Taiwan lies roughly 100 miles off the southeastern coast of mainland China across the Taiwan Strait, making it a longstanding geopolitical flashpoint. Taiwan’s status has become the focal point of intensifying military activity and rhetoric in 2024–2025. Near-daily incursions by Chinese warplanes and naval vessels, large-scale drills simulating blockades or invasions, and heated statements from Beijing have raised concerns that a conflict could be drawing closer. Observers around the world are asking: Is war with China coming over Taiwan? This analysis examines the latest developments, the key strategic positions of China and the United States, and the factors – including treaty commitments and the nuclear dimension – that will determine whether the Taiwan standoff erupts into a wider war.

Beijing’s Position: “Reunification” at All Costs

China’s ruling Communist Party has long declared that Taiwan “must and will be reunified” with the mainland, by force if necessary. President Xi Jinping has made Taiwan’s unification a core goal of what he calls China’s national rejuvenation by 2049. In his 2024 New Year’s address, Xi issued one of his bluntest warnings yet: “No one can ever sever the bond of kinship… and no one can ever stop China’s reunification, a trend of the times.” This uncompromising stance reflects Beijing’s official view that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s sovereign territory. Chinese leaders maintain that “one China” exists and that Taiwan’s de facto self-rule must eventually yield to Beijing’s authority – under a “One Country, Two Systems” formula or other terms defined by the People’s Republic.

Crucially, Beijing has never renounced the option of using military force to achieve unification. In 2005, China passed an Anti-Secession Law explicitly authorizing non-peaceful means if Taiwan formally declares independence or if peaceful unification is deemed impossible. Recent statements leave little doubt about China’s resolve. In late 2024, Xi Jinping declared that “no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification” and cautioned “pro-independence forces” in Taiwan and abroad not to underestimate China’s will. By early 2025, the rhetoric sharpened further – Chinese defense ministry spokesperson Wu Qian warned Taipei, “we will come and get you, sooner or later,” in response to Taiwan expanding its military drills. Such statements underscore that, for the Chinese Communist Party, bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s control is an existential mission tied to nationalist legitimacy.

Beijing’s actions have matched its tough talk. Throughout 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stepped up pressure with frequent warplane sorties across the Taiwan Strait’s unofficial median line and warship patrols encircling the island. Chinese forces held multiple large-scale exercises simulating an assault or blockade of Taiwan – including live-fire drills and missile tests – all meant to signal capability and resolve. In one instance, after Taiwan’s president transited through the United States, China reacted by massing naval flotillas around Taiwan and conducting air exercises to “normalize” a threatening military presence near the island. Beijing frames these moves as justified responses to “separatist” provocations and U.S. interference, but to Taipei and Washington they appear as rehearsals for a possible invasion. The current flashpoint has been exacerbated by political shifts as well: Taiwan’s 2024 election brought to power President Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing labels a pro-independence “diehard” and greeted with intensified military posturing. In short, China’s official position and recent behaviour leave little ambiguity – it is prepared to use coercion or force to achieve unification, viewing the matter as a core interest on which it is unwilling to compromise.

Could China Invade Taiwan? Capability and Calculus

Despite China’s menacing posture, actually launching an all-out invasion of Taiwan would be an exceedingly risky and difficult undertaking. Over the past two decades, Beijing has built up a formidable array of military capabilities aimed at Taiwan – from hundreds of ballistic missiles and a burgeoning fleet of advanced fighter jets, to the world’s largest navy by number of ships. The PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command regularly trains for a Taiwan contingency. On paper, China today can project overwhelming firepower around the island. However, seizing Taiwan by force remains one of the most complex military operations imaginable. The Taiwan Strait – about 160 kilometres (100 miles) wide at its narrowest – is notoriously rough, with monsoon seasons limiting amphibious operations to only certain months each year. Transporting a large invasion force across this choppy strait would be a Herculean task. Analysts note it could require moving hundreds of thousands of troops and their equipment by sea and air – a feat “that would likely have to dwarf D-Day in scale.” For comparison, the 1944 Normandy landings involved 150,000+ troops on the first day; invading Taiwan could demand even larger numbers over weeks of sustained transport, all under fire.

