU treaty, reiterating this proposal as recently as 2024. The NFU pledge and China’s frequent assurances that it “does not engage in any nuclear arms race” and keeps its forces at the “minimum level required for national security” form a narrative meant to signal restraint and responsibility.

 Yet, this declaratory posture also embodies China’s strategic ambiguity. For one, minimum deterrence remains undefined – Chinese officials have never quantified what a “minimum” nuclear capability means in practice. Is it a few dozen warheads able to strike back? A few hundred? As China’s arsenal grows, the goalposts appear to shift. Similarly, what constitutes an “arms race” is left vague. Beijing’s current buildup – by far its largest and fastest ever – ostensibly does not violate its pledge to avoid arms racing, at least in its own view. This hints that China’s leadership reserves the right to adjust nuclear force requirements as the strategic environment changes, all while claiming to uphold defensive intent.

Crucially, China’s nuclear doctrine has begun to stress achieving “strategic counterbalance” with other powers. Though not officially defined, this phrase suggests Beijing sees its nuclear forces as vital to shaping the global power equilibrium. It implies a more assertive role for nukes – not merely to deter an attack on China, but to offset the overall military might of rivals, particularly the United States. This nuanced shift in language contributes to uncertainty. Does “counterbalance” mean China seeks nuclear parity with the U.S.? Or simply a survivable second-strike? The lack of clarity keeps observers guessing.

Another layer of ambiguity surrounds the absolute commitment to NFU. Officially, China insists NFU is unconditional and permanent. Chinese experts treat it as something of a dogma ingrained in strategic culture. There is scant open debate in Beijing about altering NFU, and no alternative doctrine has ever been announced. However, foreign analysts periodically question whether China might revisit NFU if its security environment deteriorates. Notably, when a 2023 Chinese policy paper on global security omitted any mention of NFU, some wondered if Beijing was quietly softening its stance. Chinese diplomats later reaffirmed that NFU remained intact, suggesting the omission was not a policy shift. Still, the mere possibility that China could one day revise or misapply NFU – for example, in a dire conventional conflict – adds to international unease. Beijing’s opacity about its internal red lines means other countries can only speculate how firmly NFU would hold in an extreme crisis. In sum, China’s proud no-first-use pledge is both a comforting assurance and, paradoxically, a source of uncertainty, given the lack of transparency around its implementation.

Modernisation of China’s Nuclear Arsenal

Over the past decade, China has embarked on an unprecedented modernisation of its nuclear forces – one that belies its rhetoric of minimalism. In the last five years especially, Beijing has significantly expanded its arsenal with new weapons types, greater warhead numbers, and improved delivery systems. This build-up spans all three legs of a nuclear triad:

