The question of whether Iran can be trusted to honor an agreement curbing its nuclear weapons development is complex. Iran’s nuclear program has spanned decades, mixing periods of cooperation and transparency with episodes of secrecy and non-compliance. To assess Iran’s trustworthiness in abiding by a nuclear deal, it is important to review the history of its nuclear research, past agreements and violations, allegations of weaponization, and instances of both obstruction and cooperation. This article examines these factors in clear, accessible terms, before offering a reasoned conclusion on Iran’s likely behavior regarding a nuclear weapons ban.
History of Iran’s Nuclear Research
Iran’s nuclear ambitions began under the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1950s. With help from the United States’ “Atoms for Peace” program, Iran established a civilian nuclear program and received its first research reactor in 1967. The Shah’s government had grand plans for nuclear energy – aiming to build multiple power reactors and even investing in a European uranium enrichment consortium in the 1970s. Iran was an original signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 (ratified in 1970), committing not to pursue nuclear weapons. However, the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) halted the nuclear program for some time.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Iran revived its nuclear efforts – but much of it was kept hidden. Tehran began clandestine work on the nuclear fuel cycle, secretly acquiring uranium enrichment technology from abroad (notably via Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan’s black market). By the late 1990s, senior Iranian officials launched an organized weapons program known as the Amad Plan, aimed at developing at least five nuclear warheads by the early 2000s. This covert project, led by nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, made significant progress in warhead design and even conducted high-explosive tests relevant to triggering a nuclear blast. The major thing Iran still lacked for a bomb was fissile material – the highly enriched uranium or plutonium core.
Iran’s secret nuclear work came to light in August 2002, when an Iranian dissident group – the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) – held a press conference revealing two undeclared nuclear facilities: a uranium enrichment site at Natanz and a heavy-water production plant at Arak. These disclosures were a bombshell. Both sites could be used for peaceful purposes, but also had clear weapons implications (enriched uranium from Natanz or plutonium from a heavy-water reactor at Arak could fuel bombs). The fact that Iran had built these facilities in secret, without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required, immediately raised red flags about the true intent of its program. Facing international pressure after the 2002 revelations (and the U.S. invasion of neighboring Iraq in 2003), Iran halted the Amad Plan and temporarily opened some nuclear activities to scrutiny. However, as will be seen, this did not end suspicions regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which would continue in different forms.
Past Nuclear Agreements and Non-Compliance
Iran’s history with nuclear agreements is mixed. After its secret sites were exposed in 2002, Iran initially agreed in 2003 to a deal with Britain, France, and Germany (the “EU-3”) to suspend uranium enrichment and accept more intrusive inspections under the Additional Protocol to the NPT. For a time, Iran did suspend enrichment and allowed IAEA inspectors greater access. But this cooperation started to fray by mid-2004 – the IAEA complained in June 2004 that Iran was not fully complying with inspection requests, and Iran threatened to resume enrichment activities. A final attempt at a temporary agreement (the Paris Agreement in late 2004) soon fell apart. By August 2005, Iran restarted conversion of uranium and, shortly thereafter, enrichment, effectively ending the suspension. In early 2006, the IAEA formally found Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the issue to the UN Security Council. Over the next years, the UN imposed multiple rounds of sanctions as Iran continued to expand its enrichment program.
The most significant nuclear agreement was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached in 2015 between Iran and six world powers. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to strict, but temporary, constraints on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Key provisions included capping uranium enrichment at 3.67% purity (suitable for power reactors but far below weapons-grade), limiting the enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms, reducing the number of operating centrifuges by two-thirds, and halting plutonium production by pouring concrete into the core of the Arak heavy-water reactor. Iran also agreed to implement the Additional Protocol and other transparency measures, allowing IAEA inspectors broad access to verify compliance. These measures were intended to keep Iran at least a year away from having enough material for a bomb, for a duration of 10-15 years.