Logistical and geographic obstacles heavily favour the defender. Taiwan’s coastline offers few beaches suitable for mass landings – most shores are either steep cliffs or shallow, muddy flats that would force troop carriers to unload far offshore. The island’s interior is mountainous, with narrow choke-point roads and tunnels leading to the densely populated western plains. Taiwanese forces could concentrate defences at those bottlenecks, and even sabotage ports and infrastructure to bog down an invader. China’s amphibious assault fleet, while expanding, is still relatively limited for an operation of this magnitude. The PLA Navy would likely have to commandeer dozens of civilian ferries and cargo ships to carry follow-on forces and supplies across – but those vessels unload slowly and would make easy targets for Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles. Maintaining any beachhead would be extremely challenging under constant counterattack. In short, a full-scale invasion of Taiwan is a far cry from an easy fait accompli; it would be a massive gamble fraught with potential for failure.

Beijing’s leadership is well aware of these challenges. U.S. intelligence disclosed that Xi Jinping has instructed the PLA to “be prepared to invade Taiwan by 2027,” though this appears to be a readiness goal rather than a fixed deadline for action. Preparing does not guarantee Xi will give the order – it simply means China wants the option available. The decision to invade would depend on a complex cost-benefit calculus. On one hand, if Chinese leaders perceive that peaceful unification is permanently out of reach – especially as Taiwanese public opinion overwhelmingly favours maintaining their democratic self-governance – they might conclude force is eventually “the only way” to bring Taiwan into the fold. Nationalist fervour and Xi’s own legacy ambitions could add pressure not to look weak. On the other hand, the risks of war are enormous. Militarily, failure to conquer Taiwan (or a pyrrhic victory) could undermine the Communist Party’s credibility at home. Even success would almost certainly come at a staggering cost in blood and treasure, especially if the U.S. and allies intervene. Taiwan’s defenders today are far better equipped and prepared than many assume – and they would be fighting for their homeland’s survival, which historically is a powerful motivator.

Beyond the battlefield, China must weigh economic and diplomatic fallout. Taiwan is a linchpin of the global high-tech economy (producing over 60% of the world’s semiconductors), so a war would wreak havoc on supply chains. Western nations would almost surely respond with sweeping economic sanctions against Beijing, potentially cutting off China from crucial trade and technologies. The shock to the world economy from a Taiwan war is estimated at around $10 trillion (10% of global GDP) – far greater than the impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine. China, as the world’s second-largest economy, would face financial isolation and a massive loss of export markets, imperilling its development goals. Diplomatically, an invasion would unite much of the world against Beijing, shattering China’s attempts to be seen as a responsible rising power. These deterrents likely give Chinese leaders pause. Indeed, Beijing so far appears to be pursuing a strategy of incremental coercion – military posturing, grey-zone pressure like economic embargoes or cyber attacks, and efforts to “win without fighting” – rather than immediate all-out war. As long as Chinese leaders believe time is on their side, they may prefer to delay a direct assault, hoping to wear down Taiwan’s will or await more favourable circumstances. However, the possibility of a desperate move cannot be dismissed, especially if Beijing perceives a closing window to act (for instance, if it believes U.S. resolve is weakening or Taiwan is moving irreversibly toward independence). In summary, while China is rapidly improving its invasion capability, the feasibility and consequences of such a war likely restrain Beijing’s hand – at least for now.

U.S.–Taiwan Relations: Legal Commitments and Strategic Ambiguity

A critical factor in the Taiwan equation is the stance of the United States, Taiwan’s unofficial ally and principal security partner. Washington’s policy toward Taiwan has been governed by a delicate balance of commitments and ambiguity since it switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979. At that time, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which remains the cornerstone of U.S. policy. The TRA is not a formal defence treaty, but it mandates certain key obligations: the U.S. must provide Taiwan with defensive arms and maintain the capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” that would jeopardize Taiwan’s security or societal system. The law also declares that any effort to determine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means – e.g. an invasion or blockade – is “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific” and of grave concern to the United States. In effect, the TRA set up a framework whereby the U.S. treats threats to Taiwan very seriously and is expected to respond, without explicitly stating it will send troops.