• Land-Based Missiles: China is dramatically bolstering its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. It has developed at least three new vast missile silo fields in remote western regions to host advanced solid-fuel ICBMs. Each field may contain 100 or more silos, signalling potential for a major increase in deployed missiles. Construction of new silos for older liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs is also underway. The newest ICBM, the Dongfeng-41 (DF-41), was unveiled publicly in 2019 and is thought to carry multiple warheads with a range up to ~15,000 km – putting the entire U.S. in reach. Road-mobile DF-41 launchers and silo-based units are now entering service, providing China with a more survivable and potent long-range deterrent. Beijing is also testing new variants of ICBMs and “advanced strategic delivery systems” including possibly hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.
• Sea-Based Nuclear Forces: The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates a growing fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to ensure a second-strike capability at sea. Six Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs are in service, each armed with 12 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Initially these subs carried the JL-2 missile (range ~7,200 km), which could threaten regional targets but not the U.S. mainland unless the sub ventured deep into the Pacific. Now China is refitting its Jin-class subs with the longer-range JL-3 SLBM, reported to reach roughly 10,000 km. The JL-3 will allow Chinese subs patrolling near home waters to target parts of the continental United States for the first time. Notably, the JL-3 is believed to be capable of carrying multiple warheads, multiplying the destructive potential of each missile. A next-generation SSBN (Type 096) is in development and could begin construction soon, further improving China’s sea-based stealth and missile capacity. That said, China’s current subs are relatively noisy compared to U.S. or Russian counterparts, which may limit their survivability on distant patrols. Improving the stealth of its nuclear submarines remains a priority in China’s modernisation drive.
• Air Leg and Other Delivery Systems: After decades of keeping its bomber force out of the nuclear role, China appears to be re-nuclearising its air leg. The PLA Air Force has assigned an operational nuclear mission to some long-range bombers, specifically the H-6N, which can carry a new air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) believed to be nuclear-capable. This development effectively gives China a triad – land, sea, and air-based nuclear delivery – for the first time in its history. The nuclear-capable ALBM (suspected designation “CH-AS-X-13”) could extend the reach of China’s deterrent and provide flexible strike options. Meanwhile, China continues to advance hypersonic glide vehicles, which can travel at extreme speeds and maneuver unpredictably. In July 2021, Beijing startled U.S. intelligence by testing a nuclear-capable hypersonic boost-glide vehicle that was lofted into orbit and circled the globe before re-entering the atmosphere and striking near its target. This fractional orbital bombardment test demonstrated a potential capability to attack from unexpected vectors, evading traditional early-warning systems. Although China downplayed the experiment as a routine spacecraft test, the prospect of hypersonic weapons in its arsenal adds a worrisome cutting-edge to the nuclear force.

Another notable aspect of China’s modernisation is the introduction of dual-capable missiles – systems deployable with either conventional or nuclear warheads. The prime example is the Dongfeng-26 (DF-26) intermediate-range ballistic missile, which China has fielded in increasing numbers. The DF-26 has multiple variants (including an anti-ship version) and a range of about 4,000 km, covering U.S. bases in Asia or targets as far as India. Importantly, some DF-26 units are equipped for nuclear missions while others are conventional-only. The PLA Rocket Force has even practiced rapidly swapping a DF-26’s warhead in the field – potentially switching from conventional to nuclear configuration on short notice. This kind of conventional-nuclear entanglement represents a new level of ambiguity in China’s force posture.

 Overall, the scale and speed of China’s nuclear build-up are remarkable. Once content with a few dozen warheads on a handful of missiles, Beijing is now producing more nuclear weapons than ever before and deploying more types of delivery systems than at any point in its history. Analysts note that this is “among the largest and most rapid modernization campaigns” of any nuclear-armed state. The exact motivations are debated – Chinese officials cite the deteriorating security environment and advances by other powers, while outsiders suspect Beijing seeks a stronger deterrent to dissuade U.S. intervention in Asia and to assert great-power status. Whatever the intent, China’s strategic forces circa 2025 look very different from a decade prior.

Current Capabilities, Deployment and Command Structure

Estimating China’s current nuclear capabilities is challenging due to intentional secrecy, but some outlines can be discerned. As of 2024–2025, the Chinese nuclear stockpile is believed to comprise on the order of 600 warheads available for deployment on ballistic missiles and bombers. This marks a sharp increase from an estimated ~290 warheads in 2019. The U.S. Department of Defense reported that China had surpassed 600 operational warheads by mid-2024. However, it is crucial to note that Chinese warheads are not kept mated on missiles at all times in the same “operational” sense as U.S. or Russian warheads. Instead, China keeps nearly all nuclear warheads in storage separate from their delivery systems during peacetime. The warheads are held at secure central and regional depots (including a major underground facility in the Qinling Mountains) and would be mobilised and mounted to missiles only when higher alert levels are activated.

 This peacetime posture reflects China’s doctrinal emphasis on avoiding hair-trigger readiness. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains what it calls a “moderate” state of alert for its nuclear forces. In practice, this means a portion of forces are on low alert (with missiles and warheads de-mated), while a smaller portion may be kept at higher readiness. Indeed, recent Pentagon assessments indicate China now assigns some missile units to “high alert duty” drills, in which a battalion is designated ready to launch at short notice. This suggests a shift toward a dual-track readiness – most forces off-alert, but a rotating subset capable of rapid reaction. Satellite imagery and reports have shown increased activity at missile bases, possibly reflecting these heightened alert drills.

