Historical efforts to conceal nuclear activities under civilian guises, along with contributions from various international sources, have facilitated Iran’s progress in nuclear technology. Despite sanctions and international scrutiny, Iran has made notable advancements, including enriching uranium to levels close to weapons-grade. The current global focus on other conflicts may provide Iran with an opportunity to further its nuclear ambitions. Iranian officials have openly discussed the country’s capability to develop nuclear weapons if chosen, marking a shift in discourse towards a more assertive stance on nuclear capabilities. The potential for Iran to develop nuclear weapons raises significant concerns for global security and regional proliferation, emphasizing the need for a strategic approach to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapon status.
The Biden administration’s conciliatory approach towards the Islamic regime in Iran has significantly bolstered its position in the Middle East and emboldened its pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities. If the United States government continues to ignore Iran’s nuclear developments, it may decide to build an atomic bomb. The prospect of such a scenario is plausible given the significant growth in the regime’s nuclear capabilities, a sharp decline in the program’s transparency, and increased security incentives for the government to build the bomb amidst shifting global priorities.
Ever since the Islamic Republic restarted the Shah’s nuclear program, the regime has intended to produce nuclear weapons. Taking advantage of the weak Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Ayatollah’s regime launched an illicit nuclear project under the façade of a civilian program. This “hiding in plain sight” plan benefited from several factors, including the willingness of countries from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), like Russia and China, to sell materials and technology, the input of rogue regimes, such as North Korea, and the efforts of rogue agents, like Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, and the regime’s capability to establish a vast network of front companies for buying dual-use technology. In addition, IAEA’s lax oversight and readiness under Mohammed El-Baradei to declare the program peaceful also contributed. The sheer complexity of the political system in Tehran and the regime’s finely honed deception tactics confirmed its leader’s beliefs that the cost of achieving a weapon system was tolerable.