It is important to note that the TRA stops short of an absolute mutual defence guarantee. Unlike a NATO Article 5 commitment, the law does not automatically obligate American forces to fight on Taiwan’s behalf. The decision to use U.S. military force remains with the President and Congress. However, the intent of the TRA was clearly to deter aggression by convincing Beijing that the U.S. might intervene – hence preserving a degree of “strategic uncertainty” about how America would react to a Taiwan conflict. This approach is often called “strategic ambiguity.” For decades, U.S. leaders deliberately refused to say one way or the other if the U.S. would defend Taiwan, calculating that this vagueness helped restrain both sides (deterring China from attacking, while also dissuading Taiwan from declaring formal independence under the assumption that U.S. support is not guaranteed if Taipei provokes a war). The United States also adheres to a “One China policy,” which acknowledges (but does not endorse) Beijing’s claim to Taiwan and agrees not to have formal diplomatic ties with Taipei. Importantly, under the One China policy, the U.S. insists that any resolution between China and Taiwan be peaceful and consensual. Washington maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan and continues to sell arms to Taipei – actions Beijing bitterly opposes but which are supported by U.S. law and policy.

Over the years, additional understandings have reinforced U.S. support for Taiwan’s defence. In 1982, President Reagan issued “Six Assurances” to Taiwan, including pledges not to set a date for ending arms sales and not to pressure Taiwan into negotiations with Beijing. These, along with the TRA, signal a strong if implicit commitment. Politically, Taiwan enjoys broad bipartisan backing in Washington. U.S. officials frequently refer to Taiwan as a vibrant democracy and a key partner in the Indo-Pacific. Major arms sales – from fighter jets and anti-ship missiles to new coastal defence systems – have continued under successive U.S. administrations to bolster Taiwan’s self-defence. In 2022, for example, the Biden administration approved $1.1 billion in arms sales to Taiwan including advanced Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles. Congress has also pushed for expanded military aid and high-level visits to show solidarity with Taipei.

Would the United States be compelled to intervene if China attacked Taiwan? Legally, the absence of a formal treaty means the U.S. has no ironclad obligation – as one legal analyst puts it, “the U.S. does not have a strict legal obligation to defend Taiwan” under current laws. In practice, though, the TRA and America’s stated policies create a strong expectation of involvement. The law requires that the President inform Congress promptly of any threat to Taiwan, and it implies the U.S. will consider such threats with the gravest concern to its own peace and security. Moreover, U.S. officials often describe Taiwan’s security as tied to the broader credibility of U.S. commitments worldwide. If America stood aside during a Chinese invasion, allies like Japan and South Korea might doubt U.S. security guarantees to them, potentially unravelling U.S. alliances in Asia. This geopolitical reality creates intense political pressure for Washington to come to Taiwan’s aid. As a result, most observers believe that while not legally forced to fight, the United States would find it very hard to remain neutral in a major Taiwan conflict. The situation increasingly resembles a de facto alliance, even absent a defence pact.

U.S. Intervention: How Likely and What Form?

The question of if and how the United States would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan is pivotal. In recent years, American leaders have edged toward greater clarity on this issue. President Joe Biden has on several occasions stated outright that U.S. forces would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Notably, in a 2022 televised interview, Biden was asked if American troops would fight for Taiwan – he answered, “Yes… unlike in Ukraine, U.S. forces would defend Taiwan if it was attacked.” This was the most explicit affirmation by a U.S. president in decades, even though White House staff quickly insisted that official policy (strategic ambiguity) had not changed. Biden’s repeated remarks – he made similar comments in 2021 and 2023 – have led many analysts to conclude that “strategic ambiguity is effectively dead”. In other words, the current U.S. administration has signalled a clear inclination to intervene militarily should Beijing launch an unprovoked assault on Taiwan. This represents a shift in tone that has not gone unnoticed in Beijing, which angrily protested that such statements send “seriously wrong signals” to Taiwanese “separatists”.