 Command and control of China’s nuclear weapons is firmly centralised under the Chinese Communist Party leadership. The Central Military Commission – chaired by President Xi Jinping – holds ultimate authority to release nuclear weapons. The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), a dedicated branch for land-based missiles, operates the majority of delivery systems. Rigid political control is enforced to prevent unauthorised use; historically, the separation of warheads from missiles was one method to ensure no rogue launches. The flip side is that, in a crisis, China would need to mate warheads and issue launch authority under intense time pressure, testing its command and control resilience. The introduction of a submarine leg also complicates command and control: ballistic missile submarines on patrol must have some communication links for launch orders, yet maintaining secure comms without exposing submarine location is a challenge. There is no public evidence that submarine commanders have pre-delegated launch authority – likely they do not, consistent with China’s preference for tight centralized control. This means China’s nuclear C2 is highly reliant on communications infrastructure connecting leadership to far-flung launch units. Protecting those links (from cyber interference, anti-satellite attacks, or wartime disruption) is a growing priority, as is developing reliable early-warning systems to detect incoming attacks.

 In terms of force structure, China’s land-based missile arsenal now includes both silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs (DF-5, DF-31, DF-41 families), as well as medium- and intermediate-range missiles (DF-21, DF-26) for regional deterrence. The silo fields under construction could eventually house hundreds of ICBMs, potentially on “shell game” rotation (moving missiles between silos to complicate targeting). The mobile ICBMs provide shoot-and-scoot survivability across China’s vast territory, often using the extensive network of underground tunnels (sometimes dubbed the “Underground Great Wall”) to conceal movements. Regionally, the dual-capable DF-26 IRBMs give flexible reach to U.S. bases in Guam or even the Indian subcontinent, while older DF-21 medium-range missiles appear to be phasing out of the nuclear role in favour of the DF-26. At sea, the six Jin-class SSBNs carry up to 72 SLBMs (12 per sub). It remains unclear how often these subs conduct deterrence patrols armed with nuclear-tipped JL-2/3 missiles; traditionally China’s SSBNs have mostly remained in port, but as JL-3 improves their range, at-sea patrols may become more routine. In the air, a few dozen H-6N bombers provide a rudimentary air-delivered capability, likely carrying a single ALBM each. China is also developing a next-generation strategic bomber (H-20 stealth bomber), which could be nuclear-capable in the future, further strengthening the air leg.

 Notably, even as China’s arsenal grows, it continues to keep outside observers guessing about key metrics and intentions. Beijing has never publicly disclosed the number of nuclear warheads it possesses or the number of missiles and submarines in its force. This lack of transparency extends to its fissile material stockpiles and production. By keeping such data secret, China likely aims to avoid giving adversaries targeting information and to enhance deterrence through uncertainty. However, it also means foreign governments rely on estimates and worst-case assumptions. The Pentagon projects that China’s warhead stockpile will exceed 1,000 by 2030, more than doubling in a few years. Some earlier U.S. estimates even posited ~1,500 warheads by 2035 if China’s build-up continues apace. Beijing has not confirmed or denied these projections, sticking to generic statements about maintaining “minimum requirements.” The opacity around China’s future force size and alert status thus becomes a wildcard: other nuclear powers must plan for the possibility that China’s capabilities could expand significantly, even if Beijing’s official stance is that it “does not engage in arms races.”

