The DEFCON Warning System™

Ongoing GeoIntel and Analysis in the theater of nuclear war.  DEFCON Level assessment issued for public notification.  Established 1984.

Risk Analysis Methods for Nuclear War and Nuclear Terrorism (2023)

Pre-Publication copy. Subject to revision.

The assessment of risk is complex and often controversial. It is derived from the existence of a
hazard, and it is characterized by the uncertainty of possible undesirable events and their outcomes. Few
outcomes are as undesirable as nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. Over the decades, much has been
written about particular situations, policies, and weapons that might affect the risks of nuclear war and
nuclear terrorism. The nature of the concerns and the risk analysis methods used to evaluate them have
evolved considerably over time.

In recognition of the risks that both nuclear war and nuclear terrorism pose, the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to contract with the
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to undertake a study to explore the nature of
risk analysis methods and their use in assessing nuclear war and nuclear terrorism risks.
This report represents the first phase of the study, which discusses risks, explores the risk
assessment literature, highlights the strengths and weaknesses of risk assessment approaches,1 and
discusses some publicly available assumptions that underpin U.S. security strategies, all in the context of
nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. The second phase of the study will expand the focus to include an
analysis of the role that the assumptions and methods in risk analysis may play in U.S. security strategy.
Phase II of the study will produce a classified report and an unclassified summary. Table S-1 details the
committee’s work.

It is important to note that the study does not include performing a risk analysis in either phase of
its work. This report will also not address current geopolitical events, such as Russia’s 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, although these events illustrate the importance of understanding nuclear risks during
international conflicts.

The U.S. government and international community have invested significant resources and time
in trying to understand and reduce the risks of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. The current commander
of U.S. Strategic Command, as well as campaigners for nuclear disarmament, have asserted that the risks
of nuclear war remains very real. Similar statements have been made about the risks of nuclear and
radiological terrorism. Moreover, the risks are becoming more complex as new technologies and new
adversaries arise.

To identify the threats and consequences associated with nuclear terrorism and nuclear war, an
analyst would confront numerous challenges while conducting a risk analysis of nuclear war or nuclear
terrorism. The committee identified seven classes of scenarios that might lead to nuclear war: preventive,
preemptive, escalatory, catalytic, accidental, unauthorized, and misinformed. The committee also
identified three classes of scenarios that might lead to nuclear terrorism: improvised nuclear device,
radiological dispersal device or radiological exposure device, and sabotage of a nuclear facility. These
classes of scenarios are not mutually exclusive as other interactions among categories could also occur,
such as between accidental and misinformed scenarios. These dependencies have to be reflected in any
assessment of the risks. The classes of scenarios identified by the committee are used here as examples
and are not collectively exhaustive; however, an analyst will have to include all classes of scenarios that
they can envision so that the risk results are not underestimated. Estimates of the immediate physical
consequences from the use of nuclear weapons have relied on mathematical models based on nuclear
physics, past experience, nuclear test data, and other available information. Much is known about some of
the physical effects of nuclear weapons (such as immediate estimates of injuries and deaths), though some
effects (such as fires, damage in modern urban environments, electromagnetic pulse effects, and climatic
effects such as nuclear winter) are not yet well known or difficult to quantify (Frankel et al. 2015).

Methods for assessing societal, psychological, and longer-term effects of the use of nuclear weapons have
relied heavily on surrogate data for human behavior in response to other catastrophic events.2 Analyses
that use these methods typically contain large uncertainties and strong interdependencies.
The committee examined the history of risk assessments and analyses related to nuclear war and
nuclear terrorism, including an exploration of historical attempts to understand the risks of nuclear war
and nuclear terrorism, as well as the significant sources of uncertainties involved in assessing the overall
risks of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. Key insights from the historical literature are reflected
throughout this report, but a notable gap is the lack of knowledge about the less well-understood physical
effects of nuclear weapons, as well as the assessment and estimation of psychological, societal, and
political consequences of nuclear weapons use.