Beyond rhetoric, the U.S. military posture in the Western Pacific is being adjusted to deter China and prepare for a Taiwan contingency. The Pentagon’s 2022 National Defence Strategy identified China as the “pacing threat” and prioritized strengthening U.S. force presence and alliances in the Indo-Pacific. Practically, this has meant deploying more rotational forces and advanced assets near China’s periphery. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, based in Japan, maintains a carrier strike group and numerous warships that patrol the South and East China Seas. The U.S. Air Force has been conducting Agile Combat Employment drills to rapidly disperse fighter jets to smaller airfields across the Pacific, complicating any Chinese pre-emptive strike. In early 2023, Washington secured expanded access to military bases in the Philippines – locations that could be vital for launching operations in a Taiwan scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. Marines in Okinawa are restructuring into quick-reaction units armed with anti-ship missiles, explicitly designed to counter a Chinese naval assault. All these moves signal that the U.S. is actively preparing for the possibility of a conflict around Taiwan, even as it hopes to prevent one through deterrence.

How an American intervention might unfold would depend on the circumstances. Most experts envision the U.S. initially acting to support Taiwan with intelligence and supplies (as it did for Ukraine), but very likely escalating to direct combat operations quickly if China is mounting a full invasion. Unlike in Ukraine, geography and treaty obligations leave the U.S. little room to stand back. American forces are stationed just over 100 miles from Taiwan in Okinawa, and any Chinese attack on Taiwan would almost certainly involve missile strikes on U.S. bases in Japan and Guam to handicap U.S. forces. An attack that kills American service members would remove any political hesitation about entering the war. Additionally, Japan – a U.S. treaty ally – would be directly threatened by a Taiwan conflict and has indicated it would cooperate with the U.S. (for example, by allowing use of bases or even deploying its Self-Defence Forces to aid Taiwan’s defence). Given these dynamics, the probability of U.S. military involvement is high if China resorts to force. The scale of involvement could range from enforcing a maritime blockade to full-spectrum air and naval battles against PLA forces.

The costs and risks for the U.S. would be enormous – American commanders openly acknowledge that in a Taiwan war scenario, U.S. ships and planes would come under heavy fire. A prominent war game study by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that a U.S.-China war over Taiwan in 2026 would likely be a Pyrrhic victory for the U.S.-Taiwan alliance: the simulation’s median outcome had the invasion blunted, but at the loss of two U.S. aircraft carriers and dozens of other warships, thousands of American servicemembers, and severe damage to Taiwan’s infrastructure. China, too, in the war game lost over 10,000 troops, 155 combat aircraft and 138 navy ships – a carnage that would far exceed anything seen in modern wars. While these are only simulated outcomes, they underscore that intervening in Taiwan would not be a low-cost operation for Washington. Yet, despite the anticipated hardships, the U.S. seems poised to bear those costs if the alternative is to see a democratic Taiwan conquered by force. The credibility of the United States as the leading power in the Pacific and as a global guardian of the post-WWII international order is perceived to be on the line. Indeed, U.S. officials often argue that allowing a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would be a geopolitical catastrophe, weakening the entire network of U.S. alliances and emboldening authoritarian aggression elsewhere. Thus, from both a strategic and a values standpoint, American leaders have increasingly treated Taiwan’s defence as vital to U.S. national interests – making intervention in some form not only likely, but perhaps almost inevitable, should deterrence fail.

Nuclear Escalation: The Unthinkable Shadow

Any conflict over Taiwan would carry the gravest of stakes – not just for the combatants’ conventional forces, but for the potential to ignite a nuclear confrontation between the United States and China. Both nations are nuclear-armed powers, and a war between them raises the haunting question: could it go nuclear? Historically, one reason the Taiwan Strait has remained at an uneasy peace is precisely the fear that escalation could spiral out of control. While both Washington and Beijing would prefer to keep any Taiwan conflict limited and non-nuclear, the situation could evolve in unpredictable ways once major powers exchange blows. It is therefore crucial to examine each side’s nuclear posture and under what scenarios the unthinkable might occur.

China’s nuclear doctrine officially professes restraint. Since it first developed atomic weapons, China has maintained a declared policy of “No First Use” (NFU) – pledging it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict. China has also kept its arsenal relatively small compared to the U.S. and Russia, seemingly aiming just for a secure second-strike (retaliatory) capability. As of 2025, China is estimated to possess about ~600 nuclear warheads, a fraction of the United States’ ~3,700 warheads in stock. Moreover, only a small number of China’s warheads (perhaps 20–30) are actually deployed on missiles ready for immediate use, with the rest in storage. This posture has led Beijing to insist that it views nuclear weapons as purely defensive – to deter others from nuclear blackmail or attack against China, and not as tools to be used in conventional war. In line with that, Chinese state media and officials regularly state that China would never nuke a non-nuclear Taiwan. On paper, then, the risk of China initiating nuclear use in a Taiwan scenario would appear low.

