DEFCON Warning System – Condition Blue (DEFCON 4)
1 PM UTC, Monday, 26 January 2026

There are currently no imminent nuclear threats. However, several international developments require continued monitoring due to their potential impact on strategic stability.

Although recent events involving Iran have shown signs of stabilisation, the DEFCON Warning System remains at DEFCON 4. This posture reflects continued United States military activity in and around the Iranian theatre, which introduces uncertainty despite the absence of immediate escalation indicators.

United States Defence Strategy Shift

In recent days, senior leadership in the United States has signalled a decisive shift in national defence priorities. The Department of Defence has released its 2026 National Defence Strategy, explicitly stating that the security of the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere—rather than China—is now the primary concern of American defence policy. This represents a significant departure from the long-standing emphasis on China as the principal “pacing challenge” and marks a reorientation towards territorial defence and regional influence.

Under this revised strategy, Washington is placing increased burden-sharing expectations on allied partners, particularly in Europe, while reasserting U.S. predominance within its continental and hemispheric sphere of influence. Military planning documents highlight the importance of securing strategic choke points ranging from Greenland to the Panama Canal. Collectively, these priorities suggest a modernised interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine adapted for contemporary geopolitical realities.

This strategic realignment provides the broader context for several developments with implications for nuclear and alliance stability.

Greenland, Alliance Cohesion, and Strategic Trust

One of the most consequential issues of the past week concerns statements attributed to U.S. President Donald Trump regarding Greenland. According to multiple reports, President Trump informed European leaders that the United States no longer feels obliged to think “purely of peace” and would instead act according to what is “good and proper for the United States of America” when addressing strategic interests, particularly those involving Greenland.

These remarks emerged amid a dispute with several NATO allies, including Denmark, Norway, Canada, and members of the European Union, over defence responsibilities for Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. President Trump has publicly argued that Denmark lacks the capacity to defend Greenland against potential Russian or Chinese encroachment and has suggested that direct U.S. control would be necessary to ensure regional and global security.

Greenland’s government and Danish leadership have firmly rejected any proposal involving the sale or transfer of sovereignty. Copenhagen has reaffirmed that Greenland’s security falls under Danish authority and NATO protections, emphasising that Article 5 of the NATO treaty would apply in the event of an armed attack.

The U.S. position has strained long-standing alliance relationships. European leaders have discussed possible countermeasures, including tariffs, economic tools available under the European Union’s Anti-Coercion Instrument, and accelerated efforts to enhance European defence autonomy independent of Washington.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Trump moderated aspects of his earlier rhetoric following discussions with the NATO Secretary-General. He outlined a potential framework for a future Arctic security arrangement that would grant the United States long-term access and cooperation related to Greenland. Nevertheless, many allied governments continue to view the episode as damaging to trust and cohesion within the alliance.

From a nuclear stability perspective, this dispute illustrates a broader concern: erosion of allied trust weakens collective deterrence frameworks that have underpinned Euro-Atlantic security for decades. Shifting rhetoric around territorial defence and treaty obligations introduces uncertainty regarding the durability of strategic and nuclear commitments during future crises.

New START Treaty and U.S.–Russia Arms Control

Another issue requiring close observation is the status of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, commonly known as New START, between the United States and the Russia.

New START, the last remaining bilateral arms-control agreement imposing legally binding limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, is scheduled to expire on 5 February 2026. Over the past week, Russian officials have stated that there are no specific contacts with Washington regarding negotiations to extend or replace the treaty.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov confirmed that, as of late January, direct talks have not taken place. At the same time, Moscow has indicated—through statements by President Vladimir Putin—a willingness to voluntarily maintain the treaty’s limits for an additional year, provided the United States reciprocates. No formal U.S. response has yet been announced.

The expiration of New START without a successor framework would represent a significant deterioration in the nuclear arms-control architecture that has constrained U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals since 2011. Independent assessments warn that the absence of legally binding limits could lead to unconstrained nuclear competition, reduced transparency, and increased risk of miscalculation or crisis instability.

This risk is compounded by the broader geopolitical environment. Relations between Washington and Moscow remain strained, and Russia’s ongoing conventional military engagements—particularly in Ukraine—further complicate prospects for cooperative arms control. Historically, the erosion of transparency and predictability in nuclear relationships has increased strategic distrust and the likelihood of escalation.

China’s Expanding Submarine Capabilities

A third critical factor influencing global strategic risk is the rapid expansion of China’s naval and submarine forces. Recent military assessments indicate that China is systematically producing long-range submarines and other undersea platforms at a pace that could, if current trends persist, surpass elements of the Russian submarine fleet in key categories.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy has continued commissioning new hulls while improving undersea stealth, endurance, and ballistic missile capabilities. Particular attention has focused on the emerging Type 096 class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, which are designed to enhance China’s second-strike capability and long-term strategic deterrence. Chinese development efforts have reportedly benefited from earlier technological exchanges with Russian naval designers, improving overall performance and acoustic quieting.

This expansion presents a growing challenge to U.S. and allied undersea dominance. Although Western nuclear-powered submarines retain qualitative advantages on a platform-by-platform basis, the increasing number and geographic dispersion of Chinese undersea assets narrow the margin of sea-based strategic superiority.

The global submarine build-up introduces several destabilising factors. It expands the latent capacity for stealthy nuclear delivery, complicates anti-submarine warfare operations, and increases the risk of inadvertent encounters or misidentification in contested maritime regions. Historically, such dynamics have heightened the risk of crisis escalation.

Russian Claims of Normalisation

Finally, Russian state media and official sources have asserted that Russia and the United States are experiencing a “return to normal relations.” These claims remain confined largely to Moscow’s information space and should be assessed cautiously. Observable diplomatic, military, and political indicators continue to suggest significant underlying tensions, particularly in the areas of arms control, regional security, and alliance dynamics.

The DEFCON Warning System is a private intelligence organisation which has monitored and assessed nuclear threats by national entities since 1984. It is not affiliated with any government agency and does not represent the alert status of any military branch. The public should make their own evaluations and not rely on the DEFCON Warning System for any strategic planning. At all times, citizens are urged to learn what steps to take in the event of a nuclear attack. If this had been an actual attack, the DEFCON Warning System will provide radiation readings for areas reported to it. Readings will vary, and official news sources will provide radiation information for local areas.

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The next scheduled update is 1 PM, 9 February 2026. Additional updates will be issued as conditions warrant, with more frequent reporting at higher alert levels.

This concludes this report of the DEFCON Warning System.