Western Hemisphere Warning, Arctic Friction, NATO Cohesion Questions, Russian Nuclear Signalling, and Iran Unrest

Alert status for 1 PM UTC, Monday, 12th January 2026: Condition Green – DEFCON 5.
There are currently no imminent nuclear threats at this time.

Over the past week, multiple developments have added pressure to the global strategic environment. None of these events, in isolation, indicate an imminent nuclear exchange. However, several of them contribute to the same long-term pattern: great-power competition is hardening, alliance cohesion is being tested, and nuclear-capable systems are increasingly being used as political instruments in conventional conflict.

This briefing examines five issues with potential strategic-stability implications: a U.S. warning at the United Nations about hostile influence in the Western Hemisphere; renewed U.S. pressure over Greenland; statements signalling a willingness to expand military actions beyond traditional contexts; questions raised over NATO’s reliability; Russia’s use of a nuclear-capable missile in Ukraine; and destabilising protests in Iran amid continued uncertainty about Tehran’s nuclear direction.

The United States reasserts hemispheric red lines at the United Nations

In an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council this week, the United States delivered an unusually direct message: the Western Hemisphere will not be permitted to become a base of operations for states or non-state actors hostile to U.S. interests.

U.S. Ambassador to the UN Michael Waltz defended the recent U.S. operation in Venezuela — which resulted in the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro — as a matter of self-defence against what he described as an illegitimate narco-terrorist regime. He stated: “This is the Western Hemisphere. This is where we live — and we’re not going to allow the Western Hemisphere to be used as a base of operation for our nation’s adversaries, competitors, and rivals.”

The United States alleges that Venezuela under Maduro served as a permissive environment for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, Hezbollah-linked elements, and drug cartels that damage U.S. interests. Washington characterised its action as a limited, targeted response and framed it as law-enforcement in effect — a “surgical” action against an indicted drug trafficker — rather than an act of war against Venezuela.

Russia and China condemned the operation as a violation of sovereignty and a precedent-setting intervention. They argued that abducting a sitting head of state, disputed or otherwise, lowers the threshold for similar actions elsewhere. The United States replied that Maduro was “not a legitimate president” and cited self-defence provisions of the UN Charter, arguing that Venezuela had become a forward base for hostile actors attacking the United States through transnational criminal networks and proxies.

The strategic implication is less about Venezuela itself and more about signalling. Washington’s remarks function as a hemispheric deterrent message: rival powers are being warned not to deepen their footholds in Latin America. Moscow and Beijing, in turn, interpret this as confirmation that the United States is prepared to use force to enforce regional primacy. That dynamic risks further hardening bloc competition and increasing the incentive for rivals to seek asymmetric counters elsewhere.

Greenland: Arctic security becomes a test of allied boundaries

The United States has sharply escalated its rhetoric regarding Greenland, describing acquisition of the territory as a “national security priority” and stating that “utilising the U.S. military is always an option” in pursuit of that objective.

Washington argues that Greenland’s strategic location makes it central to Arctic defence, early warning, and control of North Atlantic approaches, and that its mineral potential is relevant to strategic supply chains. However, the language used has alarmed allied governments because Greenland is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark — a NATO member.

In response, Denmark, Greenland, and several major European states issued a joint statement reaffirming that “Greenland belongs to its people” and rejecting “threats, pressure, and talk of annexation.” Canada also signalled support for Denmark and Greenland, emphasising that sovereignty must be respected.

The United States maintains that Denmark is failing to prevent growing Russian and Chinese interest in the Arctic — a claim Denmark rejects. A U.S. envoy has reportedly indicated a preference to appeal directly to Greenlanders, offering promises of investment and improved economic prospects, which European capitals interpret as an attempt to bypass Copenhagen and reshape political realities through pressure.

The most important strategic question is not whether an invasion is likely — U.S. officials have reportedly signalled that no invasion is imminent — but what the rhetoric does to alliance cohesion. If allied governments begin to doubt the stability of the U.S. position on sovereignty and borders, trust erodes in precisely the space where deterrence relies on credibility. Even without any kinetic action, the Greenland issue has become a stress test of NATO’s internal political reliability.

Proposed cartel “land strikes” and the signal it sends beyond the drug war

The United States has also stated that it will begin conducting “land strikes” against drug cartels inside Mexico. In public remarks, the U.S. President argued that cartels are “running Mexico” and linked the crisis to U.S. overdose deaths, describing an intention to “start hitting the land targets” — implying cross-border raids or strikes on cartel facilities and leadership nodes.

If implemented without Mexican consent, this would represent an unprecedented modern precedent: a sustained pattern of U.S. military action inside the territory of a neighbouring partner state. Mexican leadership has opposed any such incursion. President Claudia Sheinbaum warned that unauthorised U.S. strikes would violate sovereignty and could produce severe political and security consequences. She has also proposed constitutional changes to bar foreign military actions in Mexico, reinforcing that “the Americas do not belong to any single nation.”

Even within U.S. security circles, there are concerns about second-order effects: fragmentation of cartels into smaller and more violent groups; spillover displacement and refugee flows; and the risk of clashes with Mexican security forces. There are also unresolved questions of legal authority, congressional oversight, target discrimination, and civilian harm.