However, reality could be more fluid. The Chinese leadership may re-evaluate its nuclear stance if faced with a dire situation. PLA planners surely recognize that U.S. conventional military superiority could decisively thwart a Chinese invasion. As a result, deterring U.S. intervention is a top priority for China – and nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent. Chinese generals have historically made veiled nuclear threats to dissuade U.S. action; in 1996 during a Taiwan Strait crisis, one PLA official infamously warned the U.S. “Americans care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taipei,” implying China might risk a nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland to keep America out of the fight. In the 2020s, Beijing has observed how Russia’s explicit nuclear threats during its Ukraine invasion helped deter direct NATO involvement. Chinese officials could be tempted to employ similar nuclear brinkmanship if a conflict over Taiwan erupts. This could include raising nuclear alert levels, issuing explicit threats, or even hinting at revoking the No-First-Use policy in the Taiwan context. The goal would be to terrorize Washington and Tokyo into thinking China might actually use nuclear weapons, thus pressuring them to hold back their forces. By making the prospect of “uncontrolled escalation” appear credible, Beijing might hope to fracture the U.S.-led coalition’s will to fight. For instance, China might pointedly remind U.S. allies like Japan and Australia that they are vulnerable to nuclear strikes (since those allies lack nuclear weapons of their own) in order to peel them away from supporting Taiwan.

From the U.S. perspective, any decision to defend Taiwan would necessarily factor in the nuclear risk. American leaders fully understand that a conventional war with China carries a theoretical chance of mushroom clouds if escalation spirals. A direct superpower clash is unprecedented in the nuclear age, and avoiding a catastrophic home­land-to-homeland exchange would be the paramount imperative. The U.S. does not have a No-First-Use pledge; its doctrine allows for nuclear use in “extreme circumstances” to defend vital interests. However, U.S. policymakers would be extremely reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold absent a Chinese nuclear attack. Using nuclear weapons first – for example, dropping a tactical nuclear bomb on a Chinese invasion fleet – has been raised in some hawkish circles, but most experts argue this would be an incredibly dangerous and destabilizing escalation. Employing nukes, even at sea, could trigger Chinese retaliation in kind against U.S. bases or cities, leading to all-out war. Furthermore, threatening first-use could lack credibility – since Taiwan is not a formal treaty ally, China might doubt the U.S. would break the 80-year taboo on nuclear use over this issue. Thus, Washington’s likely approach would be to rely on overwhelming conventional force and leave the nuclear arsenal as a last-resort backstop.

That said, certain red lines could conceivably lead to nuclear escalation. One is if either side targets the other’s nuclear forces or leadership. For instance, if the U.S. struck mainland China aiming to eliminate the PLA Rocket Force (which controls Chinese nuclear missiles), Beijing might interpret this as preparation for a nuclear first strike and respond with nuclear weapons before losing that capability. Conversely, if China, in desperation, fired a nuclear missile at a U.S. base like Guam or at a carrier group at sea (perhaps to avert imminent defeat), the U.S. would almost certainly retaliate with nuclear strikes. Another trigger might be if the Chinese Communist regime’s survival were on the line – facing a disastrous military failure, Xi’s government could see nuclear escalation as the only way to force a ceasefire on favourable terms. Even a “demonstration” blast – say, a high-altitude detonation or a strike on an uninhabited area – could be used by China to signal resolve, though this would be an enormous gamble. Both Washington and Beijing surely recognize that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, controlling escalation becomes nearly impossible. A limited exchange could rapidly snowball into a full-scale strategic nuclear war, given the fog of war, fear, and pressure to pre-empt further strikes.