Limited Transparency and Risks of Misunderstanding

China’s deliberate policy of secrecy and ambiguity in nuclear matters, while perhaps serving its deterrence objectives, carries serious risks. The most acute danger is that limited transparency can lead to misunderstanding or worst-case assumptions, especially during crises. When military rivals do not have clear insight into each other’s doctrines or red lines, they are more prone to misinterpret signals and actions. Unfortunately, China today has minimal dedicated communication mechanisms with the other major nuclear powers to manage such risks. Unlike the U.S. and Russia – which built hotlines, regular arms control dialogues, and data exchanges during the Cold War – China has historically been reluctant to engage in bilateral nuclear confidence-building. There is no U.S.-China arms control treaty or formal transparency regime; even high-level military-to-military talks have been sporadic. With India, China has virtually no direct nuclear dialogue at all. This communication gap means that in a fast-moving conflict, Beijing, Washington, and New Delhi could be essentially guessing at each other’s intentions.

 One major area of concern is the conventional-nuclear entanglement of forces – a situation made more likely by China’s dual-capable weapons. If a crisis or war erupts, Chinese missiles that can carry either nuclear or conventional warheads would pose a vexing ambiguity. For example, if China deployed DF-26 missiles in a regional clash (whether against U.S. forces in Asia or in a potential India-China border conflict), the adversary’s intelligence might not be able to tell if those missiles are armed with nuclear warheads or high-explosive ones. Preparations to launch – or the actual launch of – a DF-26 in the heat of battle could thus be misinterpreted as a nuclear strike and trigger nuclear retaliation. James Acton, a nuclear expert, describes this peril as “warhead ambiguity” – when the other side cannot determine if a weapon being readied is nuclear or not. In such a scenario, a false assumption could literally start a nuclear war by mistake. The side observing the ambiguous missile might opt for a pre-emptive strike or rapid escalation, fearing the worst. This kind of inadvertent escalation risk is serious and growing as China (and other nuclear states) field more dual-use systems.

 Another aspect of China’s opacity is the uncertainty it creates about thresholds for nuclear use. Because Beijing does not spell out its red lines (beyond a general NFU pledge), adversaries can only speculate when China might deem nuclear retaliation necessary. Would China ever use nuclear weapons first if, say, a war over Taiwan was going badly and the survival of Communist Party rule was at stake? Officially no, but some U.S. analysts worry that extreme circumstances could test China’s commitment to NFU. If U.S. planners do not entirely trust China’s declaratory policy, they might take pre-emptive measures in a conflict – such as striking China’s nuclear forces early, to forestall any chance of Chinese nuclear employment. However, attacking China’s nuclear arsenal, even conventionally, could itself be seen by Beijing as the start of a nuclear offensive by the U.S., potentially spurring China to actually launch nuclear weapons in desperation. This nightmare feedback loop of mistrust is exactly what cold-war style arms control and communication were designed to prevent. In the absence of such guardrails with China, miscalculation becomes more likely.

 The risks are not limited to U.S.-China; they extend to India and the broader Asia-Pacific. In the China-India context, strategic ambiguity has led to divergent perceptions. Indian security analysts closely track China’s nuclear advances and express concern, whereas Chinese analysts historically dismissed the role of nuclear weapons in their India relationship. Many in Beijing have viewed India’s nuclear arsenal as too small or backward to worry about, focusing their attention on the U.S. and Russia. This dismissive attitude, however, may breed complacency. China’s build-up could pressure India to expand its own arsenal to avoid falling too far behind, which in turn could destabilise South Asia by nudging Pakistan (India’s rival) to respond. Indeed, Chinese experts sometimes underestimate how Beijing’s actions shape New Delhi’s threat perceptions and nuclear strategy. The lack of direct nuclear dialogue means misunderstandings fester – for instance, India might doubt China’s NFU commitment just as China underestimates India’s resolve. During the 2020 border clashes in the Himalayas, nuclear weapons stayed firmly in the background of the confrontation, with both sides exercising restraint. But as each builds more capabilities and nationalist fervour grows, the next crisis could see greater nuclear shadow-boxing. A misread troop movement or missile deployment along the border, without any hotline to clarify intentions, could spark panic. Limited transparency between China and India thus contributes to an unstable situation where neither fully grasps the other’s nuclear calculus.