For the first few years, Iran broadly complied with the JCPOA. The IAEA issued numerous reports confirming that Iran kept enrichment levels and stockpiles within the agreed limits and allowed the promised monitoring. For example, in September 2016 the IAEA verified that Iran’s enrichment did not exceed 3.67%, its enriched uranium stockpile was under 300 kg, and it was only using approved numbers and types of centrifuges. Iran even shipped out or diluted the bulk of its existing enriched uranium and converted the Fordow enrichment plant into a research facility as required. It provisionally implemented the Additional Protocol, meaning inspectors could conduct snap visits to undeclared sites, and provided extra information on its nuclear activities. These actions demonstrated transparency. In short, from 2015 until 2018, Iran was deemed to be honoring its commitments under the deal, and in return it enjoyed significant sanctions relief.
However, the situation changed after the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions. Iran initially continued to abide by the deal’s terms for about a year, hoping the remaining parties could compensate for U.S. sanctions. But by mid-2019, Tehran began openly violating the JCPOA limits in a step-by-step response to U.S. pressure. In July 2019, the IAEA confirmed Iran had exceeded the 300 kg cap on low-enriched uranium. The following month, Iran started enriching uranium to 4.5%, above the 3.67% ceiling. Since then, Iran has progressively lifted virtually all restrictions: it installed more advanced centrifuges, resumed enrichment at the underground Fordow site, and enriched to higher levels. In January 2020, Iran announced it would no longer be bound by any JCPOA limits. By 2021, Iran was enriching uranium to 20% purity and even 60% purity – far above any civilian need – and stockpiling hundreds of kilograms of this material. These actions blatantly breached the accord, which had forbidden enrichment beyond 3.67%.
Iran justified its breaches as reversible responses to U.S. violations of the deal, insisting it would return to full compliance if sanctions were lifted. Indeed, most of Iran’s JCPOA violations (enriching more uranium to higher levels) could be undone by blending down or shipping out the excess material. But experts note that Iran’s advances during this period also gave it irreversible knowledge gains in operating advanced centrifuges and producing high-enriched uranium. In any case, the record shows that Iran did not fully honor the long-term spirit of the JCPOA once external pressures changed. As of early 2025, talks have been ongoing about possibly reviving or replacing the JCPOA, but Iran’s nuclear program is much expanded compared to 2015, and it is no longer under the tight constraints it once was.
Enrichment Beyond Peaceful Needs
One key indicator of intent is the level to which Iran enriches uranium. Uranium fuel for civilian power reactors is typically enriched to about 3-5% U-235. Research reactors (for medical isotope production) can use fuel enriched up to 20%. But anything beyond that begins entering weapons-useful territory – weapons-grade uranium is around 90% enriched or more. Iran’s decision to enrich to 60%, which it began in 2021, has been widely seen as far beyond any civilian requirement. The head of the IAEA pointed out that Iran is the only country without nuclear weapons to enrich uranium to 60%. The IAEA has stated there is “no credible civilian use” for uranium enriched to this level. Indeed, 60% enriched uranium is a short technical step away from the 90% needed for bomb fuel. By accumulating a stockpile of 60% material, Iran significantly shrinks the time it would need to produce a bomb’s worth of weapons-grade uranium should it decide to do so.
Even more alarming, in early 2023 international inspectors detected uranium particles enriched to 83.7% at Iran’s Fordow underground facility – just shy of weapons-grade. Iran did not announce any program to enrich to that level, and it denied trying to do so, suggesting perhaps it was an “unintentional fluctuation” or a measurement error. Nevertheless, the finding of 84% enriched traces caused concern that Iran may have at least experimented with enrichment very close to bomb-grade. Tehran’s official stance was that its centrifuges overshot the target enrichment level accidentally. But the incident reinforced fears that Iran is inching ever closer to possessing weapons-suitable nuclear material.
Beyond enrichment, there are other activities that have little to no civilian justification. For instance, Iran has conducted experiments with producing uranium metal, ostensibly for research. Uranium metal is used in the core of nuclear weapons, but civilian nuclear fuel is in oxide or gaseous form, not metallic. Under the JCPOA, Iran was explicitly prohibited from producing or acquiring uranium metal for 15 years, due to its weapons relevance. Yet Iran admitted in 2021 that it had started small-scale uranium metal production, claiming it was to develop fuel for a research reactor. The IAEA found this concerning, and as of 2025 Iran had not fully explained a discrepancy in its uranium metal research activities. This is another example of work that nudges Iran’s program closer to weapons-applicable know-how despite having questionable peaceful utility.