For these reasons, most analysts assess that both sides would strive mightily to keep a Taiwan war non-nuclear. Deterrence would not stop at the conventional level – the shadow of mutual nuclear destruction would continue to deter the leadership on each side from letting the conflict go too far. It’s often noted that there is no “victory” in a nuclear war between the U.S. and China – it would be suicide for both. Senior U.S. officials have likened the situation to two fighters “locked in a room with cans of gasoline” where neither wants to light a match. Still, the proximity of intense military operations could create situations of confusion or miscalculation. For example, a submarine-launched ballistic missile test or the use of a dual-capable missile could be misread by the other side as a nuclear launch in progress, prompting a mistaken counterstrike. This is why crisis communication channels and clear signalling would be critical in any clash. The bottom line: the nuclear dimension is the ultimate wild card that makes the Taiwan standoff so dangerous. It greatly raises the stakes and imposes caution – but it also means if deterrence fails, the conflict’s escalation could have truly civilization-ending potential.

Conclusion: Flashpoint on a Knife’s Edge

So, is war with China coming over Taiwan? Not inevitably, and not necessarily imminently – but the risk is real and appears to be growing. The current situation is a classic powder keg: China’s resolve to eventually unify Taiwan has only hardened under Xi, and its military capabilities are catching up to its ambitions. Taiwan, for its part, has shown no interest in yielding its democracy or de facto independence, and its people have become ever more opposed to Beijing’s rule. The United States and its allies are increasingly forthright about standing with Taiwan, even as they try to dissuade Beijing from aggression. This dynamic makes the Taiwan Strait one of the most dangerous strategic flashpoints in the world.

Encouragingly, no side actually wants a war in the near term. Beijing would prefer to win Taiwan over through isolation and intimidation rather than a costly invasion. Washington also prefers deterrence and the status quo over a fight with a nuclear-armed peer. Taiwan’s leaders, while defiant about their autonomy, tread carefully to avoid crossing Beijing’s red lines (such as formal independence) that could trigger conflict. These mutual cautions have preserved an uneasy peace for decades. Yet history is replete with wars that no one “wanted” but which broke out through miscalculation, provocation, or an erosion of deterrence. A sudden crisis – an accident at sea, a nationalist surge, a contentious election – could ignite hostilities if not managed prudently. As of 2025, each military drill and each fiery statement ratchets up the risk by a notch, even if outright war still seems a worst-case scenario.

In analysing the Taiwan flashpoint, one must conclude that we are in a period of heightened danger. The coming few years are especially critical. U.S. intelligence and many experts worry about the late 2020s as a potential window when China might feel confident enough – or desperate enough – to attempt forceful unification. The world witnessed in Ukraine that authoritarian leaders may underestimate resistance and plunge into war with ruinous consequences. It is in the interest of all parties to avoid such a tragedy in Taiwan. Strong deterrence combined with open communications are key to preventing war. China must be made to see that an invasion would likely fail and incur intolerable costs, while also assuring Beijing that Taiwan’s status quo does not threaten China’s core security. Taiwan, with international support, will continue fortifying its “porcupine” defences to raise the stakes of any attack. And the U.S. will seek to maintain a balance – showing resolve so Beijing never feels it can succeed through force, but also avoiding reckless steps that could provoke an unnecessary confrontation.

War with China over Taiwan is not preordained. But without careful management, the flashpoint will remain a tinderbox. As Chinese warplanes buzz Taiwanese airspace and U.S. naval vessels patrol nearby waters, the margin for error is thin. All sides would do well to remember that once the guns fire, events could escalate beyond anyone’s control – and the spectre of nuclear catastrophe would loom over humanity. For now, sober minds and status quo maintenance have kept the peace. The hope is that continued vigilance, diplomacy, and deterrence will ensure that cooler heads prevail, so that this volatile standoff can be resolved without the nightmare of a great power war.

Endnotes:

1. Xi Jinping, New Year’s Speech 2024, as reported by Reuters: “No one can sever our family bonds, and no one can stop the historical trend of national reunification.”
2. Reuters, “Xi says no one can stop China’s ‘reunification’ with Taiwan”, Dec. 31, 2024 – Notes stepped-up Chinese military pressure near Taiwan in 2024, with daily warship and aircraft patrols around the island.
3. Reuters – Ibid. Beijing never renounces use of force; in 2024 it conducted two major war-game exercises around Taiwan as warnings against “separatist acts”.
4. Indian Express, “China to Taiwan: ‘We will get you sooner or later’”, Feb. 28, 2025 – Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian’s threat “we will come and get you, sooner or later” after Taiwan announced expanded defence drills.
5. David Sacks, Council on Foreign Relations – “Why China Would Struggle to Invade Taiwan,” June 12, 2024. Emphasizes the extreme complexity of a Taiwan invasion, e.g. 90-mile wide strait with limited invasion windows due to weather, and the operation would require moving hundreds of thousands of troops, “dwarfing D-Day in scale”.
6. CFR – Ibid. Notes China’s amphibious fleet is relatively small; invasion would need civilian ships that unload slowly and would be vulnerable to attack. Also, Taiwan’s geography (few suitable beaches, shallow west coast, mountainous interior) favours the defender.
7. CIA Director William Burns interview (CBS Face the Nation, Feb 26, 2023) – Publicly revealed Xi Jinping’s directive for the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, though not a fixed decision.
8. War on the Rocks, “A Chinese Economic Blockade… Would Fail or Launch a War”, June 2024 – Discusses how Beijing’s coercion short of war has not compelled Taiwan, as <10% of Taiwanese desire unification. Defence Minister (General) Li Shangfu in 2023 admitted peaceful reunification prospects are “increasingly being eroded” by Taiwanese resistance and foreign support.
9. Bloomberg Economics via Bloomberg (Jan 2024), as cited in National Review and others – Estimates a war over Taiwan could cost the global economy around $10 trillion (~10% of GDP), “dwarfing the blow from the war in Ukraine”.
10. Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Public Law 96-8 (Section 2(b)) – U.S. policy is to consider any non-peaceful effort to determine Taiwan’s future a “threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific” and a matter of grave concern to the U.S.; and to “maintain the capacity… to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan.
11. Julian Ku, Lawfare – “Taiwan’s U.S. Defence Guarantee…”, Jan 2024. Notes that while the U.S. is not legally bound by treaty to defend Taiwan, the TRA creates a strong policy expectation; indeed U.S. has no automatic treaty obligation even to allies (Congress must authorize force).
12. Reuters, “Biden says U.S. forces would defend Taiwan…”, Sept. 19, 2022 – Biden, asked if U.S. troops would defend Taiwan, replied “Yes… if there was an unprecedented attack,” explicitly comparing it to the U.S. not sending troops to Ukraine. White House later affirmed no change in “strategic ambiguity” policy.
13. Atlantic Council, “The role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis”, Nov 2023 – Discusses how China might use nuclear threats to deter U.S. intervention, possibly by issuing veiled or explicit nuclear warnings, raising alert status, or even signalling a change in its No-First-Use stance in a Taiwan scenario. Also notes a Chinese general’s 1996 remark that the U.S. wouldn’t trade Los Angeles for Taipei, an implied nuclear threat.
14. Atlantic Council – Ibid. Emphasizes that any U.S.-China war carries a risk of “uncontrolled nuclear escalation” to a catastrophic homeland exchange, though both sides would seek to avoid this. China might attempt to increase the perceived risk of nuclear escalation to scare off U.S./allied intervention.
15. War on the Rocks, “Strategic Myopia: The Proposed First Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Defend Taiwan”, Mar 2024 – Argues against U.S. first use of nukes. Notes that threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons in a Taiwan scenario would be highly escalatory, likely not credible (especially given 80 years of non-use), and unnecessary since U.S. conventional forces can severely attrit a Chinese invasion force without resorting to nuclear weapons.
16. Federation of American Scientists – Nuclear Notebook: China 2025 (published in Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Mar 2025). Estimates China’s warhead stockpile at approximately 600 warheads, vs. ~3,700 for the U.S., highlighting that China is “not a nuclear peer” of the U.S. in numbers or capabilities. China has built new missile silos and is modernizing, but most of its warheads are not deployed on alert status.
17. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) – “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan” (Jan 2023). After 24 iterations of a Taiwan invasion war-game set in 2026, CSIS concluded the invasion would likely fail but at enormous cost. In a typical scenario: at least 2 U.S. aircraft carriers sunk, 10–20 other U.S. warships destroyed, ~3,200 U.S. casualties; China loses ~10,000 troops, 155 warplanes and 138 ships; Taiwan suffers ~3,500 casualties and its navy wiped out. The report stressed “there is no ‘Ukraine model’ for Taiwan” – once war starts, outside resupply is nearly impossible, so Taiwan must be fully armed before hostilities.