 In sum, China’s tight control over information regarding its nuclear forces – the “nuclear ambiguity” of the title – is a double-edged sword. It may enhance China’s deterrence by complicating enemy planning, but it also magnifies the risk of misinterpretation. As one scholar warns, ambiguity about a weapon’s status before launch is an underappreciated danger that could precipitate inadvertent nuclear escalation. The world today has scant experience managing a three-way nuclear rivalry (U.S.-Russia-China), let alone one that includes regional dyads like China-India. The communication and transparency gap increases the chance that what one side doesn’t know – or misunderstands – about the other could be the spark that ignites a nuclear exchange.

Potential Flashpoints and Escalation Scenarios

How might China’s strategic ambiguity actually trigger a nuclear exchange? Several hypothetical scenarios illustrate the pathways to disaster if miscalculation occurs:

• Taiwan Strait Crisis – Crossing the Nuclear Threshold: The most likely flashpoint for a U.S.-China military conflict is Taiwan. In a severe Taiwan crisis or war, nuclear escalation risk looms in the background for both sides. China has strong incentives to keep the U.S. and its allies out of a Taiwan fight, and some analysts speculate Beijing might leveraged its nuclear arsenal for coercion. For instance, China could issue veiled nuclear threats or even signal a policy shift away from No First Use to warn off U.S. intervention. Chinese leaders have noted how Russia’s explicit nuclear threats during the Ukraine war in 2022 seemingly deterred direct Western intervention. In a future Taiwan scenario, Xi Jinping might similarly order demonstrations of nuclear readiness – perhaps dispersing mobile ICBMs, sending SSBNs to sea, or conducting missile test launches – to raise the stakes for Washington. If China were to overtly raise its nuclear alert level or hint that an attack on its territory could provoke nuclear use, U.S. decision-makers would face extreme pressure. American forces might then take steps to pre-empt or counter any imminent Chinese nuclear action, including strikes on Chinese missile units. Each side would be operating under intense time constraints and imperfect information. The fog of war could easily cause an incident: e.g., China detects what it thinks is a nuclear missile inbound (when in fact it might be a conventional prompt-strike weapon), and feeling its back against the wall, China launches a retaliatory nuclear strike. The Taiwan theatre brings a real danger of rapid escalation, given its importance to both parties. Analysts at the Atlantic Council warn that any U.S.-China war over Taiwan would carry a significant danger of escalating to the nuclear level – potentially through limited nuclear use to change the outcome of battle. Only careful crisis management and clear signalling (which are hindered by China’s opacity) could hope to prevent that.
• Conventional Conflict Meets Nuclear Ambiguity: Another scenario arises if there is a conventional clash involving China, in which one side misreads the other’s nuclear intentions. The earlier example of a DF-26 launch is apt here. Imagine a conflict in the Western Pacific where the PLA Rocket Force fires conventional missiles at U.S. naval forces or bases (for instance, on Guam or Okinawa). The U.S., unsure whether those missiles could carry nuclear warheads, is faced with a split-second judgment. If U.S. commanders assume worst-case and interpret the salvo as a potential nuclear attack, they might respond with their own nuclear weapons to blunt the perceived threat. Conversely, if the U.S. waits to see impact and it was nuclear, it would suffer a devastating blow. This extreme pressure could lead to inadvertent nuclear war by miscalculation, essentially a doomsday scenario born of ambiguity. Modern military technologies also complicate this picture: hypersonic glide vehicles, like those China is developing, compress decision times because they can strike very quickly. An incoming HGV blurs the line between nuclear and non-nuclear ambiguity further – is it a conventional prompt strike or a nuclear first strike? The defender might not know until detonation. Such dynamics existed in Cold War planning, but China’s new systems and the lack of China-U.S. arms control agreements make the situation more volatile today than in decades.
• India-China Border Crisis: Consider a future border standoff between China and India that escalates into broader hostilities. Both nations have NFU policies, so a deliberate nuclear first strike is unlikely. However, intense fighting could raise the spectre of nuclear use indirectly. If India, fearing China’s superior conventional forces, began moving its medium-range Agni nuclear missiles for dispersal, Beijing could grow alarmed. Lacking mutual trust, China might wonder if India intends to break NFU under certain conditions. China could respond by mobilising its own nuclear units in Tibet or Xinjiang for signaling. Without direct communication, each side’s moves could appear more menacing than intended. There is also a triangular dimension: Pakistan, India’s nuclear rival, could misinterpret India’s actions (meant for China) as directed at itself, and ready its arsenal – an escalatory cascade. A relatively contained border war could thus activate nuclear alerts on three fronts. Even if no side wanted nuclear war, the chance of a mistake or technical accident grows exponentially once weapons are cocked and loaded in a crisis. The absence of China-India nuclear hotlines or regular strategic dialogue means there is no reliable channel to defuse such a misunderstanding in real time. As one Carnegie study notes, Chinese experts often downplay the risk of nuclear escalation with India, assuming both sides will act cautiously. That very complacency could prove dangerous if it leads to misreading Indian signals. Both countries’ nuclear restraint policies, including NFU, are under some internal debate as their security competition intensifies. A miscalculation in a future crisis – such as mistakenly perceiving an existential threat – could test the strength of those policies, with potentially dire consequences.