From a nuclear-risk standpoint, the direct connection is limited — cartels do not possess nuclear forces. The strategic relevance lies in perception. When a major power signals a greater willingness to use force outside conventional war frameworks, rivals and regional actors recalibrate their expectations of U.S. thresholds. That can increase tension in other theatres by convincing adversaries that the United States is more likely to act decisively — or unpredictably — in crises. In a competitive environment, that change in perceived willingness can influence escalation dynamics well beyond the Western Hemisphere.

NATO cohesion: public doubt as a strategic vulnerability

Transatlantic tension increased further after the U.S. President publicly questioned whether NATO would come to America’s aid if the United States were attacked. In a social media post, he wrote: “Russia and China have zero fear of NATO without the United States, and I doubt NATO would be there for us if we really needed them.”

Shortly afterwards, the White House press secretary insisted that U.S. commitment to NATO remains “ironclad,” noting additional comments that the United States would remain committed even if reciprocity were uncertain. However, the political impact in Europe was immediate. For allied governments, the core concern is not the legal text of Article 5, but the credibility of political will — and public doubts voiced by the United States weaken that credibility.

Security analysts have long noted that Russia benefits from any appearance of NATO division. Even if no policy changes follow, uncertainty itself can have an effect: adversaries may test boundaries more aggressively when they believe alliance responses are politically constrained. At the same time, some U.S. officials argue the remarks are intended to pressure allies into higher defence spending and greater self-reliance, consistent with earlier U.S. criticism of allied burden-sharing.

NATO officials are emphasising unity publicly, but the combination of Greenland-related friction and questions over reciprocity places additional stress on alliance cohesion at a time when deterrence messaging toward Russia requires clarity and discipline.

Russia uses a nuclear-capable missile in western Ukraine as a strategic signal

Russia has intensified nuclear-adjacent signalling in the Ukraine war. On 9th January, Russia launched a nuclear-capable ballistic missile into western Ukraine, striking an area near the Polish border. The missile — identified as an “Oreshnik” intermediate-range hypersonic system — is designed to carry nuclear warheads over continental distances.

Reports indicate the missile carried an inert payload, breaking into submunitions and causing limited damage near Lviv. However, the strategic purpose appears to have been signalling rather than battlefield effect. This is reportedly the second time Russia has used this system in combat and the first time it has done so near a NATO frontier.

Ukrainian and European officials condemned the strike as escalatory. Ukraine described it as a grave threat to European security and warned that the same risk profile extends to nearby NATO and EU states. Western capitals have maintained that they will not be intimidated, and officials pointed to the need to strengthen Ukrainian air and missile defence. NATO militaries reportedly reviewed alert status, although there has been no public shift in nuclear posture.

Russia’s stated justification — retaliation for a purported Ukrainian drone attack against a presidential residence — has been disputed, with U.S. and Ukrainian sources saying the incident never occurred. That discrepancy strengthens the assessment that the strike was pre-planned for strategic messaging, potentially timed to coincide with diplomatic activity and to leverage nuclear fear as a bargaining tool.

The key issue is escalation management. The strike did not cross into nuclear use, but it deliberately blurred the boundary between conventional conflict and nuclear-capable delivery systems. That behaviour erodes the traditional “firebreak” between conventional and nuclear spheres and increases the risk of misinterpretation, accident, or coerced escalation in a future crisis. Russia’s objective appears to be deterrence by intimidation: reminding the West that Russia can escalate rapidly if it chooses, without necessarily detonating a nuclear weapon.

Iran unrest amid nuclear uncertainty: instability cuts both ways

Iran is experiencing its most destabilising internal unrest in decades. Mass protests have continued for more than two weeks, driven by economic collapse, currency shocks, and political anger at the regime. Demonstrations that began over prices have reportedly escalated into direct challenges to clerical rule.

The government response has been severe. Security forces have imposed internet restrictions, used force against crowds, and conducted widespread arrests. Human rights reporting suggests hundreds may have been killed and tens of thousands detained, though precise figures remain difficult to verify due to information controls.

Iran’s domestic instability is strategically significant because it remains a threshold nuclear state with a record of covert nuclear work. Western intelligence believes Iran has actively pursued nuclear weapons capability even while asserting peaceful intent. Some analysts suspect Iran may have assembled rudimentary devices for research or as a hedge, though there is no confirmation of an operational, deployable nuclear weapon. Iran’s uranium enrichment progress in recent years keeps it close to weapons options even under pressure.

Unrest can cut two ways. A weakened regime could become less capable of advancing nuclear work if resources and leadership attention are consumed by domestic control. However, regimes under existential threat sometimes take more dangerous steps. Iran could accelerate nuclear efforts as insurance, or provoke an external confrontation to rally internal support. The region is particularly sensitive to the possibility of proxy activity, missile actions, or escalatory incidents involving Israel or U.S. forces.

Against that backdrop, the United States has indicated that Iran may have contacted Washington to negotiate over its nuclear programme. Iranian messaging has been mixed: some statements suggest openness to discussion “on the basis of mutual respect,” alongside warnings that Iran is prepared for conflict. Even if exploratory contacts exist, the negotiating environment is adverse. Trust is extremely low, Iran’s domestic situation is unstable, and both sides have incentives to posture. Any misstep — a crackdown that triggers external intervention, a proxy strike that spirals, or a misinterpretation of military movements — could escalate rapidly.

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The next scheduled update is 1 PM, 19th January 2026. Additional updates will be made as the situation warrants, with more frequent updates at higher alert levels.

This concludes this report of the DEFCON Warning System.