Allegations of Secret Weapons-Related Work
Over the years, numerous allegations have surfaced that Iran engaged in nuclear weapons development research in secret, even while publicly insisting its program was purely peaceful. Many of these revelations have come from Iranian opposition groups or Western intelligence, and later some were partially confirmed by the IAEA. The NCRI dissident coalition, for example, not only blew the whistle on Natanz and Arak in 2002, but subsequently exposed other covert sites. In 2004, the group revealed a secret military research center in Tehran’s Lavizan-Shian district, which they claimed housed a Defense Ministry project on nuclear weaponization. Shortly after this became public, Iran literally demolished the Lavizan facility – razing buildings and even removing large quantities of topsoil, in what was widely seen as an attempt to sanitize the site before any inspectors could see it. Satellite images supported the claim that buildings were torn down and soil excavated at Lavizan in 2003-2004, erasing possible evidence of undeclared nuclear activity. When the IAEA asked to visit the location, Iran eventually allowed inspectors in mid-2004 to take environmental samples, and no obvious traces were found – likely thanks to the prior cleanup. The Lavizan case remains a textbook example of how Iran was willing to hide and destroy evidence of work that it did not want the world to see.
Another notorious site is the military base at Parchin, southeast of Tehran. The IAEA and Western officials suspected that in the early 2000s Iran conducted tests at Parchin related to nuclear weapons high-explosive detonators – possibly using a specialized cylindrical chamber to simulate nuclear core compression. When the IAEA began asking for access to Parchin around 2012, Iran repeatedly refused. In the meantime, Western intelligence observed via satellites that Iran was altering the Parchin site extensively, demolishing buildings and bulldozing and washing parts of the compound. By the time limited access was granted years later, the site had been sanitized to the point that finding evidence was highly unlikely. Iran insisted Parchin was just a conventional military base and dismissed the allegations as “ridiculous”. The IAEA did eventually visit Parchin in 2015 as part of a “roadmap” to resolve outstanding questions, but Iran only permitted a managed access (with Iran taking its own samples under observation). The environmental samples taken did find some traces of man-made uranium particles, but the IAEA did not conclusively determine their origin. Overall, the Parchin saga reinforced perceptions that Iran was willing to stonewall and sanitize sites to prevent discovery of past nuclear weapons-related experiments.
Iran’s pattern of obstruction has included smaller incidents as well. For instance, when the IAEA wanted to inspect the Kalaye Electric Company workshop in Tehran (suspected of enrichment R&D) in 2003, Iran delayed access and reportedly repainted and cleaned the facility thoroughly beforehand. Yet, even after those efforts, IAEA swipe samples at Kalaye still detected traces of enriched uranium, indicating nuclear material had been present. More recently, in 2019, the IAEA found undeclared uranium particles at a warehouse in the Turquzabad district of Tehran – a site that Israel had pointed out as a secret “atomic archive” storage facility. Iran again delayed explanations, and as of 2025 the IAEA reports that questions about the origin of those particles (and two other locations with unexplained nuclear traces) remain unresolved. In some cases Iran has argued that the environmental traces were accidentally brought in on used equipment purchased from abroad, or are otherwise innocuous. But the agency has deemed Iran’s answers unsatisfactory so far, and the issues of undeclared nuclear material remain a sticking point between Iran and inspectors.
Furthermore, opposition sources continue to claim that Iran never truly stopped clandestine work. In 2018, Israeli intelligence seized a trove of Iranian documents (the so-called “Atomic Archive”) from a secret Tehran warehouse, which revealed in great detail the extent of Iran’s weapons program up to 2003 and suggested some activities continued beyond that date. These documents corroborated much of what the IAEA had long suspected – that Iran’s leaders had a structured nuclear weapons program and that knowledge from it was preserved. And in early 2025, the NCRI made new allegations about an active covert site. The group released information on a facility in Iran’s Semnan province, code-named “Rainbow”, which it says is run by the Defense Ministry and engaged in producing tritium. Tritium is a radioactive isotope used to boost the explosive yield of nuclear warheads, but it has virtually no civilian uses (unlike uranium enrichment, which can have peaceful purposes). According to the NCRI, this “Rainbow” facility has been operating for over a decade under a fake cover as a chemicals factory. If these claims are accurate, it would mean Iran is working on materials relevant only to nuclear bombs (tritium can enhance a nuclear explosion) while hiding it from the international community. Iranian officials, for their part, routinely dismiss opposition-sourced revelations as propaganda, and the “Rainbow” site claims have yet to be verified by independent authorities. Nonetheless, the continual emergence of such allegations underscores the deep climate of mistrust. It suggests that even during periods of declared compliance, Iran may be keeping parts of its nuclear program in the shadows.