These scenarios underscore that China’s strategic ambiguity, when mixed with fast-paced conflicts, could amplify the fog of war. Whether in the East Asian maritime domain or the Himalayan mountains, the risk is that nuclear weapons come into play not by deliberate choice but by mistake. Such an outcome would fulfill the warning in this article’s title: what the world doesn’t know (or misunderstands) about China’s nuclear posture could start a war, one of unimaginable scale.

Avoiding Nuclear Escalation: Bridging Gaps and Building Confidence

Preventing a nuclear cataclysm involving China is not solely China’s responsibility – it requires concerted efforts by all nuclear stakeholders to bridge the gaps in understanding and communication. However, given China’s rising capabilities, the onus is increasingly on Beijing to provide clarity about its intentions and to engage in risk-reduction measures. Several steps could help reduce the danger of miscalculation stemming from China’s nuclear ambiguity:

• Enhance Strategic Dialogue: It is imperative that China opens dedicated channels of communication with both the United States and India on nuclear risk reduction. Even unofficial Track-2 dialogues have been scarce (especially with India). Formal talks on nuclear doctrines, while sensitive, would allow each side to clarify how they view escalation and what their red lines are. China’s reluctance to acknowledge India as a nuclear peer is a political hurdle, but maintaining silence is increasingly risky. A China-India nuclear dialogue could be structured to avoid diplomatic pitfalls (for instance, it need not imply recognition of India’s NPT status, but rather focus on practical measures to avoid war). With the U.S., strategic stability talks that include nuclear dimensions would help both sides manage the emerging reality of a three-way deterrent system. Simply resuming military-to-military hotlines and communication channels – and using them in crises – would be a baseline improvement. In essence, more transparency in peacetime can build a modicum of trust that may pay dividends when crisis comes.
• Clarify Nuclear Signaling and Doctrine: China could mitigate ambiguity by clearly articulating certain aspects of its nuclear policy. One example is distinguishing its conventional ballistic missile operations from nuclear ones. Developing agreed protocols or notifications for missile tests and exercises could prevent false alarms. If, say, China is conducting a major DF-26 conventional missile drill, informing other powers in advance might stop misinterpretation. Additionally, Beijing could publicly clarify that any change to its NFU policy would be explicitly announced (to dispel the kind of rumours that omission in 2023 sparked). Reaffirming at the highest levels that nuclear weapons are solely for retaliation against nuclear attack – and backing this up with observable practices – would reinforce credibility. Of course, China prizes flexibility and might resist giving away information. But even small gestures, like publishing a defence white paper with basic data on its arsenal size or the number of missiles (as the U.S. and Russia often do), would signal confidence and reduce uncertainty.
• Avoid Entangling Nuclear and Conventional Forces: Both China and its adversaries can take steps to de-entangle nuclear assets from conventional ones. For China, this could mean dedicating certain missile units exclusively to nuclear roles and others to conventional roles, and conveying this separation (even indirectly) to reduce ambiguity. The current practice of mixing nuclear/conventional DF-26 brigades is efficient for China but dangerous for crisis stability. If segregation is not possible, technical measures – such as devices or agreed inspection regimes – to assure a missile’s warhead status (nuclear or not) might be explored in future arms control frameworks. Similarly, the U.S. could avoid deploying conventionally armed missiles that are indistinguishable from nuclear ones, to reduce Chinese misperceptions. This broader issue of warhead ambiguity is a two-way street; it calls for innovative confidence-building measures (for example, Russia and the U.S. in the past considered distinguishing conventional cruise missiles from nuclear ones via external markings). Bringing China into such discussions is vital as its forces grow.
