This article was originally posted in Russian in Russia In Global Affairs. Translation by Google Translate.
Response to Sergei Karaganov’s article “A Difficult But Necessary Decision“
Sergei Karaganov, in his recent article, brought into the public space the most difficult issue of the use of nuclear weapons in the ongoing 16th month of a special military operation in Ukraine. Many responses to this publication come down to the well-known formula – there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it cannot be waged. Against this background, President Vladimir Putin, answering a question during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, spoke in the sense that nuclear weapons are a means of deterrence, the conditions for their use are defined in doctrinal documents ; the theoretical possibility of using this weapon exists, but there is no need to use it now.
In principle, from the very beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, nuclear weapons have been “on the desktop” of Russian politics precisely as a means of keeping the United States and its allies from being drawn into the conflict. Nevertheless, the repeated public indications by the Russian president and other officials of Russia’s nuclear status have so far not prevented the creeping escalation of the involvement of NATO countries in military operations in Ukraine. As a result, it became clear that nuclear deterrence, which many in Moscow relied on as a reliable means of securing the country’s vital interests, turned out to be a tool of much more limited use.
In fact, the United States has now set itself an unthinkable task during the Cold War years – to defeat another nuclear superpower in a strategically important region for it, without resorting to nuclear weapons, but only by arming and controlling a third country. The Americans are acting cautiously, testing the reaction of the enemy and consistently expanding the boundaries of what is possible with regard to the weapons transferred to Kyiv, as well as the choice of targets for them. From the supply of anti-tank weapons, the United States has come close to the transfer of F-16 fighter jets and long-range missiles to Ukraine.
It is likely that such a US strategy is based on the conviction that the Russian leadership will not dare to use nuclear weapons in the current conflict, and its references to Russia’s nuclear arsenal are nothing more than a bluff. The Americans outwardly calmly reacted even to the deployment of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus. Such “fearlessness” is a direct result of the geopolitical changes of the last three decades and the generational change of people in power in the United States and in the West in general.
The restraining fear of the atomic bomb, which had been present throughout the second half of the 20th century, disappeared. Nuclear weapons are out of the question. The practical conclusion from this is obvious: there is no need to be afraid of Russia’s reaction.
This is an extremely dangerous misconception. The trajectory of the Ukrainian war points to an escalation of the conflict both horizontally, through the expansion of the theater of operations, and vertically, through an increase in the power of the weapons used and the intensity of their use. It must be soberly recognized that this trajectory leads in the direction of a direct armed clash between Russia and NATO. If the accumulated momentum is not stopped, then such a collision will occur, and in this case, the war, having spread to Europe, will almost inevitably become nuclear. And after some time, a nuclear war in Europe will most likely lead to an exchange of strikes between Russia and the United States.
This is an extremely dangerous misconception. The trajectory of the Ukrainian war points to an escalation of the conflict both horizontally, through the expansion of the theater of operations, and vertically, through an increase in the power of the weapons used and the intensity of their use. It must be soberly recognized that this trajectory leads in the direction of a direct armed clash between Russia and NATO. If the accumulated momentum is not stopped, then such a collision will occur, and in this case, the war, having spread to Europe, will almost inevitably become nuclear. And after some time, a nuclear war in Europe will most likely lead to an exchange of strikes between Russia and the United States.
The Americans and their allies are actually playing Russian roulette. Yes, so far the Russian response to the Nord Stream bombings , the drone attack on the strategic aviation base in Engels, the entry of saboteurs armed by the West into the Belgorod region and many other actions of the side supported and directed by Washington have been relatively restrained. Such restraint, as President Putin recently made clear, has good reasons. Russia, the Supreme Commander said, has the ability to destroy any building in Kyiv, but will not stoop to the methods of terror used by the enemy. Putin, however, also said that Russia is considering various options for destroying Western warplanes if they, based on the territory of NATO countries, take part in the war in Ukraine.
Until now, the Russian strategy in the Ukrainian conflict has given the escalation initiative to the enemy. The West took advantage of this, seeking to wear down Russia on the battlefield and shake it from the inside. It makes no sense for us to support this scheme. On the contrary, it makes sense to refine and modernize our nuclear deterrence strategy, taking into account the practical experience of the Ukrainian conflict. The existing doctrinal provisions were formulated not only before the start of the military special operation, but also, apparently, without a precise idea of what might happen during the NWO.
Russia’s foreign strategy includes, in addition to the military itself, foreign policy, information and other aspects. An unambiguous – and no longer verbal – signal should be sent to the main adversary that Moscow will not play giveaway and according to the rules established by the opposite side. Of course, in parallel, it is necessary to organize a confidential dialogue with our strategic partners and neutral states outlining the motives and goals of our actions. The possibility of using nuclear weapons in the current conflict should not be hidden. Such a real, and not just theoretical, perspective should become an incentive to limit and stop the escalation of the war and, ultimately, pave the way for a strategic balance in Europe that suits us.
As for Russian nuclear strikes against NATO countries: Hypothetically speaking, Washington would most likely not respond to these strikes with its own nuclear strike against Russia, out of fear of Russian retaliation against the United States. The absence of such a reaction will dispel the mythology that has been created for decades around Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and lead to the deepest crisis of NATO – perhaps even to the collapse of the organization. It cannot be ruled out that the Atlantic elites of the NATO and EU countries will panic under these conditions and be swept away by national forces that will see with their own eyes that the security of their countries actually depends not on the non-existent “nuclear umbrella” of the United States, but on building balanced relations with Russia. It may turn out that America will leave Russia alone.
It is possible that the calculation just described will turn out to be correct. But it is also possible that not quite . Yes, probably, a US nuclear strike on Russia will not immediately follow. Americans are unlikely to sacrifice Boston for the sake of Poznan, just as during the Cold War they were not going to sacrifice Chicago because of Hamburg. But it is also likely that there will be some kind of response from the United States. This non-nuclear response – which one, we will not guess – is likely to be sensitive and painful for us. It is likely that with its help Washington will try to pursue a goal similar to ours: to paralyze the will of the Russian leadership to continue the war and create panic in Russian society.
It is unlikely that the Russian leadership will capitulate after such a blow: at this stage, it will be about the very existence of Russia. Most likely, a retaliatory strike will follow – and this time, one can assume, already at the main enemy, and not at his satellites.
Let us stop before this point of no return and summarize our analysis. The “nuclear bullet” must be obligatorily and revealingly inserted into the “revolver drum”, which the US leadership is recklessly playing today. To paraphrase a late American statesman, why do we need nuclear weapons if we refuse to use them in the face of an existential threat.
No need to scare anyone with words anymore. It is necessary to prepare for a possible application practically, carefully working through the possible options and their consequences.
The war in Ukraine took on a protracted character. As far as can be judged by the actions of the Russian leadership, it is counting on achieving strategic success, relying on Russian resources that are many times greater than Ukrainian ones, and on the fact that the stakes for Russia in this war are much higher than those of the West. This calculation is probably correct, but it must be taken into account that the enemy assesses Russia’s chances differently than we do, and may take steps fraught with a direct armed clash between the Russian Federation and NATO and the United States. We must be prepared for such a development of the situation. In order to avoid a general catastrophe, it is necessary to return fear to politics and public consciousness: in the nuclear age, this is the only guarantee for the preservation of mankind.