Obstructing Inspections and Verification
A vital component of any nuclear agreement is the inspections regime – the ability of the IAEA to verify on the ground that a country is not cheating. Iran’s record here is problematic. As described, Iran has at times outright refused access to certain facilities (like Parchin for many years) and only relented under intensive diplomatic pressure. Delays in access give time to remove or clean up evidence, as was observed with both Lavizan and Parchin sites where significant cleanup was noted via satellite. Iranian officials have argued that some of these sites (often military bases) are off-limits to inspectors under sovereign rights or that allegations are baseless so no access is warranted. However, under the Additional Protocol and even the JCPOA’s terms, the IAEA can request access to suspect undeclared sites. Iran’s grudging cooperation in those instances did little to build confidence.
In addition to site access issues, Iran has also been accused of limiting inspector oversight in other ways. In 2020, after a contentious period, Iran reduced the IAEA’s monitoring by ceasing implementation of the Additional Protocol when its parliament passed a law to that effect. Iran shut off certain IAEA remote cameras and limited inspector visits to declared nuclear facilities only (as required by the basic NPT safeguards, but without the extra transparency measures of the JCPOA). In 2022, Iran went further by expelling some experienced IAEA inspectors from the country or revoking their designation, which the IAEA condemned as an impediment to effective verification. Iran claimed these inspectors were biased or had leaked information, but the practical effect was to handicap the inspection regime. The IAEA reported in 2023 and 2024 that it could no longer fully monitor Iran’s nuclear activities in real time, creating gaps in knowledge if Iran were to divert materials.
Another pattern has been Iran “playing for time” when questions arise. For example, when the IAEA discovered evidence of undeclared nuclear material at sites like Turquzabad (revealed by Israel) in 2019, Iran took many months before allowing inspectors to visit some related locations, and in one case did not allow access at all because the site had been sanitized so much that the IAEA assessed a visit would have no verification value. This kind of foot-dragging and selective cooperation undermines the inspection process. Each instance might have its own rationale or excuse, but collectively they paint a picture of a state that often treats its obligations to the IAEA as a cat-and-mouse game – revealing only what it must and concealing whatever it can.
On the other hand, it should be noted that Iran has complied with inspections requirements during certain periods. Under the JCPOA from 2016-2018, Iran did permit an unprecedented level of monitoring: continuous surveillance of enrichment facilities, regular inspector access (including some snap inspections), and detailed reporting of nuclear-related activities. IAEA inspectors conducted hundreds of inspections in Iran each year during that time, and the agency had real-time monitoring via cameras and seals on nuclear materials. This was a level of transparency Iran had not provided before. Even today, Iran maintains its required basic safeguards under the NPT at declared sites – meaning the IAEA still monitors the known enrichment facilities like Natanz and Fordow to ensure no diversion of nuclear material from those sites. The major concern is what might be happening at undeclared sites or with undeclared materials, which is inherently harder to detect. The trust deficit is such that without very stringent verification measures, the international community is reluctant to take Iran at its word.
Temporary vs. Permanent Restrictions
One criticism of past agreements with Iran is that they impose temporary limitations rather than a permanent end to problematic nuclear activities. The JCPOA is a case in point: its key restrictions (often called “sunset clauses”) expire after 10–15 years. After those sunsets, Iran would legally be free to expand its enrichment program to an industrial scale, operate advanced centrifuges, and stockpile more material, as long as it remained under basic NPT inspections. Opponents of the deal argued that this merely delayed Iran’s ability to build a bomb, effectively “kicking the can down the road”. They worried that Iran could simply wait out the clock, then rapidly enrich uranium with advanced technology once the accord expired.
