In a world where geopolitical tensions can escalate quickly and the stakes are nothing short of civilization itself, few procedures are more consequential—or more secretive—than the launch of a nuclear weapon. The United States maintains a highly structured, tightly controlled system for the employment of nuclear arms, designed for both speed and certainty. This article offers a clear, step-by-step breakdown of how a U.S. nuclear launch would proceed—from presidential order to the moment of detonation.

1. The President’s Sole Authority

The United States places nuclear launch authority solely in the hands of the President. No other individual—not the Secretary of Defense, not the Joint Chiefs, not Congress—has the legal power to authorize a nuclear strike.

At all times, the President is accompanied by a military aide carrying the “nuclear football”—a briefcase containing communication equipment and a menu of pre-planned nuclear strike options. Also on or near the President is a small card known as the “biscuit,” which holds identification codes used to verify the President’s identity during a launch order.

The process begins the moment the President decides that a nuclear strike is necessary. This decision may come after warning of an incoming attack, as a response to enemy action, or in an escalating crisis. The President may consult with senior advisors such as the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—but consultation is not legally required.

2. Authentication: Proving the Order is Legitimate

Before an order is carried out, the President must prove his identity through a strict authentication process. Using the “biscuit,” the President reads a unique code over a secure communications line to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon, or one of its alternates such as Site R or the Strategic Command Global Operations Center in Nebraska.

This code must match up with a known sequence maintained by military officials to ensure that the order is genuine and not issued under duress or from an unauthorized actor.

3. The Emergency Action Message (EAM)

Once authenticated, the President’s decision is converted into a highly encrypted and time-sensitive message known as the Emergency Action Message (EAM). This message includes:

• Authentication codes
• Strike option identifiers (e.g., a limited counterforce strike or full retaliatory response)
• Timing details
• Unlock codes for the weapons themselves

The EAM is transmitted via secure communications systems to all relevant military nodes, including missile launch centres, submarines at sea, and strategic bomber units.

4. StratCom and NMCC Relay

U.S. Strategic Command (StratCom), located at Offutt Air Force Base, is responsible for executing the nuclear order. Working in tandem with the NMCC, StratCom ensures the EAM reaches the appropriate units.

Depending on the scenario and the type of strike ordered, the message is sent to:

• Land-based ICBM launch control centres
• Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
• Air Force strategic bombers (e.g., B-2, B-52)

Each platform has its own authentication and launch protocols, but all rely on the same foundational principle: the order must be verified, and multiple personnel must concur.

5. Launch Execution: The Platforms

ICBM Silos (Minuteman III)

Each missile is controlled by a Launch Control Center (LCC), typically manned by two officers, deep underground. When the EAM is received:

• The officers authenticate the message using sealed authentication codes.
• They input the unlock codes and prepare the missiles for launch.
• Both officers turn separate launch keys simultaneously.
• To prevent a rogue launch, multiple LCCs must concur—a minimum of two separate LCCs must issue the launch command for any missile to fire.

Once initiated, the launch sequence is automatic and cannot be recalled.

Submarines (Ohio-class SSBNs)

Ballistic missile submarines receive EAMs via Very Low Frequency (VLF) radio or satellite communication. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer authenticate the order independently. Upon confirmation:

• Missile tubes are readied.
• The crew inputs targeting and unlock codes.
• Multiple safety and procedural checks are followed before launching missiles from beneath the ocean’s surface.

Unlike ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) can be maneuverer and fired with higher flexibility, increasing survivability and second-strike capability.

Strategic Bombers (B-2, B-52)

Bomber crews may be airborne or scramble after receiving a launch alert. They carry nuclear gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles.

• Orders are authenticated in-flight using similar EAM procedures.
• Bombers can be recalled until final release commands are given—providing an important degree of flexibility and human judgment.

6. Safeguards and Redundancy

The nuclear command and control system is built with multiple layers of safety and redundancy, including:

• Two-Person Rule: No single individual may act alone to launch a weapon at any point in the process.
• Permissive Action Links (PALs): Electronic locks on nuclear warheads that require valid codes to activate.
• Satellite and Land-Based Redundancy: Multiple communication methods exist to ensure survivability and continuity in case of attack.
• Alternate Command Posts: In the event that NMCC or StratCom is destroyed or unreachable, other command centres can carry out orders.

7. Timeline: Speed and Irreversibility

A full nuclear launch order can be executed in 5 to 15 minutes under high-alert conditions. The system is built for maximum speed, particularly in a first-strike or retaliatory scenario.

For ICBMs:

• Authentication and launch can occur within 10 minutes.
• Missiles reach targets across the globe in 20–30 minutes, depending on distance.

For SLBMs:

• Launches can be initiated minutes after order receipt.
• Targets can be hit with minimal warning due to forward deployment.

8. Legal and Ethical Considerations

While the President holds unilateral authority, legal scholars continue to debate the constitutional limits of that power. An order to launch must be lawful under the Law of Armed Conflict—proportional, discriminate, and militarily necessary. Some military officials have said they would refuse an illegal order, but such situations are unprecedented and murky.

9. Final Thoughts: A System Built on Trust and Control

The U.S. nuclear launch system is designed to respond to unthinkable scenarios with control, speed, and certainty. But it is also built on human judgement—on the decisions of the President, the professionalism of commanders, and the discipline of military operators.

In the atomic age, knowledge of how these systems work is not just strategic—it’s essential. As international tensions evolve and technological threats grow, understanding the mechanisms behind nuclear command and control helps inform the public, guide policy, and maintain accountability in the most dangerous moments humanity may ever face.