• Crisis Hotlines and Communication Protocols: When tensions spike, having reliable direct lines of communication is critical. A lesson of the Cold War was the establishment of the Moscow-Washington hotline after the Cuban Missile Crisis, which helped avert misunderstandings in later crises. Today, a similar Beijing-Washington hotline exists but needs to be active and trusted – it should be used for clear communication in any incident involving military forces. The same goes for Beijing-New Delhi: currently, their crisis communications focus on border troop commanders, not nuclear matters. Setting up an emergency line for leadership communication specifically about strategic concerns could prove lifesaving in a precarious moment. Additionally, agreeing on communication protocols – for instance, that if one side’s early warning systems detect what looks like an incoming nuclear strike, they will as a rule confer via hotline before retaliating – could address false alarms. Such protocols are admittedly hard to establish and even harder to trust in the moment, but they at least provide a framework for sanity when automated systems and human nerves are on edge.
• Arms Control and Transparency Measures: In the long run, integrating China into international arms control efforts will be essential for global nuclear stability. This might involve creative new approaches since traditional U.S.-Russia style arms reduction (with equal caps) may not immediately appeal to Beijing, which still has a smaller arsenal. Nonetheless, preliminary steps like mutual declarations of arsenal size, exchange of missile test telemetry, or agreements on not targeting each other’s nuclear forces, can build confidence. Regional arms control – for example, a treaty among China, India, and Pakistan to refrain from certain dangerous practices – could also be pursued. One idea floated is a no-targeting agreement where nuclear states pledge not to target population centers (city avoidance) – this is symbolic but could reduce the sense of existential threat. More concretely, China could take up arms control consultations with the U.S. (something it has been hesitant about while its arsenal was much smaller). Now that it is approaching parity in numbers, Beijing might find value in shaping the rules of the game rather than letting them be imposed. Transparency can be incremental: China could start by allowing observer visits to showcase the separation of warheads from missiles (proving its commitment to non-launch-on-warning posture), or share its nuclear security practices to assure others that its weapons are safe from theft or accidental launch.

Ultimately, avoiding nuclear escalation will require mutual respect for each other’s core interests and red lines, alongside these technical and diplomatic measures. The U.S., China, and India (and Russia, which is also a factor in Asia) need to better understand how each perceives nuclear use and what each considers unacceptable. Miscommunication in this realm could be fatal. The goal should be to move away from strategic ambiguity where it is dangerous – for example, no side should be guessing whether the other is about to go nuclear. Instead, through dialogue and confidence-building, there should be a shared understanding that nuclear weapons are truly last-resort deterrents, not tools for coercion in a conventional war. If China’s nuclear doctrine remains analytically neutral and defensive as it claims, Beijing has a strong case to make that clearer to the world.

Conclusion

China’s nuclear strategy today sits at a crossroads of consistency and change. The historical constants – No First Use, a posture of assured retaliation, and a rhetoric of minimal deterrence – provide some reassurance that Beijing does not seek nuclear war nor domination. However, the rapid modernisation and expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal introduce new uncertainties that the world has not previously had to confront with China. Beijing’s “nuclear ambiguity” – its tight control over information and its mixing of nuclear with advanced conventional capabilities – is a calculated gamble that enough uncertainty will deter aggression. Yet that same ambiguity could backfire disastrously by leading an adversary to imagine the worst and act on mistaken beliefs. In a nuclear standoff, perception is reality, and misperception can be lethal.