Iran, for its part, has always insisted it will not accept permanent curbs on what it views as its sovereign right to nuclear technology. Iranian officials frequently emphasize that under the NPT, they have a right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and they are unwilling to surrender that right indefinitely. In ongoing talks, Iran has made clear that any new deal cannot eliminate its enrichment program, only regulate it. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was quoted in 2025 saying that Iran’s right to civilian uranium enrichment “cannot be subjected to any deal” – in other words, Iran refuses to sign away enrichment altogether. This stance suggests that Iran would only ever agree to limit the scope or level of enrichment temporarily, in exchange for incentives, but not to permanently forego enrichment or other dual-use nuclear work.
The tension between Iran and Western powers on this issue is fundamental. The international community, especially adversaries like the United States and Israel, would prefer that Iran have zero enrichment capability and zero potential path to bomb material. Iran views that demand as unjust and impractical – no other non-nuclear-weapon state is asked to permanently renounce enrichment if it’s under safeguards. Thus, past agreements have been structured as compromises: Iran keeps a limited program under tight watch. The problem is, once those limits expire or if monitoring falters, Iran’s program could rapidly accelerate. This dynamic makes trust difficult. If Iran’s nuclear activities were truly purely peaceful, one might ask, why not agree to permanent restrictions that still allow nuclear energy but bar weapons-relevant work? The answer seems to be that Iran wants to preserve its option to expand nuclear capacities in the future – which naturally sows doubt about its ultimate intentions.
Tehran’s Public Statements vs. Credibility
Iran’s top leaders have repeatedly declared that nuclear weapons are against their principles and that they do not seek them. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, even issued a purported fatwa (Islamic legal decree) against the acquisition or use of nuclear weapons, calling them forbidden (haram) in Islam. Iranian officials often cite this as evidence of the country’s peaceful aims. For instance, Khamenei has stated, “We ourselves do not want nuclear weapons,” even adding that if Iran had wanted to build them, the U.S. could not have stopped it. This statement, made in 2025, was meant to signal that Iran’s restraint is a choice rooted in moral and strategic calculation, not simply external pressure. President Hassan Rouhani (in office 2013–2021) similarly affirmed that Iran would never seek “weapons of mass destruction” and that its nuclear program is solely for energy and research.
These assurances, however, are met with skepticism outside of Iran. One reason is the discrepancy between rhetoric and past actions. Iran vehemently denied pursuing nuclear weapons throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s – only for the world to later learn about the secret enrichment facilities and weapons research program (Amad Plan) that Iran had been running during that exact period. In hindsight, Iran’s official statements were at best misleading. This history makes it hard to take new proclamations at face value.
Moreover, the fatwa itself, while often referenced, is regarded by many experts as a flexible political tool rather than a binding, permanent religious injunction. Fatwas in Shia Islam are pronouncements by a cleric that can be changed or reinterpreted if conditions change. Khamenei’s reported fatwa against nuclear arms is not part of any codified law; it’s essentially a statement of current policy. Analysts point out that if Iran’s leadership decided nuclear weapons were necessary for the regime’s survival, Khamenei (or a future Supreme Leader) could simply revise or rescind the fatwa. There is even debate over whether a formal written fatwa exists – some suggest it has only been mentioned in speeches. In any case, the credibility of the fatwa as a guarantee is doubtful, given that it is non-binding and subject to the leader’s discretion.
Additionally, in recent years, there have been hints of internal debate in Iran about the nuclear weapons option. A number of hardliners have publicly argued that Iran should consider actually developing nuclear weapons if international threats against Iran persist. For example, voices within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have reportedly urged the Supreme Leader to rethink the weapons ban in light of national security interests. In mid-2023, Khamenei himself warned that although Iran hadn’t built a bomb, if it wanted to, “the Americans could not do anything” to prevent it. Such remarks, which border on nuclear deterrent signaling, make Iran’s true stance somewhat ambiguous. Is Iran saying it could build a bomb but chooses not to, as a way of strengthening its bargaining position? Possibly. The upshot is that while Iran’s official position is to renounce nuclear weapons, many outside observers question the sincerity and permanence of that position. The mistrust is amplified by Iran’s lack of full transparency about past weaponization work – the IAEA has long sought clarity on what exactly Iran did prior to 2003 and possibly afterward, but Iran provided only partial answers before the issue was politically closed in the JCPOA context. This leaves a lingering uncertainty: Iran asserts it has a policy not to build nuclear arms, yet it has invested in capabilities that inch it toward that threshold and has not fully accounted for past weapons-related activities.