Risk information can be a crucial input for decision makers when making a variety of decisions,
including the identification of priorities, the development of new policies or procedures, and the
allocation of resources or time. In both natural and engineered systems, especially when statistical data
are available and reliable, risk analysis based on frequencies in samples of events can readily produce
estimates of future risks. As noted in previous National Academies studies, however, the application of
traditional risk methodologies for nuclear war and nuclear terrorism—with limited direct evidence; great
uncertainties in contexts; and intelligent, adaptive adversaries (NASEM 2016; National Research Council
2008, 2011)—represents a significant challenge. Among many assumptions, assessments of risks in such
contexts have to account for the intentions and interests of the actors, their capabilities, the information
and intelligence available to them, and their adaptive responses—all of which may be difficult to assess.
The committee considered risk to refer to four key questions:

  1. What can happen? Specifically, what can go wrong?
  2. How likely is it that these events will happen?
  3. If these events happen, what are the potential consequences?
  4. What is the time horizon in which these events might happen?

Risk analysis can be a powerful tool for clarifying assumptions; structuring and systematizing
thinking about complex, interrelated factors; describing uncertainties; and identifying what further
evidence or information might be needed to inform the decisions to be made. However, using risk
analysis methods to assess the overall risks of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism is difficult for several
reasons.

In addition to the specific conclusions detailed in the body of this report (and listed in Chapter 8),
the committee reached three overall conclusions.

  1. Past examples of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism are rare. As such, there is little direct evidence that can be relied on to make empirical estimates about the probability of either

Analysts attempt to describe the resulting uncertainties by applying different methods and using multiple sources of information to supplement this limited body of evidence. Similarly, the historical record includes limited examples of attempts at nuclear or radiological terrorism, and analyses of the risks of nuclear terrorism often draw on these. The uncertainties introduced by limited direct evidence are compounded by the important role that human intentions, perceptions, and motivations play. The policy relevance of an overall risk analysis is unclear, given the significant uncertainties involved and the different possible risk attitudes of the decision makers.

While much is known about the physical consequences of nuclear and radiological weapons, the indirect consequences are not as well understood. This includes the social, economic, political,infrastructure, climate, and psychological effects, which are affected by the immediate physical effects of these weapons.

The dynamic interactions among these factors are complex, and methods of analysis for them are less developed. The minimal direct evidence about these effects represents a challenge for assessing the consequences of nuclear weapons used by a state or a terrorist. Even the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki offer only limited information about the likelihood and consequences of conflicts involving modern nuclear weapons.

Information elicited from experts is often all that is available for assessing some of the risks associated with nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. Analysts and decision makers need to be aware of the sources of that information, of the biases and limitations that the experts could introduce in the analysis,and of the resulting effects of this information on the risk results. Best practices for expert elicitation can be adapted from other risk analysis disciplines, although some aspects of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism may pose challenges for the adequate application of these methods.

  1. The scenarios that might lead to nuclear war and nuclear terrorism are numerous and
    involve many interdependent factors, and the assessment of their risks often depend on the capabilities, values, perceptions, and intentions of many experts and actors

The risks of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism depends in part on the effectiveness of deterrence,
which reflects the capabilities, beliefs, motivations, intentions, anticipation strategies, and information
available to all parties involved. The unavailability and inaccuracy of information in the throes of a crisis
can potentially increase the risks faced by both aggressors and defenders. The risks of nuclear war and
nuclear terrorism scenarios varies in terms of the justification or initiating reason by states or actors
involved, the type and number of weapons used, and the target(s), among many other highly
interdependent factors. Because there are a large number of scenario possibilities, they are often grouped
together and analyzed as classes of scenarios that share some key common factors.