What the world doesn’t know about China’s nuclear forces indeed could start a war, if mistrust and worst-case thinking fill the void of uncertainty. The risk is heightened by the geopolitical friction between China and other powers: the U.S.-China strategic rivalry is deepening, and each side is wary of the other’s intentions, while India-China relations have grown more fraught with border clashes and aligning of alliances. These conditions make open communication about nuclear matters both more difficult and more necessary than ever. Avoiding a nuclear catastrophe will depend on pragmatic steps to reduce misunderstanding – from dialogues and hotlines to possible arms control understandings that include China as a full participant.

For its part, China faces a choice: continue expanding its nuclear forces behind a veil of ambiguity, or embrace a degree of transparency and engagement to stabilize great-power nuclear relations. The coming years will reveal which path Beijing takes. The world will be watching closely, hoping that increased capabilities are matched by increased clarity. In the nuclear realm, ambiguity can be deadly. Ensuring that China’s nuclear doctrine is understood – by friend and foe alike – may well be a prerequisite for peace in the 21st century. The stakes could not be higher, for in the nuclear age, what we don’t know can hurt us.

References:

1. Johns, Eliana and Knight, Mackenzie. “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2025.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 81, no. 2 (March 2025), pp. 135-160. thebulletin.orgthebulletin.org. (Details China’s rapid nuclear modernization, including new missile silo fields, DF-26 deployment, JL-3 SLBM introduction, nuclear-capable bombers, and an estimated stockpile of ~600 warheads as of 2024.)
2. Ministry of National Defense of PRC. China’s National Defense in the New Era (White Paper, 2019 & updated policy 2023). thebulletin.org. (Reiterates China’s No First Use policy “at any time and under any circumstances,” pledge not to threaten non-nuclear states, and commitment to minimum deterrence and no arms race.)
3. Hautecouverture, Benjamin. “Chinese No-First-Use: A Strategic Signaling Device, Diplomatic Tool, and Dogmatic Reality.” Note de la FRS No. 06/2025 (Foundation for Strategic Research, April 2025).  (Discusses the centrality of NFU in Chinese strategy, recent debates about its omission in certain documents, and the reaffirmation of NFU as a cornerstone despite China’s expanding arsenal.)
4. Kristensen, Hans M. and Korda, Matt. Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2021. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77:6 (2021), pp. 318-336. (Details on China’s dual-capable DF-26 missiles and the risks of warhead ambiguity, as well as information on JL-2 and JL-3 submarine-launched missiles and their ranges.)
5. Acton, James M. “Is It a Nuke? Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2020. (Analysis of how ambiguity in whether a weapon is nuclear or conventional could lead to misinterpretation and inadvertent nuclear war, citing risks relevant to U.S.-China and other rivalries.)
6. Dalton, Toby and Zhao, Tong. “At a Crossroads? China-India Nuclear Relations After the Border Clash.” Carnegie Endowment, August 19, 2020. (Findings from Chinese and Indian experts’ views: Chinese analysts often dismiss the nuclear aspect of India relations, potentially underestimating future risks, and highlighting the lack of nuclear dialogue.)
7. Atlantic Council. “The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Taiwan Crisis.” Issue Brief by Matthew Kroenig et al., 2023. (Explores how China’s nuclear arsenal could be used to deter U.S. intervention in a Taiwan scenario, including possibly raising nuclear readiness or threatening to change its No First Use stance, and the escalatory implications thereof.)
8. Arms Control Association – Shannon Bugos. “China Tested Hypersonic Capability, U.S. Says.” Arms Control Today, Nov. 2021.(Reports on China’s July 2021 test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle that orbited the globe, surprising U.S. observers and raising concerns about advanced delivery systems; includes China’s official denial that it was a weapon test.)