Instances of Compliance and Transparency
In weighing Iran’s trustworthiness, it is fair to acknowledge that Iran has shown the ability to comply with rigorous nuclear constraints when it chooses to (usually when the incentives and pressures are appropriately balanced). As mentioned earlier, during the implementation of the JCPOA from 2015 to 2018, Iran drastically scaled back its nuclear program. It shipped out roughly 97% of its enriched uranium stockpile, leaving only a token amount in country. It dismantled or placed into storage thousands of centrifuges, keeping only a few older models running for limited enrichment. Iran halted enrichment at the formerly secret Fordow site and allowed it to be repurposed for stable isotope research with Russian partnership. It redesigned the Arak heavy water reactor so it could not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The IAEA installed continuous monitoring devices and had an expanded inspector presence on the ground. During those years, not a single significant violation by Iran was reported. In fact, the IAEA repeatedly confirmed Iran’s full compliance with the deal’s terms. This compliance was not due to any technical inability to cheat – it was a deliberate policy choice by Iran’s leadership that sticking to the deal was more beneficial at the time (due to the sanctions relief and improved international standing Iran received).
Going further back, even in 2003-2005, Iran did cooperate to an extent. Under intense scrutiny after 2002, Iran signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 and, for about two years, allowed the IAEA much greater access than before. It temporarily suspended enrichment, as a confidence-building measure, which was verified by inspectors. Iran invited the IAEA to visit sites like Natanz and even some military workshops, and provided an extensive declaration of its nuclear activities in 2004 (admitting for the first time to some past experiments, like plutonium separation and laser enrichment research, which it had previously kept secret). This period showed that diplomacy can yield transparency from Iran, albeit under the threat of referral to the UN Security Council. When that diplomatic process collapsed in 2005, Iran’s cooperation level dropped off. But the lesson remained that Iran’s behavior is not uniform – it can range from open compliance to covert defiance, depending on circumstances.
It is also worth noting that Iran has adhered to the basic obligations of the NPT in terms of not actually testing or openly building a nuclear weapon. Unlike North Korea (which signed the NPT, cheated, and then withdrew to test nuclear bombs), Iran, to date, has stayed within the treaty and has not taken the drastic step of leaving it or conducting a nuclear test. Some analysts argue this indicates Iran’s intention is to remain a “threshold state” – to develop the capability to build nuclear weapons without crossing the line of assembling one. In theory, if Iran truly intended to flagrantly break its promises, it might have been expected to dash for a bomb already or at least leave the NPT. The fact that Iran has not done so, and continues to say it prefers to be in compliance with international law (at least formally), is cited by some as evidence that Iran could be dealt with through agreements, if those agreements address its core concerns.
That said, remaining a threshold state can also be a strategic choice – it keeps the option of a weapon available while avoiding the repercussions of actually making one. So while Iran deserves credit for periods of compliance and for not taking the most extreme steps, these actions are often seen as part of a calculated strategy rather than purely good-faith fulfillment of obligations.
Conclusion: Will Iran Honor a Nuclear Weapons Ban?
Drawing all these threads together, can Iran be trusted to honor an agreement that seeks to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons? The evidence offers reasons for serious doubt, but also suggests trust is not entirely impossible under very strict conditions.