Assessing the overall risks of nuclear war and nuclear terrorism involves great uncertainties about
the likelihood and consequences of different scenarios. The assessment and communications of these
uncertainties are critical for policy decisions essential to managing these risks. However, the value of risk
analysis is not solely in assessing the overall risks. Risk analysis can provide valuable input on many

smaller-scale problems related to nuclear war and nuclear terrorism. Many analyses are intended to
determine the relative or comparative risks of classes of scenarios (e.g., the risk of sabotage of a nuclear
facility compared with the risk of a radiological exposure device; or the determination of the risk
reductions associated with different investments or design changes) or to address specific questions
confronting decision makers such as: What is the reliability of a particular country’s nuclear stockpile?
What is the probability that a particular model of detector at an automobile border crossing will detect a
specific level of radiation? Which nuclear facilities should be inspected and how often? For risk
management problems that involve significant uncertainties and a need to make resource-constrained
decisions, assessing the risk variations associated with different options can help inform decision making.

Analysts inevitably make assumptions in risk analysis, including assumptions about the definition
and the framing of the risk problem; which models can be used effectively; the reliability of data; and the
capabilities, intent, and potential actions of adversaries. Strategic assumptions can help define the
boundaries of a risk problem. Some strategic assumptions address the nature or magnitude of risks, the
effect of risk drivers, whether policies or actions increase or decrease the risks, the nature and the variety
of threats that confront the United States, and the most likely scenarios. Strategic assumptions also
include risks of nuclear wars outside the borders of the United States.

  1. Different risk assessment methods are more or less suited to different situations and goals

The committee identified the following methods relevant to analyzing these risks and considered
the applicability and limitations of those methods:

  • First-strike stability analyses compare the advantages to both sides of striking first in a crisis in which nuclear war appears imminent.
  • Probabilistic risk assessment can explore interactions between adaptive adversaries, though extracting qualitative values from quantitative outputs may obscure some of the nuanced results.
  • Order-of-magnitude estimates set extreme bounds on the probability of a nuclear incident, which can then be incrementally narrowed.
  • Game theory can be used to model potential moves and their outcomes between intelligent adversaries based on information about their preferences and capabilities.
  • Adversarial risk analysis can be used to evaluate possible choices of an intelligent adversary or small number of adversaries.
  • Agent-based models can estimate behaviors of individuals given defined rules and uncertainties.
  • Multi-attribute models assess the different elements (attributes) of the outcomes of different scenarios, according to defined and weighted criteria among the different attributes of the decision makers’ preferences.
  • Network models use network analysis to explore multiple alternatives at nodes representing key events and scenarios in the path from start to end.
  • Nuclear and conventional force exchange models can help assess deterrence by quantifying the outcomes of potential nuclear or conventional attacks.

Just as the structure, parameters, and assumptions in a risk analysis may color the results of a risk
analysis, the ways that risk information is assessed, framed, or presented has a powerful effect on how
that information is understood and used in decisions. Risk analysis results are most valuable when the
methods and assumptions by which they were generated is clear, the process is replicable, trust in the
analytical process is established, and the results address the real questions or decisions that the decision
makers are facing.

Risk information may be a valuable input to decision making, but it does not and cannot dictate
decisions, which also depend on preferences and risk attitudes. Other considerations beyond risk need to

be taken into account, such as legal, political, or budgetary consequences and constraints. Emerging
technologies, such as new weapons systems and advances with artificial intelligence, are quickly
changing the risk and deterrence landscape. The U.S. nuclear posture has evolved over time, taking into
account new threats, developing deterrence strategies involving different U.S. adversaries, technological
advancements, nuclear arms treaties, and changing geopolitical environments. U.S. assessments of the
risks of nuclear terrorism have likewise evolved over time, taking into account new threats and emerging
technologies.

As the context in which decisions about nuclear war and nuclear terrorism are made continues to
evolve, risk assessment will continue to be a valuable tool for analysts and decision makers.

Read full document at National Academies Press

Ongoing Geointel and Analysis in the theater of nuclear war.

Opportunity

© 2024 The DEFCON Warning System. Established 1984.

The DEFCON Warning System is a private intelligence organization which has monitored and assessed nuclear threats by national entities since 1984. It is not affiliated with any government agency and does not represent the alert status of any military branch. The public should make their own evaluations and not rely on the DEFCON Warning System for any strategic planning. At all times, citizens are urged to learn what steps to take in the event of a nuclear attack.