On one hand, Iran’s track record includes decades of clandestine nuclear work that directly violated its commitments (under the NPT) to disclose nuclear activities and refrain from weapons development. Key facilities and projects were hidden until exposed by others, indicating a willingness to deceive international inspectors in the past. Iran has breached agreements when they became inconvenient – for example, ending the 2003 enrichment suspension, and expanding its program once the U.S. exited the JCPOA. Iranian leaders have often pursued a dual approach: publicly avowing peaceful intentions while covertly exploring technology relevant to bombs. The pattern of obstruction and evasion – sanitizing sites, stalling access, failing to explain suspect findings – naturally undermines confidence. All this suggests that Iran, if it signs a new deal, might follow it to the letter as long as it benefits, but could quietly prepare the groundwork to resume weapons-related work if the opportunity arises. In other words, trust in Iran’s compliance would have to be continually verified; “trust but verify” would be essential, leaning heavily on the “verify” part.
On the other hand, Iran has shown it will abide by an agreement if the incentives align with its national interests. When Tehran did comply with nuclear limits, it was when it saw clear benefits (economic relief, avoidance of isolation) and acceptable terms. This means a well-crafted deal, with rigorous monitoring and balanced give-and-take, can elicit compliance – at least temporarily. The crux is longevity: Iran seems to resist anything that permanently forecloses its nuclear options. Any agreement that is time-limited or allows Iran to retain some nuclear infrastructure leaves room for future backsliding once constraints lapse. Therefore, if the goal is a permanent ban on nuclear weapons development, it clashes with Iran’s likely desire to maintain itself as a threshold nuclear state. Iran’s leadership may never explicitly break a promise by detonating a bomb while an agreement is in force, but they might quietly keep advancing the program just short of a bomb, effectively biding their time.
In a neutral analysis, one might conclude that Iran is likely to continue a cat-and-mouse approach. It may formally adhere to an agreement that curbs weaponization – especially to gain sanctions relief or strategic advantage – but simultaneously preserve as much of its nuclear capability as possible and perhaps conduct limited secret research to keep a nuclear option available. The international community’s challenge is to design an agreement with verification strong enough to catch any clandestine move swiftly, and consequences severe enough to dissuade cheating. Without such airtight measures, skepticism about Iran “honoring” a deal is well-founded. As a U.S. State Department official once quipped, agreements with Iran are not built on trust, but on verification and inspections.
In summary, Iran’s past behavior indicates that it cannot be simply taken at its word on renouncing nuclear weapons – consistent transparency and accountability would need to be enforced to have confidence in any accord. While Iran could honor a deal in the short term if it serves its interests, the real test is whether it would refrain from nuclear weapons development permanently. Given the historical evidence, many analysts lean toward a pessimistic view: absent fundamental changes, Iran is likely to eventually resume clandestine efforts to reach a weapons capability, even if it pauses or slows them under an agreement. Thus, any nuclear ban accord with Iran would require not only signing on the dotted line, but an enduring vigilance to ensure that what is promised is actually delivered.
References:
- Iran Watch – A History of Iran’s Nuclear Program. (Detailed background on Iran’s nuclear activities and secret weapon efforts).
- Arms Control Association – Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, 1967-2023. (Chronology of Iran’s agreements, suspensions, and breaches).
- International Atomic Energy Agency Reports on Iran (2016–2023). (Verification of Iran’s compliance or non-compliance with agreements).
- Reuters – IAEA to press Iran for access, West suspects site “clean-up” (Aug 22, 2012). (On Parchin site sanitization).
- Associated Press – U.N. fears nuclear cover-up in Iran (June 18, 2004). (On Lavizan-Shian site demolition and soil removal).
- Al Jazeera – Iran’s Khamenei says nuclear talks with US won’t lift sanctions (Mar 12, 2025). (Supreme Leader’s quote on not wanting nuclear weapons).
- Iran International – Iran is only non-nuclear armed state enriching uranium to 60%, IAEA says (Mar 3, 2025). (IAEA on lack of civilian need for 60% enrichment).
- Fox News – Satellite images reveal alleged secret Iranian nuclear weapons facility (May 8, 2025). (Dissident claims of “Rainbow” tritium production site).
- Norwich University Blog – Khamenei’s Nuclear Fatwa: Religious Ruling or Political Strategy? (Feb 11, 2025). (Analysis questioning the nuclear fatwa’s permanence).
- Arms Control Association – Iran Continues to Comply with the Nuclear Deal (Sept 2016). (IAEA-confirmed metrics of Iran’s compliance under JCPOA).
